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BIOPIRACY AND BEYOND: A CONSIDERATION OF
SOCIO-CULTURAL CONFLICTS WITH GLOBAL
PATENT POLICIES
Cynthia M. Ho*
This Article provides afresh and multi-dimensioned approach to a long-standing
claim of biopiracy patents made by developing countries and communities. The
basic principles of patent law and policy are first established to provide afounda-
tion from which to evaluate the claim that genetic resources and traditional
knowledge from developing countries are being misappropriated in a variety of
ways that are loosely referred to as biopiracy. The Article distinguishes rhetoric
from reality in examining biopiracy allegations from the perspective of national
patent laws, as well as international agreements. In addition, the Article explains
the underlying conflicts, misconceptions, and historical biases that have predis-
posed some to biopiracy claims. Similarly, the Article presents a new perspective on
how the present landscape of international agreements, as well as negotiation
stances, has failed to lead to satisfactory resolution of biopiracy claims despite
years of heated discussion within major international forums, including the
World Trade Organization, the United Nations, and the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity.
In addition to explaining the dynamics behind the current stalemate, this Article
provides a template for moving forward. As a first step, the Article advocates that
the piracy lingo be jettisoned and that substantive discussion instead focus on is-
sues that have mutual appeal to all countries. Drawing upon past success of issue-
framing in the context of the access to medicine debate, this Article proposes new
foci that nations might universally agree on. For example, this Article suggests a
novel linkage between biopiracy patents and more general problems within Western
patent law to help focus on issues of interest to all nations. In addition the Article
proposes a new internet-based process for promoting meaningFul dialogue that will
likely be more effective than current proposals because it avoids previous intransi-
gent issues. This final proposal has broad application to many issues at the
intersection of patent law and social policy, ranging from the proper scope of pat-
entable subject matter, to the scope of exceptions from patent liability.
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INTRODUCTION
Piracy is a central theme running through the international dis-
course on patent rights. The concept was utilized as a rationale for
including intellectual property rights within a global trade agree-
ment; in particular, the United States asserted that it was losing
millions of dollars a year because of global piracy of copyrighted
and patented works.' One major response to these piracy claims
was the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), along
with the adoption of the landmark Trade-Related Agreement on
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which established minimum
levels of intellectual property standards for all member states.2
However, these developments did not mark the end of global pat-
ent policy disputes or piracy rhetoric.
A decade after the creation of the WTO and minimum intellec-
tual property rights, piracy continues to be a compelling theme,
but the term is being used by parties with divergent interests. In
3particular, the United States and European "Western" countries
have enacted a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements
based upon the premise that higher levels of protection are neces-
sary to combat global piracy.4 On the other hand, many developing
1. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REc. 10, 291 (1986) (statement of Senator Wilson) ("In the
area of intellectual property protection, plainly stated, criminals around the world are cost-
ing American companies billions of dollars by... expropriating patents and process patents,
developed at great expense by U.S. companies, to make bootleg pharmaceuticals and
chemicals."); Bus. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY: TRENDS IN
SoFrwARE PIRACY 4, 9 (2003); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INDUS. COMPETITIVENESS, GLOBAL
COMPETITION: THE NEW REALITY 52-53 (1985) (concluding that the strengthening of intel-
lectual property fights via international implementation of an anti-counterfeiting code
should be national policy). The United States' position was a result of organized efforts from
major industries including pharmaceutical, entertainment and software companies. See gen-
erally SUSAN SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW 39-55 (2003).
2. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1143, 1197-1223
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement].
3. The term "Western" here refers to developed countries that predominantly favor
patent rights, such as the United States, Japan, and the European Union member-states. In
addition, it would be synonymous with references to countries of the "North" (primarily
industrialized countries in the northern hemisphere) as opposed to countries of the "South"
(economically poorer, but biologically richer countries primarily from the southern hemi-
sphere).
4. E.g., Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The Work of the USTR-Intellectual
Property (July 8, 2004), http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Sectors/Intellectual Property/The
Work_of USTR_--IntellectualProperty.html (noting that bilateral initiatives are one of the
tools used by the USTR to combat "piracy" in other countries).
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countries5 have argued that these Western countries engage in
their own piracy-"biopiracy"-by taking genetic resources and
associated traditional knowledge6 from biodiverse developing
countries without permission,7 then patenting related inventions,
but failing to share any of the resulting commercial profits. 8 The
process of obtaining private rights over products derived from
third world resources or knowledge that is considered sacred or
beyond private ownership is considered to be morally offensive to
many citizens of developing countries, as well as those with sympa-
thetic interests in other countries.9 Moreover, many of these
citizens view Western countries and companies with great suspicion
since usurpation of resources harks back to colonial imperialism.' °
5. The term "developing countries" is used broadly here to also include indigenous
groups and nongovernmental organizations with the same interest in protecting biodiversity.
However, biopiracy is sometimes an issue only for indigenous populations within a country.
See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] & the International Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Development [ICTSD], Protecting Traditional Knowledge and Folklore: A
Review of Progress in Diplomacy and Policy Formulation, at 17 (Oct. 2002) (prepared by
Graham Dutfield), available at http://www.iucn.org/themes/pbia/themes/trade/training/
Protecting%20TK%20and%2OFolklore.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD & ICTSD, Protecting Tradi-
tional Knowledge and Folklore] (noting that some countries, such as India, see the nation itself
as a "victim of biopiracy," whereas for "New World countries" established by European set-
ters, the issue is localized to smaller communities outside of the mainstream culture).
6. Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 8(j),June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [here-
inafter CBD] (calling for the respect, preservation, and maintenance of the knowledge,
innovations, and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional life-
styles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity); WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG. [WIPO], INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF TRA-
DITIONAL KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS 25 (2000) (defining "traditional knowledge" broadly to
include tradition-based innovation and creations transmitted orally between generations,
typically unique to a given region and constantly evolving in response to a changing envi-
ronment, including agricultural or scientific knowledge, medicinal knowledge). In addition,
the term often refers to both scientific and literary works, although "traditional knowledge"
will be used here only to refer to scientific knowledge. Id. Traditional knowledge is some-
times used synonymously with indigenous knowledge. See, e.g., Padmashree Gehl Sampath,
Intellectual Property Rights on Traditional Medicinal Knowledge: A Process-Oriented Perspective, 7 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 711, 714 (2004).
7. Some advocates of bioprospecting, including corporations that use these methods
and academic researchers, assert that the process need not be exploitative. See, e.g., SANTI-
AGO CARRIZOSA, Introduction to ACCESSING BIODIVERSITY AND SHARING THE BENEFITS:
LESSONS FROM IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 3, 4 (Santiago
Carrizosa et al. eds., 2004) (noting that despite controversy concerning patenting genetic
material and claims of biopiracy, bioprospecting can yield benefits to both developed coun-
tries, as well as those from biodiverse countries); WALTER V. REID ET AL., A New Lease on Life,
in BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING: USING GENETIC RESOURCES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
1, 1 (1993) ("[B]iodiversity prospecting [is] the exploration of biodiversity for commercially
valuable genetic and biochemical resources.").
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. See infra Part II.A.3.
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Developing countries are calling for immediate international
resolution of the biopiracy problem through amendment of TRIPS
as well as pending amendments to existing, or proposed interna-
tional agreements." The proposed amendments require patent
grants to be conditioned upon compliance with the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD) .2 Western countries concede that pro-
tecting genetic resources and traditional knowledge is important,
but have opposed such efforts. Even though Western countries ac-
knowledge that some allegations of biopiracy reflect improperly
granted patents, they suggest that the present system adequately
addresses such patents through existing correction mechanisms,
such that amendments are unnecessary.13
Is biopiracy a real issue and if so, is it important? Developing
countries believe that this is a real issue, as reflected by years of ad-
vocacy among multiple international forums, including the WTO,
the CBD and the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO). 14 In addition, the issue has also attracted the attention of
policy-makers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 5  and
11. See infra Part II.
12. See supra notes 172-179 and accompanying text. Additionally, the United Nations'
greater recognition of indigenous communities and their respective human rights, includ-
ing rights to maintain their traditional culture and knowledge, also suggests that continued
use of biological materials may be considered an affront to the human rights of indigenous
peoples. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion & Prot. Of Minorities, Commission on Human Rights, Draft United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (Oct. 28, 1994) [hereinaf-
ter ECOSOC Draft Declaration].
13. See infra Part 111.
14. See infra Parts I.B, II.B, III; see also Graham Dutfield, Bioprospecting: Legitimate Re-
search or 'Biopiraty?, Sci. & D~v. NETWORK POL'Y BRIEFS, at 1 (Oct. 2001, rev. Dec. 2002),
available at http://www.scidev.net/dossiers/index.cfm?fuseaction=policybrief&dossier-8&
policy-40 (noting that "bioprospecting" is of recent vintage linguistically, but a "centuries-
old" practice).
15. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 82-104 (2002), available at
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final-report.htrn [hereinafter COM-
MISSION ON IPRs]; Robert Lettington & Kent Nnadozie, A Review of the Intergovernmental
Committee on Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore at WIPO, in TRADE-RELATED
AGENDA, DEVELOPMENT AND EQUITY OCCASIONAL PAPERS, (No. 12, Dec. 2003) (providing
background concerning the utility of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, includ-
ing the possibility of misappropriation of resources, as well as international discussions of
how to prevent such misappropriation under existing or proposed legal frameworks, as one
of a series of papers from NGOs with an interest in aiding developing countries); Manuel
Ruiz, The International Debate on Traditional Knowledge as Prior Art in the Patent System: Issues and
Options for Developing Countries, in TRADE-RELATED AGENDA, DEVELOPMENT AND EQUITY OC-
CASIONAL PAPERS, (No. 9, Oct. 2002) (providing analysis of possible solutions to address
biopiracy under patent law as part of a project for NGOs South Centre and the Center for
International Environment Law). See generally WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE AND THE
CENTER FOR INT'L ENVTL. LAW, BIODIVERSITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
SPRING 2006]
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academics."' Western countries, on the other hand, typically dismiss
claims as misunderstandings of patent rights and policies that op-
erate to the benefit of all countries. 7 However, such a simplistic
dismissal does not explain concerted efforts of Western countries
in silencing discussion within international forums, including re-
cent efforts to entirely exclude the issue from discussion in a
pending global patent treaty.18
Biopiracy is indeed a very real problem for developing countries,
although not one that they can address on their own.' 9 For exam-
ple, although the European Patent Office revoked a patent on a
derivative of a neem tree in March 2005 in response to allegations
of biopiracy, the final decision was only reached a decade after ini-
REVIEWING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CONVEN-
TION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (2001).
16. In addition to a plethora of articles discussing biopiracy, academic conferences
have been devoted to biopiracy-related issues, such as the protection of traditional knowl-
edge. See, e.g., Symposium, Traditional Knowledge, Intellectual Property, And Indigenous Culture,
11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 239 (2003); Symposium, The Law and Policy of Protecting
Folklore, Traditional Knowledge, and Genetic Resources, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 753 (2002); Conference, Biodiversity and Biotechnology and the Protection of Traditional
Knowledge (Washington University in St. Louis, School of Law, Center for Interdisciplinary
Studies, April 4-6 2003), http://law.wustl.edu/centeris/Confpapers/index.html.
17. See infra Part I.A.
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. The international discussion should speak for itself in terms of broad recognition
of the problem of biopiracy. However, some have suggested that biopiracy is not a concern
because pharmaceutical companies no longer engage in activities that result in biopiracy, or
because so few drugs ever become commercialized there is no substantial compensation at
issue and, hence, no need for discussion. See, e.g., Susan Kling Finston, The Relevance of Ge-
netic Resources to the Pharmaceutical Industry, 8 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 141, 143-44, 151
(2005) (suggesting that biopiracy assertions overstate the problem as well as the likelihood
that a blockbuster drug could result from biodiverse resources and ultimately concluding
that developing countries need more intellectual property rights to exploit the potential of
natural products by analogizing to the United States' situation with Bayh-Dole, but without
considering cultural and spiritual issues attendant to the biopiracy problem); Sally Satel,
Diminishing Biodiverse Returns, TCS DAILY, Feb. 16, 2003, http://www.tcsdaily.com/
article.aspx?id=0216051 (noting that bioprospecting constitutes a "small and shrinking"
percentage of the portfolio of major drug companies, with little prospect for eventual suc-
cess). But see Carrizosa, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that although pharmaceutical companies
such as Merck reduced their natural products discovery programs in 2002 and 2003, the
economic value in genetic resources actually may have increased due to new technologies
such as high-throughput screening, bioinformatics and genomics). Moreover, even if com-
panies are no longer collecting natural products, it does not mean that they are not
continuing to use products previously collected before there was a concern about impropri-
ety and before CBD was effective. See CBD, supra note 6, at art. 15 (specifying that agreement
only applies to material "acquired ... in accordance with this Convention"); see also W.
LESSER, SUSTAINABLE USE OF GENETIC RESOURCES UNDER THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY: EXPLORING ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING ISSUES 13-14 (1998) (noting that the
national sovereignty aspect of CBD is presumed to apply only to activities occurring after the
entry into force in December 1993).
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tiation of the correction process.20 Just two weeks after this deci-
sion, the European Patent Office (EPO) agreed to work towards
thwarting biopiracy based upon traditional Indian medical knowl-
edge through a new database to be provided by the Indian
technology ministry under a non-disclosure agreement.
2
'
Although the EPO action reflects some Western recognition of
the need to address biopiracy allegations, it fails as a comprehen-
sive solution. The EPO does not issue all patents and many of the
patents alleged to result from biopiracy are issued by the United
States.2 Indeed, in the case of the neem tree patents, the decision
to revoke the single EPO patent has no impact on the dozens of
other related patents that continue in force in Europe, as well as a
nearly identical patent that is considered valid in the United States
because of differing patent laws.
23
The biopiracy problem is an important issue for all countries
because of its broader international implications. The conflict that
exists between promoting patent rights versus protecting tradi-
tional knowledge challenges Western assumptions about the
appropriateness of patents and also demonstrates the problems
that arise based upon misunderstandings and disagreements about
Western patent law. Such misunderstandings are not unique to
biopiracy, and, as addressed in the final section of the Article, can
be more effectively resolved. In addition, the biopiracy problem
illustrates that the present landscape of international laws impedes
resolution of the issue by promoting patent rights over other social
and cultural norms, such as biodiversity and human rights. In par-
ticular, this Article argues that because TRIPS provides
substantially more effective enforcement measures than those
20. See, e.g., LINDA BULLARD, RESEARCH FOUNDATION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
ECOLOGY, FREEING THE FREE TREE: A BRIEFING PAPER ON THE FIRST LEGAL DEFEAT OF A
BIOPIRACY PATENT: THE NEEM CASE (2005), available at http://www.ifoam.org/press/press/
pdfs/BriefingNeem.pdf. This decision, essentially affirming a lower court's ruling in 2000,
was made following a ten-year battle. For additional information on the earlier decision, see,
e.g., U. Hellerer & KS. Jarayaman, Greens Persuade Europe to Revoke Patent on Neem Tree, 405
NATURE 266, 266-67 (2000); Press Release, European Patent Office, "Neem tree oil" Case:
European Patent No. 0436 257 Revoked (May 10, 2000), http://www.european-patent-
office.org/news/pressrel/2000_05-1 1-e.htm.
21. See, e.g., Gireesh Chandra Prasad, EU to Protect India's Traditional Knowledge, ECON.
TIMES ONLINE, May 16, 2005, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articlesbow/
1111159.cms.
22. See infra Parts I.A, III.
23. See infra Part I.A. Every patent is presumed valid when issued. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C.
§ 282 (2000). Moreover, even within each patent, individual claims (which define the pat-
ented invention) are considered independent of each other such that invalidity of any one
claim does not impact other claims. As a broader analogy, resolution of the validity of a sin-
gle patent only affects that patent and not related ones in the same way that claim
preclusion only addresses the identical claim if relitigated. Id.
SPRING 2006]
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available to protect either CBD norms of biodiversity or interna-
tional human rights, it de facto trumps other agreements and
hence other social values. This is an important issue not only for
biopiracy, but also for all international issues that may intersect
with TRIPS. Similarly, this Article analyzes present proposals to
amend TRIPS to address biopiracy. This analysis illustrates TRIPS's
dominance in the international arena, as well as the present diffi-
culties of challenging it.
Biopiracy allegations are also important because of what they re-
veal about the Western patent law upon which TRIPS is based. In
particular, whereas there is already a rich discourse concerning the
need to balance patent rights against public health, that argument
is inherently different from balancing moral issues arising from
biopiracy. 4 In the public health context, there is typically consen-
sus that patents promote research on drugs that, in fact, provide
direct health benefits.25 Biopiracy patents, on the other hand, may
be contrary to the desire of indigenous communities to keep cer-
tain information sacred. 6  Moreover, national sovereignty is
implicated in biopiracy allegations in a manner different than the
typical health care conflict. In particular, although most nations
24. In the context of access to medicine, there has been widespread criticism of the
degree to which TRIPS impinges on domestic abilities to provide low cost medication. See,
e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WHO Health, Econ. & Drugs EDM Series No. 12, WHO/EDM/PAR/2002.3 (2002),
available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int.hq/2002_edu.par_2002.3.pdf (discussing the impact
of the Doha Public Health Declaration with particular emphasis on addressing the concerns
of countries with insufficient capacity to utilize compulsory licensing as a mechanism for
protecting public health); James Thuo Gathii, Rights, Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS
Pandemic, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 261 (2002); Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and
Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27 (2002) (pro-
viding an overview of the changing perspective on access to medicine being adversely
impacted by patented drugs); see also WHO, Globalization and Access to Drugs: Perspectives on the
WI'O/TRIPS Agreement, Health, Econ. & Drugs DAP Series No. 7, WHO/DAP/98.9 Revised
(1999) (providing an early overview of the implications of TRIPS on public health and ac-
cess to drugs).
25. Of course, even if patents promote the development of drugs that benefit the gen-
eral public, patents alone may not promote innovation to address diseases of third world
countries, for which profits on patented drugs would be minimal. See, e.g., ECOSOC,
Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on TRIPS on Human Rights, at 12, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001) (noting that patent incentives inherently lead
researchers "away from unprofitable diseases, such as those that predominantly affect peo-
ple in poorer countries"); Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global
Healthcare R&D, 2 PLOs BIOLOGY 147 (2004) (noting the low rate of patents and research in
third world diseases and suggesting an alternative mechanism to promote innovation). In
addition, there is also a similarity here between public health and biopiracy--in both in-
stances a patent may provide a medical treatment, but in both instances, the patent
incentive may only promote treatment for Western nations.
26. See infra Part IA
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would prefer to decide their own balance of patent rights and ex-
ceptions in the interest of public health, the balance is just that-
typically an acceptance that some patent rights are permissible and
even desirable. However, in the biopiracy context, some believe
that patent rights, regardless of limiting exceptions, are inherently
irreconcilable with protecting genetic resources and traditional
knowledge.27
Ultimately, this Article provides new templates for addressing
both the immediate biopiracy problem, as well as the broader issue
of balancing patent rights and social policy in Western countries.
This Article rejects prior attempts to provide a single "magic bul-
let" to address biopiracy. As reflected in the protracted, yet
unfruitful discussion of biopiracy, the problem is a complex one
that is unlikely to be solved by a single solution. Moreover, prior
proposals have failed, in part, for presenting biopiracy as a unique
issue that had no easy analog to existing Western issues.
This Article provides a multi-faceted approach to the nuanced
biopiracy problem. As an initial step, the piracy lingo is jettisoned
in favor of national sovereignty, which is a universally understood
concept. In addition, this Article advocates that current biopiracy
problems be considered concurrently with existing proposals to
reform Western patent law and policy. These proposals provide a
convenient vehicle to facilitate realistic consideration of patent law
and policy. Moreover, such an approach can have a broad impact
as Western patent laws have been used as a template for patent laws
imposed on countries worldwide through TRIPS and other inter-
national agreements. This Article also provides a new method for
addressing patent policy problems effective not only for biopiracy
patents, but any controversial patents. These approaches are not
intended to be exclusive of other proposals to address biopiracy.2
Part I of this Article begins with some historical background on
the evolution of biopiracy as a concept, as well as the parallel nego-
tiation and implementation of TRIPS and the CBD. Part II then
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. See infta Part III.
29. The proposal suggested in this Article is offered as one way to address this aspect of
biopiracy without prejudicing additional solutions to protect traditional knowledge. In par-
ticular, proposals to protect traditional knowledge with sui generis protection, or new
methods of access and benefit sharing, are beyond the scope of this Article. However, read-
ers interested in specific and dramatic proposals addressing biopiracy will find plenty of
pertinent documents. See, e.g., Peter Drahos, Indigenous Knowledge, Intellectual Property and
Biopiracy: Is a Global Bio-Collecting Society the Answer?, 6 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 245 (2000);
Craig D. Jacoby & Charles Weiss, Recognizing Property Rights in Traditional Biocultural Contribu-
tions, 16 STAN. ENV. L.J. 74 (1997); Thomas J. Krumenacher, Note, Protection for Indigenous
People and Their Traditional Knowledge: Would a Registry System Reduce the Misappropriation of
Traditional Knowledge?, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 143 (2004).
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provides a detailed analysis of issues that underlie the present im-
passe. Part A explains the instrumentalist perspective of patent
policy, as well as how that perspective clashes with protection of
traditional knowledge and genetic resources of indigenous com-
munities. Part B then gives an overview of the relevant
international agreements relating to the biopiracy issue, focusing
primarily on TRIPS and the CBD, with the ultimate goal of show-
ing that TRIPS reinforces and elevates patent rights over social
norms in competing international agreements that embrace and
advocate protection of traditional knowledge, because of the ease
of enforceability of the TRIPS provisions.
Part III focuses on the present proposals to amend TRIPS and
presents fundamental flaws in their conception. In doing so, this
Part illustrates that the dominance of TRIPS has negatively im-
pacted resolution of biopiracy because its powerful enforcement
provisions entice developing countries to propose amendments to
TRIPS. A major problem is that TRIPS currently reflects the pre-
ferred norms of Western countries behind its creation, such that
any proposed changes are likely to fail. In addition, in the unlikely
situation of TRIPS amendments to address biopiracy, such
amendments might nonetheless be futile because Western coun-
tries are utilizing other forums to negotiate increased levels of
patent protection that might overshadow TRIPS.
Part IV provides specific strategies to promote productive discus-
sion of the underlying issues behind the current biopiracy rhetoric
and also provides a template for addressing the broader problem
of socio-cultural conflicts with patent law and policies. Most impor-
tantly, this Part suggests abandoning the "piracy" term in favor of a
focus on national and community sovereignty while refocusing
patent law and policy on issues of overlapping concern between
biopiracy allegations and the protection of traditional knowledge.
For example, current controversies over whether certain patented
inventions are unethical, such as those on gene patents, stem cells,
and human cloning, raise similar issues to developing country
claims of commodification of life forms. This Part concludes with
an innovative method for addressing patent policies that should
help to improve understanding and potentially effectuate neces-
sary change.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Patent Law and Policy versus Genetic Resources
and Traditional Knowledge
1. Patent Law and Policy-Patents serve an instrumental and
• • 30
utilitarian goal of fostering the development of new innovation.
As noted by the United States Supreme Court, the patent system
reflects a "carefully crafted bargain" that encourages innovation
and promotes increased knowledge by providing an incentive to
risk time, research, and development costs. 31 The patent incentive
exists because it provides exclusivity that may result in a commer-
cial advantage in the marketplace. In particular, a patent provides
its owner with the right to exclude others from making, using, sell-
ing, offering to sell, or importing the patented invention within the
territory of the granting nation. 32 This exclusivity is considered es-
sential to "stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further
... advances.''3 In addition, the exclusivity is considered to en-
courage inventors to disclose inventions through the patent system,
rather than maintain them as trade secrets in perpetuity. Inven-
tions kept as trade secrets are less valuable to the public since
patents are public documents that disclose the invention such that
subsequent inventors can understand and build upon the innova-
tion.
Although a patent provides a measure of exclusivity, that exclu-
sivity is not absolute. A patent only provides its owner with the right
30. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. 303 (1980); Moore v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). In the United States, the instrumentalist purpose
dates back to the Constitutional clause animating federal patent law, which provides Con-
gress the right to promote progress by grants of limited exclusivity to inventors. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (providing that Congress may "promote the progress of science and useful
arts").
31. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989)
(noting that the federal patent system reflects a "carefully crafted bargain" that encourages
innovation and promotes increased knowledge); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (noting that patents provide an incentive to risk time, research,
and development, as well as a reward for disclosure of an invention).
32. See, e.g., TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 28; 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a)
(2000).
33. Bicron, 416 U.S. at 481. See also Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573,
1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that the "the express purpose of the Constitution and
Congress, to promote the progress of the useful arts, would be seriously undermined" with-
out the right to exclude); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (noting that the right to exclude is essential to patent rights since the Patent Act
specifies that patents are a form of property and the right to exclude is the essence of prop-
erty rights).
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to exclude others from the patented invention; it is not an affirma-
tive right to use the invention.34 In particular, there may be
regulations that prohibit or limit the use of the patented invention.
A typical example exists in the area of patented drugs, which may
not be sold in the commercial marketplace before approval by the
Food and Drug Administration. 3 In addition, the exclusivity pro-
vided by a patent is limited to the territory in which the patent is
granted. For example, a patent granted in the United States enti-
tles its patent owner to exclude all others from making the
patented invention in the United States, as well as from importing
the patented invention into the United States.36 However, a U.S.
patent would not prevent someone from making the identical in-
vention in Germany. On the other hand, if the patent owner had
applied and been granted a similar patent in Germany, the patent
owner would have such exclusionary rights in Germany.
A final important, but often misunderstood concept with respect
to patents is that the right to exclude is bound not only by territo-
rial restrictions, but also by the legal parameters of patents. In
particular, a patent allows exclusion of others only from the
"claimed invention," but not from all related subject matter. Claims
are the technical "metes and bounds" that describe the legally en-
forceable boundaries of a patent against others.37 Patents may more
generally describe a subject matter, but not have any legal implica-
tions outside of the claims. For example, a patent with claims on a
new method of baking a chocolate cake in a microwave oven would
have no legal implications for traditional methods of cake-baking
in conventional ovens. Moreover, claims are typically very detailed.
In the hypothetical cake example, claims would typically specify
temperature and time requirements, such that some cakes cooked
in microwave ovens would not be legally excluded by the patent
because of these important details. Although the cake example
seems simple, the fundamental concepts about the scope of patent
34. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (2000).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000). Furthermore, as another example, the patent owner
may actually need a license from another patent owner to use his invention. This typically
occurs for owners of patents that improve on other patents-while the second patent may be
commercially valuable in excluding others from the improvement, the owner of the patent
on the more fundamental invention (sometimes referred to as a pioneering patent) may still
have the right to exclude from a broader scope. See generaUy 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (pro-
viding that a patent owner has the right to exclude anyone who infringes the patent during
its term).
36. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (2000).
37. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (noting that patents must conclude with one or more
claims describing the invention); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (2000) (noting that a patent
owner has the right to exclude others from the patented invention).
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claims are critical to evaluating statements (and misstatements)
concerning patents that are based on traditional knowledge.
To obtain a patent, a formal application must be submitted to
the country where the patent is desired and the invention, as well
as the application, must satisfy certain requirements. First, the in-
vention must constitute patentable subject matter." Generally, laws
of nature and products in their natural state, such as trees or rocks,
are considered unpatentable discoveries." In addition, the inven-
tion must be new, nonobvious, and useful." The terms "new" and
"nonobvious" have special meaning in patent law that do not nec-
essarily reflect lay usage of the terms. In addition, these terms do
not have uniform definition in the global context. While some en-
tities, such as the United States and EU, consider material isolated
from living material, such as a derivative of a plant that does not
naturally occur in nature, or an isolated portion of a gene to satisfy
the definition of "new," developing countries predominantly objectto such .. 42,, ,
to such definitions. In addition, in determining what is new,
38. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); Convention on the Grant of European Patents
(European Patent Convention), art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268, 270, available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/ [hereinafter EPC]; see also TRIPS, Mar-
rakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27(1).
39. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1948). In addition, the Supreme Court has the oppor-
tunity to revisit and reaffirm this view in an upcoming case of Metabolite, for which it has
granted certiorari. Metabolite Lab., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed.
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005).
40. See, e.g., TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27(1).
41. For example, although lay persons often assume that something "obvious to try" is
unpatentable, the United States has expressly rejected this on grounds that it unduly pro-
motes hindsight speculation. Rather, the United States requires that there be some
suggestion or motivation to combine two or more references for something to be obvious.
See, e.g., In re Oetiker, 977 E2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992). This has been questioned by
academics and policy makers as imposing too high a standard for obviousness and thus al-
lowing patents on sub par innovations. See, e.g., Brief of Twenty-Four Intellectual Property
Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., peti-
tion for cert. filed (U.S. May 12, 2005) (No. 04-1350), 2005 WL 1334163; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & 11CH. L. REv. 363 (2000) (providing empirical evi-
dence indicating a decrease in the Federal Circuit patent invalidations on grounds of
obviousness and suggesting that the Federal Circuit test for obviousness is one of the
causes); Press Release, The Progress and Freedom Found., High Court Must Address Patent
Obviousness: Circuit Standard Flawed, PFF Fellows Argue in Brief (May 13, 2005), available
at http://www.pff.org/news/news/2005/051305ksramicus.htm. In addition, the U.S. Gov-
ernment also supports the request for certiorari. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, KSR Int'l Co., petition for cert. filed, No. 04-1350 (U.S. May 25, 2006), 2006 WL
1455488.
42. Carlos M. Correa, Patent Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 189, 198 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds.,
1998); European Patent Office, Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, Part C-
IV, 2.3 (1994) (noting that if a substance found in nature is isolated, and the substance can
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patent offices must compare an invention with the existing "prior
art," which refers to what is previously known in the technical field
of the invention. Because of differing national definitions of what
constitutes prior art, the same invention may be granted or denied
a patent in different countries.
2. Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge-Before discussing
biopiracy patents, it is important to first understand the underlying
resources that are alleged to have been "pirated." The relevant re-
sources are typically from third world countries and consist of
either genetic resources or traditional knowledge. The genetic re-
sources often are plant-based and native to these biodiverse
countries.3 The traditional knowledge at issue is often traditional
knowledge concerning natural resources, sometimes with a me-
dicinal purpose. For example, traditional knowledge could involve
the use of bark from a certain tree native to a third world country
that cures certain wounds.
It is important to first clarify the scope of traditional knowledge
to understand the objection to patents based upon such knowl-
edge. Although there are a variety of definitions of traditional
knowledge, at their core they all involve knowledge, innovation,
and practices of indigenous and local communities that are trans-
mitted orally between generations and are typically unique to a
given geographic region.4 In addition, unlike patents, which pro-
vide rights for a static invention, traditional knowledge is
constantly evolving over generations and in response to a changing
environment. 45 In particular, traditional knowledge is seen as part
be characterized either by it structure, or the process by which it is obtained, it is 'new' and
may be patentable).
43. Although there are some instances of human-based resources involved in biopiracy
patents, such cases are not included within the scope of this paper because they raise differ-
ent issues of informed consent, as well as ethical implications for research. However,
additional information on that topic is available. See, e.g., Annie 0. Wu, Note, Surpassing the
Material: The Human Rights Implications of Informed Consent in Bioprospecting Cells Derived from
Indigenous People Groups, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 979 (2000); Leonard H. Glantz et al., Research in
Developing Countries: Taking 'Benefit'Seriously, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 38.
44. See, e.g., WIPO, Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. and Genetic Res., Tradi-
tional Knowledge and Folklore, Matters Concerning Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore--An Overview, Annex 3, at 3, 20-21, WIPO/GRTFK/IC/1/3
(Mar. 16, 2001) [hereinafter WIPO, Matters Concerning Intellectual Property] (noting that tradi-
tional knowledge does not seem to exist and that because of the "highly diverse and
dynamic nature of traditional knowledge," it is difficult to develop a single and exclusive
definition); Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 233, 240-41 (2001) [hereinafter TRIPS-RATK] (noting different definitions).
45. See, e.g., Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Int'l Bu-
reau of WIPO, Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources-An Overview, at 3, IP/C/W/218 (Oct.
18, 2000) ("[traditional knowledge] is being created every day, and it is evolving as a re-
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and parcel of the holistic relationship that indigenous communi-
ties have with their environment. Such communities strongly value
the development and preservation of their environment, including
plant and agricultural resources.46 The high value placed on envi-
ronmental protection is often described as a result of a social and
spiritual responsibility to respect all life forms based on the under-
standing that all parts of the natural world are infused with spirit.
47
For all the foregoing reasons, traditional communities typically fos-
ter discovery, development and preservation of the environment,
as well as medical uses of plants through traditional knowledge.
For example, traditional knowledge is considered responsible for
helping communities develop diverse crops through knowledge
and cultivation of their environment.
48
In addition, unlike patents, which were created as a tool to pro-
mote innovation, traditional knowledge by definition coexists and
evolves naturally within communities. Because the benefits of tradi-
tional knowledge inure to the entire community, it is not necessary
to clearly identify an individual or group who should be "re-
warded." This is an obvious contrast to Western patent rights. 49
sponse of individuals and communities to the challenges posed by their social and physical
environment.").
46. As noted by Canadian anthropologist Martha Johnson, traditional knowledge is
rooted in a social context that sees the world in terms of social and spiritual relations be-
tween all life forms and that all life forms are considered to be interdependent, with human
life not superior to other elements. Martha Johnson, Research on Traditional Environmental
Knowledge: Its Development and Its Role, in LORE: CAPTURING TRADITIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
KNOWLEDGE 3 (MarthaJohnson ed., 1992).
47. See, e.g., id.; Peter-Tobias Stoll & Anja von Hahn, Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous
Knowledge and Indigenous Resources in International Law, in INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY: GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE 5, 15
(Silke von Lewinski ed., 2004) ("Indigenous peoples' profound relationship to land is not
only based on the use of its natural resources, but is also a prerequisite for the spiritual and
religious well-being of the group, and thus is central not only to their physical but also their
cultural survival."). In addition, some have suggested that indigenous people regard their
environment to be indistinguishable from their cultural heritage. See, e.g., Russel Lawrence
Barsh, How do You Patent a Landscape? The Perils of Dichotomizing Cultural and Intellectual Prop-
erty, 8 INT'LJ. CULT. PROP. 14 (1999).
48. See, e.g., WIPO, Matters Concerning Intellectual Property, supra note 44, Annex 3 at 4;
Dutfield, TRIPS-RATK supra note 44, at 243 (noting that traditional knowledge and com-
munities are "responsible for the discovery, development, and preservation of a tremendous
range of medicinal plants, health-giving herbal formulations, and agricultural and forest
products").
49. See, e.g., Stoll & von Han, supra note 47, at 16 (noting that traditional knowledge is
"generally not owned or monopolized by individual members of the indigenous group, but
is a collective right that extends to the community as a whole"). Identifying a single source
may be difficult since traditional knowledge by definition evolves over time and may be
difficult to trace. See, e.g.,Johnson, supra note 46, at 3-4.
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Entire communities often jointly share traditional knowledge."0
There is often an important collective responsibility deriving either
from a belief that traditional knowledge comes from an other-
worldly source,5' or a more general sense that each individual's
"rights" are inextricably linked to collective responsibility in a
52manner distinct from Western property norms. Moreover, because
traditional knowledge is valued as part of community and spiritual
norms, there is a naturally self-sustaining incentive to protect,
promote, and continue to improve such knowledge. In addition,
and perhaps most important, some indigenous groups would con-
sider it improper to attribute authorship to an individual or even a
group of people because of the close tie between traditional
knowledge and prior ancestry.5 3
3. Biopiracy Patents?-Biopiracy allegations arise from patents
that are based on, or in fact are identical to, genetic resources. Pat-
ents should not be permissible for genetic resources since by
definition, patents do not cover naturally occurring material 5 4
However, there is greater controversy concerning patents for mate-
rials derived from genetic resources through chemical isolation or
genetic engineering processes. For example, although the neem
tree, indigenous to India and considered sacred by Indian citizens,
cannot be patented, there can be valid patents based upon the
tree. They adequately satisfy the "new" requirement because they
have qualities that do not exist in nature. For example, one patent
50. See, e.g., Matthias Leistner, Analysis of Different Areas of Indigenous Resources: Tradi-
tional Knowledge, in INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GENETIC
RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, supra note 47, at 49, 57. There is no
single model of ownership of traditional knowledge-ownership may be determined based
upon the predominant contribution of individual or collective contributions. In addition,
shamans are sometimes considered individual creators, although their role as creator is
often inextricably linked to their social function of the community, such that the word
"owner" in a Western context is not entirely applicable. See, e.g., WIPO, Intellectual Property
Needs and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge Holders, WIPO Publication No. 768E (Apr.
2001); UNCTAD & ICTSD, Protecting Traditional Knowledge Folklore, supra note 5, at 15 (noting
that over 10,000 individual inventions are documented by the India-based Honeybee Net-
work).
51. See, e.g., Michael Blakeney, The Protection of Traditional Knowledge under Intellectual
Property Law, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 251, 252 (2000) (noting that traditional folklore
may be attributed to the creator spirit). Similarly, traditional knowledge has been stated to
reflect more than the efforts of either individual or collective efforts; rather, it has been
described as "inextricably interwoven with historical, ethical and religious aspects that touch
at the very identity of the respective indigenous group or local community." Leistner, supra
note 50, at 56-57.
52. See, e.g., Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples and the Idea of Individual Human
Rights, 10(2) NATIVE STUD. REV. 35 (1995).
53. See UNCTAD & ICTSD, Protecting Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, supra note 5, at
15.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
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that covers special storage properties the natural neem tree does
not have is "new" under the patent law-because it contains fea-
tures that do not exist in its natural state. 5
Biopiracy allegations also arise from patents based upon, or
identical to, traditional knowledge, such that it appears that the
"new" requirement has been violated. For example, a patent was
issued to two University scientists for a method of healing wounds
using turmeric, an active ingredient based upon neem seed is dis-
tinct from the naturally occurring neem seed because it had a
longer shelf life and stability compared to the natural seed, 6 even
though the patent itself disclosed no information beyond the tradi-
tional knowledge that was known for centuries in India.57 Patent
proponents argue that this case proves the patent system works be-
cause it eventually corrected the error by canceling all the claims
of the patent. However, this only happened after a legal challenge
by the Indian government that involved locating and translating
thirty-two references from Sanskrit, Urdu, and Hindi to establish
51that the "invention" in the patent was not truly new.
The turmeric example is also useful in highlighting an anoma-
lous definition of what constitutes "new" under United States
patent law. In particular, knowledge outside the United States is
not considered relevant to determining patentability, unless docu-
mented in writing.60 To the extent that a great deal of traditional
55. U.S. Patent No. 5,124,349 (filed Oct. 31, 1990).
56. U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (filed Dec. 28, 1993).
57. In fact, the patent noted that "turmeric has long been used in India as a traditional
medicine for the treatment of various sprains and inflammatory conditions." Id. at col.1
1.36-39. Nonetheless, the patent claimed to be a "[m]ethod of promoting healing [sic] of a
wound by administering turmeric to a patient afflicted with the wound." Id. at [57].
58. See, e.g., Communication from the United States, Review of the Provisions of Article
27.3(b) Further Views of the United States, 4, IP/C/W/209 (Oct. 3, 2000) (noting that in the
turmeric case, the patent system "worked as it should" since the patent was eventually can-
celled once relevant prior art was brought to the attention of the patent office).
59. The patent was cancelled during reexamination proceedings after the Indian
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) formally requested a reexamination
and submitted documentation to support its claims that what was disclosed in the patent was
known in India. COMMISSION ON IPRs, supra note 15, at 76. After receiving this information,
the USPTO decided that all the claims of the patent were invalid as anticipated and obvious.
Id. This case is notable as the first time a United States patent was successfully challenged
(i.e., revoked) on the basis of a challenge by a developing country asserting that the patent
was based upon traditional knowledge.
60. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). Some have criticized this rule as anachronistic in the
global economy and even unconstitutional. Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The
Geographical Limitations on Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679 (2003); Shayana
Kadidal, Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art and the Neem Patent Controversy,
37 IDEA 371 (1997). In addition, proposed legislation to amend the patent laws would po-
tentially minimize this rule by including disclosures that are known through sources other
than through printed publication and without geographical restriction. H.R. 2795, 109th
Cong. (2005).
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knowledge is oral in nature, the United States' rule may automati-
cally exclude consideration of information that would show the
invention is not truly "new" when considered in the entire global
context. Accordingly, the turmeric patent would have been consid-
ered valid under United States' laws if no documentation had been
found.
For patents that are based upon, but not identical to, either ge-
netic resources or traditional knowledge, the issues are less clearly
resolved under present patent law. Sometimes the problem is a
misunderstanding of the scope of patent rights, or what the "new"
and "nonobvious" standards require. In particular, sometimes in-
digenous communities or advocates on their behalf have argued
that patents based upon traditional knowledge do not provide any-
thing new, yet they do so without considering how "new" is defined
under the relevant laws.
B. International Development of Biopiracy
The coinage of the term biopiracy coincides with a number of
international developments, as well as protests against specific pat-
ents that were alleged to constitute biopiracy. The Rural
Advancement Foundation (RAFI, now ETC Group), an environ-
mental advocacy group6 defines biopiracy as "the appropriation of
the knowledge and genetic resources of farming and indigenous
communities by individuals or institutions who seek exclusive mo-
nopoly control (patents or intellectual property) over these
resources and knowledge."62 Technically, genetic resources cannot
be patented as such; rather, only genetic resources that are derived
from the natural products can be protected. Nonetheless, the defi-
nition of biopiracy resonated with an existing mistrust of big
63business and globalization. A variety of definitions of biopiracy
61. The group has been referred to as Erosion, Technology and Concentration (ETC),
as well as Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI). See infra note 125.
62. Keyword Definitions-ETC Group, http://www.etcgroup.org/key-defs.asp (on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
63. See, e.g., Charles R. McMannis, Fitting Traditional Knowledge Protection and Biopiracy
Claims into the Existing Intellectual Property and Unfair Competition Framework, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 425, 427 (Burton Ong ed., 2004) (noting that
mounting protests over biopiracy and globalization more generally represent a "visceral
populist reaction" to seeming devaluation of biocultural contributions). Indeed, Vandana
Shiva, an Indian activist, has authored several books and articles focused on the theme of
biopiracy and Western misappropriation of resources. See, e.g., VANDANA SHIVA ET AL., COR-
PORATE HIJACK OF BIODIVERSITY: How wrO-TRIPS RULES PROMOTE CORPORATE HIJACK OF
PEOPLE'S BIODIVERSITY AND KNOWLEDGE (2002) [hereinafter SHIVA, CORPORATE HIJACK OF
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have emerged, including: unauthorized use of biological material
that results in a patent, unauthorized use of traditional knowledge
concerning biological resources, and lack of benefit-sharing with
those who provided resources.64 Some groups consider patents
based upon biological resources to constitute biopiracy either
when the patent fails to meet present patent criteria, or because
the patent criteria are considered unfair. The coinage of the term
biopiracy also coincided with public protests against U.S. patents
that appeared to fit this definition of biopiracy. For example, the
existence of a patent relating to the Ayahuasca Vine was first un-
covered in 1994 by an organization representing indigenous
groups.65 Similarly, although patents granted on variants of the
neem tree were issued in the early nineties, public outcries and
subsequent legal challenges concerning improper misappropria-
tion of what is considered a sacred tree in India did not begin until
1995.67 The previously noted turmeric patent was similarly
BIODIVERSITY]; VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRAcY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE
(1997) [hereinafter SHIVA, BiopiRAcY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE]; VANDANA SHIVA, MONO-
CULTURES OF THE MIND (1993).
64. See Dutfield, supra note 14, at I (noting that biopiracy refers to the "uncompen-
sated commercial use of biological resources or associated traditional knowledge from
developing countries, as well as the patenting by corporations of claimed inventions based
on such resources or knowledge"); ETC Group, From Global Enclosure to Self Enclosure: Ten
Years After - A Critique of the CBD and the "Bonn Guidelines" on Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS),
COMMUNIQUE, Jan-Feb. 2004, at 2, http://www.etcgroup.org/article.asp?newsid=432 (stat-
ing biopiracy "refers to the privatization of genetic resources ... from those people who
hold, maintain, embody, develop, breed, or otherwise create, foster or nurture those re-
sources," and that emphatically that "all bioprospecting unavoidably falls into the category
of biopiracy").
65. See, e.g., AmazonLink.org, The Ayahuasca Case: Vine of the Soul,
www.amazonlink.org/biopiracy/ayahuasca.htm (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) (noting that the Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations of
the Amazon Basin (COICA) first learned of this patent in 1994 and subsequently instigated
action to have the patent reexamined). A request for reexamination of this patent was filed
in 1999, and the PTO cancelled all the claims of the patent during the same year. See, e.g.,
Glen M. Wiser, Center for International Environmental Law, PTO Rejection of the "Ayahuasca"
Patent Claim: Background and Analysis (Nov. 1999), http://www.ciel.org/Biodiversity/
ptorejection.html. However, the PTO has since reversed its position as of 2001. HowardJ.
Locker, United States Dep't of Commerce Patent & Trademark Office, Notice of Intent to
Issue Reexamination Certificate: Statement of Reasons for Patentability and/or Confirma-
tion (Jan. 26, 2001), available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/PTOExaminer
Transcript.pdf.
66. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,946,681 (filed June 26, 1989); U.S. Patent No. 5,124,349
(filed Oct. 31, 1990).
67. See, e.g., Ulrike Hellerer & K.S. Jarayaman, Greens Persuade Europe to Revoke Patent on
Neem Tree, 405 NATURE 266, 266 (2000) (noting that protests against the neem patents began
in 1993 with legal opposition in 1995). The EPO canceled the neem patent in 2002, but
because of differing patent standards, it remained valid in the U.S.. See, e.g., Chakravarthi
Raghaven, Neem Patent Revoked by European Patent Office, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, May 11,
2000, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/revoked.htm (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform); Press Release, European Patent Office, supra note 20.
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challenged in the mid-nineties. 68 Other patents that have been em-
broiled in biopiracy allegations since then include a patent on
Quinoa, as well as the "Basmati Rice Patent,"7 ° and more recently,
the Enola Bean patent" and the so-called natural Viagra or Maca
patent. 2 These examples are mentioned as illustrative of the biopi-
racy patent disputes, as well as the timing of these protests. This
Article does not attempt to retread the voluminous history on such
examples. Rather, these specific patents are noted here because
the timing of their protests coincide with important international
agreements that are central to this Article.
Discussion of biopiracy patents are associated not only with
these controversial cases, but also in conjunction with the signing
of the 1992 CBD agreement, as well as the 1994 TRIPS agreement.
The CBD provides an international framework for discussing pro-
tection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, while the
TRIPS agreement provides an international framework for what
must be patented, without any mention of compliance with the
CBD. One CBD objective is the "fair and equitable sharing of the
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources .... 74
CBD has a related goal of sharing benefits that arise from tradi-
tional knowledge, to the extent that such knowledge promotes the
CBD goals of "conservation and sustainable use of biological diver-
sity .... ,7 The TRIPS agreement, on the other hand, mandates
68. U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (filed Dec. 28, 1993).
69. U.S. Patent No. 5,304,718 (filed Feb. 3, 1992).
70. U.S. Patent No. 5,663,484 (filedJuly 8, 1994).
71. U.S. Patent No. 5,894,079 (filed Nov. 15,1996).
72. U.S. Patent No. 6,093,421 (filed Aug. 31, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 6,267,995 (filed
Mar. 3, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 6,878,141 (filedJune 28, 2000). The ETC reported protests of
Maca patents in July 2002. See ETC Group, Peruvian Farmers and Indigenous People Denounce
Maca Patents, GENOTYPE,July 3, 2002, http://www.etcgroup.org/documents/macafinall.pdf.
Also, a patent challenge was at least contemplated once pro-bono representation was se-
cured. Alicia Upano, D.C. Team Gets to the Root of the Problem, LEGAL TIMES,Jan. 12, 2004, at
13.
73. However, for readers interested in greater discussion of the details of these biopi-
racy patents, see Leanne M. Fecteau, The Ayahuasca Patent Revocation: Raising Questions about
Current U.S. Patent Policy, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 69 (2001) (providing details of the Vine
patent controversy); Muriel Lightbourne, Of Rice and Men: An Attempt to Assess the Basmati
Affair, 6J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 875 (2003) (providing a detailed discussion of the Basmati
patent controversy); Emily Marden, The Neem Tree Patent: International Conflict over the Com-
modification of Life, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 279 (1999) (providing a good discussion of
commodification of life issues associated with neem tree patents); McMannis, supra note 63
(providing a good overview of controversial cases involving biopiracy, and analyzing which
are not "true" problems according to Western patent law). See also Brendan I. Koerner, Via-
gra Natura LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 48 (describing the controversy surrounding
the maca patent in Peru that has prompted greater Peruvian interest in countering biopi-
racy).
74. CBD, supra note 6, at art. 1.
75. Id. at art. 80).
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that member states provide "minimum" standards of intellectual
property protection, including patent rights, without any mention
of whether such rights need be contingent on compliance with the
CBD. 6
The signing of these international agreements in conjunction
with the issuance of controversial patents like those mentioned
above has led to substantial discussion of whether CBD and TRIPS
conflict, and whether patent laws-particularly under TRIPS-
should be amended to address biopiracy. The issue was first dis-
cussed at a meeting of the Conference of Parties to the CBD-the
highest decision-making body within the CBD.77 Developing coun-
tries, beginning with Columbia in 1999,78 have repeatedly proposed
specific amendments to international patent law to mandate or at
least suggest a linkage between patent validity and compliance with
CBD norms.79 Columbia's initial proposal generated immediate
discussion, such that a new working group was formed under
WIPO to further study of this issue. 0 Similarly, as a result of many
76. See TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 1.
77. See, e.g., Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity and
the Agreement on TRIPS, Third Meeting: Item 14 of the Provisional Agenda, Buenos Aires,
Arg., Nov. 4-15, 1996, Relationships and Synergies, UNEP/CBD/COP/3/23 (Oct. 5, 1996). In
addition, nongovernmental organizations also supported this issue. See, e.g., Center for Int'l
Envti. Law, Comments on Improving Identification of Prior Art: Recommendations on Traditional
Knowledge Relating to Biological Diversity Submitted to the United States Patent and Trademark Office,
Aug. 2, 1999, http://www.ciel.org/Publications/IdentificationofPriorArt.pdf.
78. Columbia submitted a surprise proposal to condition patent grants on compliance
with norms consonant with the CBD during a WIPO session concerning a draft patent law
treaty that had until that point had been focused entirely on unifying procedural aspects of
national patent laws. WIPO, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Third Session,
Geneva, Switz., Sept 6-14, 1999, Protection of Biological and Genetic Resources: Proposal by the
Delegation of Columbia, SCP/3/10 (Sept. 8, 1999) (suggesting that industrial property protec-
tion, such as patents, should "guarantee the protection of the country's biological and
genetic heritage. Consequently, the grant of patents ... that relate to elements of that heri-
tage shall be subject to their having been acquired legally"); UNCTAD & ICTSD, Protecting
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, supra note 5, at 4 ("The PLT was intended to harmonise
certain patent procedures while steering clear of matters relating to substantive patent
law.").
79. India suggested that patents based upon or essentially derived from traditional
knowledge be excluded, or, that there at least be a mandatory disclosure of origin of bio-
logical resources, together with evidence of prior informed consent. Council for TRIPS,
Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(b), Communication fisom India, IP/C/W/161 (Nov. 3,
1999); General Council, The Challenge of Integrating LDCs into the Multilateral Trading System:
Coordinating Workship for Senior Advisors to Ministers of Trade in LDCs in Preparation for Third
WTO Ministerial Conference, Communication from Bangladesh, WT/GC/W/251 (July 13, 1999)
(proposing that Article 27(3) be amended to state that patents must not be granted without
prior consent of the country of origin and that patents "inconsistent" with Article 15 of the
CBD should not be granted).
80. WIPO created a new Intergovernmental Committee in April 2000 to provide a
platform for continued discussions of IP with respect to access of genetic resources, and
benefit sharing for any commercial benefits arising from use of such resources. WIPO Gen.
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proposals by developing countries that TRIPS needed to be
amended to resolve an inherent conflict between it and the CBD, s'
the Doha Ministerial Declaration included an explicit directive that
the TRIPS Council examine the relationship between TRIPS and
812CBD, including the protection of traditional knowledge.
The United Nations and the World Health Organization (WHO)
have also considered the biopiracy issue from a human rights per-
spective. For example, in August, 2000, the UN Subcommission on
Human Rights issued a resolution that referred to an actual or po-
tential conflict between intellectual property rights and human
rights based in part on patents on the genetic material that leads to
biopiracy; accordingly, the UN requested that the WTO take inter-
national human rights into account during its ongoing review of
TRIPS. 3 Similarly, the WHO recommended traditional medical
knowledge be protected from biopiracy, and that governments
consider patent systems that not only protect traditional medicine
84from biopiracy, but also promote equitable benefit sharing. In
addition, the UN and WHO stated that human rights-including
Assemb., Sept. 25-Oct. 3, 2000, Matters Concerning Intellectual Property and Cenetic Resources,
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, 13-14, WO/GA/26/6 (Aug. 25, 2000) (charging the
committee with considering potential positive and negative roles of IPR with respect to ge-
netic resources, as well as protection of folklore).
81. General Council, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: Implementation Issues
to be Addressed before/at Seattle, Communication from Cuba, Doam. Rep., Egypt, El Sal., Hond., India,
Indon., Malay., Nig., Pak., Sri Lanka, and Uganda, WT/GC/354 (Oct. 11, 1999); General
Council, Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference: Implementation Issues to be Addressed in
the First Year of Negotations, Communication from Cuba, Dom. Rep., Egypt, El Sal., Hond., India,
Indon., Malay., Nig., Pak., Sri Lanka and Uganda, WT/GC/W/355 (Oct. 11, 1999); see also
Council for TRIPS, The Agreement Under Article 71.1: Proposal on Protection of the Intellectual
Property Rights of the Traditional Knowledge of Local and Indigenous Communities, Communication
from Cuba, Hond., Para., and Venez., IP/C/W/166 (Nov. 5, 1999) (requesting that negotia-
tions "establish multilateral rules to accord effective moral and economic intellectual
property rights to traditional knowledge, medicinal practices and expressions of folklore
and take into account the social and collective nature of these rights" and suggesting the
rules be incorporated into TRIPS by 2004, but failing to provide specific details to accom-
plish such a goal); Council for TRIPS, Review of the Provisions of Article 2 7.3(b), Communication
from India, IP/C/W/161 (Nov. 3, 1999) (suggesting a more expansive amendment of Article
27(3) (b) to exclude all life forms from patentability).
82. World Trade Organization [WTO], Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
19, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declara-
tion]. In addition, the declaration noted that the TRIPS Council should also examine any
related developments. Id.
83. U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Intell. Prop. and Human Rights: Sub-
Comm'n on Human Rights Res., 1 8, 2000/7, E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000);
see also David Weissbrodt & Kell Schoff, Human Rights Approach to Intellectual Property Protec-
tion: The Genesis and Application of Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/07, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP.
REv. 1, 3-26, 41-46 (2003) (providing historical context of the U.N. resolution).
84. WHO Traditional Medicine Workshop, Bangkok, Thailand, Dec. 6-8, 2000, Report
of the Inter-regional Workshop on Intellectual Property Rights in the Context of Traditional
Medicine, WHO/EDM/TRM/2001.1 (2000).
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protection of the right to health and protection against biopi-
racy-should be given serious consideration in the implementation
of TRIPS.'
Although international dialogues in established foras concern-
ing patents based upon genetic resources and traditional
knowledge have substantially increased since the initial allegations
of biopiracy, there is little tangible progress towards resolution. Al-
though developing countries have actively promoted discussions at
the WTO and WIPO in recent years, their proposals to amend
TRIPS and other international patent agreements have been
largely forestalled for lack of agreement. In some instances, sub-
stantive discussion is curtailed on the grounds that another forum
would be a more appropriate venue to address the issue. In addi-
tion, although the Conference of the Parties of the CBD has
actively addressed biopiracy issues, the CBD only offers weak pro-
scriptions because it is effectively powerless to effectuate proposed
changes to patent laws. 6 In light of the seeming futility of these
substantial efforts, the next section takes a closer look at the under-
lying tension between patent rights and traditional knowledge to
help understand and move past the present stalemate in interna-
tional discussions.
II. COMPLEXITIES OF COMMUNAL, NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON BiopiRAcy
A. National and Communal Perspectives
This section analyzes the underlying reasons why biopiracy
claims thus far have not achieved universal legitimacy. First, there
is a major culture clash with respect to what-if anything-should
be patentable, as well as disagreements concerning the proper
scope of patent protection in lieu of other social policies. Second,
the disagreements are exacerbated by misconceptions about the
scope of patent rights. Moreover, allegations that biopiracy consti-
tutes the newest form of Western imperialism may impede
conciliation because the claim results in defensiveness.
1. Complex Conflicts
a. Can Patents Coexist with Protection of Traditional Knowledge?-A
predominant Western view of patents based upon traditional
85. See infra Part II.B. 1.
86. See infra Part II.B.
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knowledge is that there is no conflict or cause for concern. First, to
the extent that patents are based upon, rather than identical to,
traditional knowledge, the patent is seen as providing a greater so-
cial good by creating commercial value from underutilized
resources. 7 Second, patents are not seen as derogatory to tradi-
tional cultures since the patent does not prevent use of the original
traditional knowledge and is not intended to be a statement about
the value of such original knowledge.
Although the Western perspective adequately reflects the in-
strumentalist perspective of patents, it does so in a vacuum,
divorced from the implications of such patents on the communi-
ties that provided the original traditional knowledge. Because
traditional knowledge is part of a society's social fabric and is po-
tentially sacred, the patent represents an improper incentive to
commodify what traditional cultures have for years preserved and
revered. In addition, some believe that patents based upon tradi-
tional knowledge may have a deleterious effect on the
environment because while traditional knowledge aims to enhance
the existing environment, the Western patent system does not.
An essential problem lies with the broader socio-cultural context
in which patent rights versus traditional knowledge exists. Tradi-
tional knowledge exists and is perpetuated for the greater good of
the community without any need to provide monetary reward or
other compensation.88 In contrast, patent rights function in a mar-
ket context in which a patent provides its owner with a commercial
advantage in the marketplace. A conflict arises because the "own-
ers" of traditional knowledge may not want any part of a market
economy. In particular, they may not be interested in trading in
their traditional knowledge for a financial reward. As noted above,
the creation and perpetuation of traditional knowledge has inher-
ent value in a community-based economy that emphasizes
sharing-without monetary rewards.89 Rather, a society may place a
high cultural importance on protecting the knowledge from those
who cannot be trusted to appropriately protect its use. An excel-
87. See, e.g., GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE AND BIODI-
VERSiTY 61-62 (2000) (describing the pro-patent position that local communities should
not feel exploited because traditional knowledge alone would not be patentable and a pat-
ent does not technically prevent continued use of resources in their natural state); Craig
Allen Nard, In Defense of Geographic Disparity, 88 MINN. L. REV. 222, 225 (2003) (suggesting
that a patent based upon traditional knowledge could lead to significant profits if exploited
in a rich market such as the United States).
88. See supra Part I.A.2.
89. See Stephen Gudeman, Sketches, Qualms, and Other Thoughts on Intellectual Property
Rights, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 102, 103 (Stephen B. Brusch & Doreen Stabinsky eds., 1996).
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lent example of a potential clash is presented by Professor Ghosh
who hypothesizes that if a traditional knowledge holder has the
cure for cancer, but does not wish for such knowledge to be mar-
keted (through the use of a patent) because the knowledge should
be used only for ritualistic purposes, there is a question of who
should dictate use of the knowledge. 90 In other words, should the
utilitarian premise of patent rights govern? This is especially a
problem because of the cross-cultural issue: if Western countries
elect to pursue a completely utilitarian regime of promoting inno-
vation, should Western countries be allowed to impose this regime
on other cultures who not only do not subscribe to this regime, but
do not subscribe to the market economy in which this regime
works?
Although some patent regimes may permit consideration of
socio-cultural concerns in excluding some subject matter from pat-
entability, the patent laws fail to address the particular cultural
concerns inherent in the clash between traditional knowledge and
patents. For example, some domestic patent laws provide that an
invention may be excluded from patentability if it would be abhor-
rent to public morality.9' However, the focus of such an inquiry is
only on the society providing the patent-there is no place under
present patent laws to consider the cultural offensiveness of subject
matter to those outside the nation granting the patent, even if they
are likely to be impacted. For example, in the United States, the
potential morality of an invention is not a factor in the patentabil-
ity calculus.92 The lack of consideration of morality has been
justified on the grounds that a patent is not an absolute license to
use an invention; moral implications are arguably better left to
90. Shubha Ghosh, Reflections on the Traditional Knowledge Debate, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 497, 508-09 (2003). Professor Ghosh further suggests that the problem is the in-
verse of the situation with access to AIDS medicine. In the public health context a company
is reluctant to sell a patented drug for lower profit whereas, in the context of biopiracy and
traditional knowledge, communities may not be willing to part with the knowledge for any
price if market mechanisms and dissemination are perceived anathema to their culture. Id.
91. TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27(2); EPC, supra note 38, at
art. 53(a).
92. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (2000) (providing no provision for morality as a basis
for denying patentability); Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 E3d 1364, 1366-67
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801, 802 (Bd. App. 1977). In addi-
tion, although Canada does not have any statutory authority for considering morality, it has
recently denied a patent to a genetically engineered mouse purportedly on grounds of strict
statutory construction, but for an invention that has raised morality concerns among patent
offices worldwide. See Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P 4 sec. 2 (1993) (Can.); Harvard Coll. v. Can-
ada (Commissioner of Patents), File 28155, 2002 S.C.C. 76, paras. 152-58 (May 21, 2002),
available at http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/2002/vol4/html/2002scr4_
0045.html; infra note 415 (noting controversy surrounding same invention in Europe, where
the laws expressly permit morality to be considered).
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examination by agencies with greater expertise in regulating cul-
tural norms.93 However, this justification fails to consider the multi-
cultural context of patents based on traditional knowledge. Regu-
latory agencies are only responsible for controlling behavior within
their national borders. There is no corollary agency to regulate
international behavior. The most analogous "institution" to an in-
ternational regulatory body would be a creation of international
agreements that provide for such regulation. In fact, the CBD may
at first blush seem to be such an agreement since its objectives in-
clude not only the promotion of biodiversity, but also traditional
94knowledge. However, as further explained later, the CBD has no
effective enforcement abilities, such that it cannot actually function
95
as an international regulatory agency.
b. Conflict Created or Averted Through Compensation ?-There is a
Western world view that patents based upon traditional knowledge
are in fact beneficial to the countries and communities that cur-
rently protest such patents. Based on the assumption that a patent
provides an incentive to commercialize, some suggest that patents
granted on traditional knowledge may yield monetary benefits for
countries that are in undisputed need of greater economic re-
93. See, e.g., Greenpeace U.K. v. Plant Genetic Systems N.V. (Opposition Div. EPO
1992), reported in 25 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 618, 620 (1993) (noting that
"a patent does not confer a positive right to use an invention; exploitation of the patent is
always subject to regulation by governmental agencies where appropriate," such that a pat-
ent should not be denied purely based on potential problems with commercial use); Case T-
356/93-3.3.4, Plant Genetic Systems N.V. v. Greenpeace Ltd., 8 O.J. E.P.O. 557, 568-70
(Technical B. App. 1995) (noting that regulatory authorities are better equipped to assess
potential hazards of exploiting technology and the grant of a patent alone is not cause for
concern since a patent does not provide a license to exploit an invention); Transgenic
Plant/Novartis II, 2000 OJ. E.P.O. 111, para. 3.9 (EPO Enlarged B. App. 1999) (noting that
the patent office is not vested with considering economic impacts of a patent grant, such
that they should not be relevant to determining the scope of patentability); see also Margaret
Llewelyn, The Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions: An Alternative Approach, 19 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REP. 115, 122-23 (1997) (suggesting that morality in patent law is difficult to
define such that it can be easily applied and suggesting that it might be more appropriate
for morality to be considered by regulatory bodies "which would arguably be better for a for
objectively deciding and enforcing concepts of morality"); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual
Property in Higher Life Forns: The Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REv.
1051, 1067-68 (1988) (arguing that "[tihe patent system normally is not the proper place to
conduct technology assessment" since its purpose is the "simpler" goal of promoting science,
such that potential social consequences should be dealt with in the regulatory context,
rather than in patent law). Similarly, it is has been repeatedly noted that problems with
commercial exploitation should not be decided by patent offices because such information
would typically be unavailable during the course of patent examination due to the typical
filing of applications long before commercial application. Plant Genetic Systems, supra, at 561,
624.
94. CBD, supra note 6, at art. 1.
95. See infra notes 206-208 and accompanying text.
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sources.96 This argument has been made despite the fact that pat-
ent owners often do not acknowledge use of traditional knowledge,
let alone voluntarily provide compensation to originating commu-
nities. 7 An important note is that communities providing
knowledge or information are not considered inventors of the pat-
ent, and thus would ordinarily have no legal entitlement to any
profits resulting from a patent-even if they provided assistance in
the broader search that led to the patented invention. Oftentimes,
compensation is only negotiated after negative publicity. Moreover,
some criticize the compensation arrangements as inadequate be-
cause royalty structures tend to provide only a miniscule
percentage of profits which, of course, hinge on commercial suc-
98
cess.
Ultimately, monetary compensation is a Western solution that
fails to acknowledge that traditional knowledge often transcends
monetary value due to its sacred status. To many groups, sharing
commercial proceeds is morally offensive because it necessitates
acceptance of the very activity-patenting of sacred information-
which they protest as improper.9
96. See, e.g., Nard, supra note 87, at 231 (noting that at least for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts developed based upon traditional knowledge, "the patenting and commercial
exploitation ... can bring much needed capital to these countries and their indigenous
populations"). Similarly, some see the idea of protecting traditional knowledge as contrary
to patent principles. See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 90, at 499 ("For those who see the issue
through the lens of United States law, protecting neem or turmeric ... seems to stray from
the Constitutional mandate that intellectual property law should serve 'to promote the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts.' But, of course, this directive is largely isolated to the
United States.").
97. See, e.g., The Gala Foundation, Genetic Resources Action International, Biodiversity
for Sale: Dismantling the Hype About Benefit Sharing, GLOBAL TRADE AND BIODIVERSITY IN CON-
FLICT, Apr. 2000 [hereinafter Biodiversityfor Sale].
98. See id. at 3 (referencing an example of a partnership agreement between Washing-
ton University, Monsanto, and the United States government to provide a twenty-five
percent royalty which was understood by the Aguarana to mean twenty-five percent of the
profits, but instead meant twenty-five percent of Washington University's one percent of
Monsanto's Royalty, i.e. 0.25%). Some have advocated the sharing of the eventual commer-
cial proceeds, or that patent rights are jointly owned, even if current law only provides rights
to those who invent the claimed invention, and not to those who assisted in the broader
search that led to the claimed invention. Indeed, some have suggested that the present defi-
nition of patent inventorship should be expanded to enable traditional communities to be
included as inventors. See, e.g., Michael J. Huft, Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery Research:
A Question of IntellectualProperty Rights, 89 NW. U. L. REv. 1678 (1995). In addition, the same
issue has arisen in the context of patents derived in part from genetic resources of Western
patients. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Who Deserves the Patent Pot of Gold?: An Inquiry into the Proper
Inventorship of Patent-Based Discoveries, 2 Hous.J. HEALTH L. & POL. 107, 132-50 (2002).
99. See infra note 109. The objection of traditional groups is akin to a moral right in
their material, but in a very different sense than the narrowly defined moral rights that are
linked to copyrighted subject matter. Drahos P., Indigenous Knowledge, Intellectual Property and
Biopiracy: Is a Global Biocollecting Society the Answer?, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 2000, 22 (6), 245-
50. There has been a suggestion that an expanded definition of moral rights for patent law
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Providing monetary compensation for something that previously
was culturally shared creates additional complications. Some com-
mentators have suggested that money deteriorates the structure of
societies that traditionally protect indigenous culture. °0 In addi-
tion, to the extent that a genetic resource or traditional knowledge
is located or known in multiple communities, there may be a 'race
to the bottom' that enables Western companies to pay the lowest
going rate among multiple communities that are willing to set
aside cultural opposition for present profits.'1 This not only pro-
vides less economic value to communities, but also has been cited
as contributing to animosity and reduced sharing of resources
amongst communities.' In addition, even within a single commu-
nity, there may be internal community strife since those that
negotiate the benefit agreement need to reconcile such benefits
with a community's fundamental opposition to any benefit-
sharing.
103
could be helpful to traditional groups. See, e.g., David R. Downes, How Intellectual Property
Could be a Tool to Protect Traditional Knowledge, 25 COLUM.J. ENVTL. L. 253, 276 (2000) (noting
that although moral rights have "received surprisingly little attention to date" in the context
of protecting traditional knowledge, these rights are designed to protect non-market values,
albeit in the context of copyrights, rather than in the context of patents); Ghosh, supra note
90, at n.10 (2003) (noting that moral rights, although typically used to refer to the rights of
authors, could be considered to protect rights of all creators in that it "captures a recurrent
problem of how much ownership and control any creator of intellectual property is allowed
to have"). However, moral rights are not even universally accepted among Western coun-
tries. See, e.g., TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 9(1); DANIEL GERVAIS, THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 124-26 (2d ed. 2003) (providing the
history of the negotiations which resulted in the exclusion of moral rights from TRIPS).
Given the tenuous reception of moral rights among Western countries, further expansion
seems unlikely.
100. Thomas Greaves, Tribal Rights, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEO-
PLE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 89, at 29.
101. See, e.g., Biodiversityfor Sale, supra note 97, at 4 (noting that because there is poten-
tially a large group of communities that have the same genetic resources or knowledge,
benefit-sharing agreements could result in a "race to the bottom" that provides the bio-
prospector with the lowest price, but also excludes most of those with the same resource)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
102. See, e.g., Corinna Heineke & Franziska Wolff, Access to Genetic Resources and the Shar-
ing of Benefits: Private Rights or Shared Use for Biodiversity Conservation , 2 ENVTL. L. NETWORK
INT'L. 26, 28 (2004) (noting that communities may become rivals because of commercial
potential and therefore fail to freely exchange seeds, contrary to tradition, which would
have long term negative impacts on food security); Shane Greene, Indigenous People Incorpo-
rated? Culture as Politics, Culture as Property in Pharmaceutical Biaprospecting, 45 CURRENT
ANTHRO. 211 (2004) (noting that in Peru, an agreement led to conflicts between organiza-
tions representing different communities, as well as at the national level); Shane P. Mulligan,
For Whose Benefit? Limits to Sharing in the Bioprospecting 'Regime', 8 ENVTL. POLITICS 35 (1999).
103. See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note 102, at 35 (noting that a benefit-sharing deal "con-
tributed to animosities within an already divided tribe with regard to how to share benefits
with those who oppose benefit-sharing" in the case of the Kani tribe of Kerala); B. Tobin,
Biodiversity Prospecting Contracts: The Search for Equitable Agreements, in BIODIVERSITY AND TRA-
DITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: EQUITABLE PARTNERSHIPS IN PRACTICE 287 (Sarah A. Laird ed.,
[VOL. 39:3
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 460 2005-2006
Biopiracy and Beyond
c. Communities v. Countries-The situation is further compli-
cated by the fact that the holders of traditional knowledge are
generally not the government and may in fact have diametrically
opposed interests from governments who purport to speak on their
behalf. In particular, although many communities contest that pat-
ents and associated monetary compensation are fundamentally
inconsistent with the promotion of traditional knowledge, their
countries may welcome patents on the presumption that profits
will flow from such activity. 1
4
Conflict may also arise between communities and a national
government agency when a patent is based upon traditional
knowledge known by the community. A recent example of this is a
patent based upon the traditional knowledge concerning the abil-
ity of the Hoodia plant to block feelings of hunger. This discovery
was brought to the attention of the South African Council for Sci-
entific and Industrial Research (CSIR) by the San community.
CSIR performed additional research over a period of nine years,
patented the active components of the Hoodia plant and then li-
censed the patent to Phytopharm, which in turn licensed the
patent to Pfizer. 5 The San did not know about the patent until a
Phytopharm press release, leading the San to feel as if "someone
had stolen the family silver."0 6 There was also some initial discus-
sion and division within the San community whether they should
seek to share in benefits from the patent, or oppose the patent on
moral grounds.' 7 The community ultimately decided that moral
,,118principles were "too expensive. Instead, the San attorney
2002); WIPO and United Nations Environment Program [UNEP], The Role of Intellectual
Property Rights in the Sharing of Benefits Arising from the Use of Biological Resources and Traditional
Knowledge, WIPO/PR/2004/399, (2004) (prepared by Anil K. Gupta), htpp://www.wipo.int/
tk/en/publicationsl769_unep.tk.pdf (noting that there were divisions among a tribal com-
munity in India with respect to how traditional knowledge of a plant with anti-fatigue
properties,Jeevani, should be used if commercialized).
104. See, e.g., Michael R. Dove, Center, Periphery and Biodiversity: A Paradox of Governance
and a Developmental Challenge, in VALUING LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 89, 41, at 56 (noting that developing countries
that negotiate trade and intellectual property agreements may be representing the interests
of the political elites, rather than the interests of indigenous groups).
105. Megan Lindow, Reaping New Meds from Old Cures, WIRED, Nov. 9, 2003,
http://www.wired.com/news/medtech/0,1286,61090,00.html.
106. Lesley Stahl, African Plant May Help Fight Fat, CBS NEWS, Nov. 21, 2004,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/18/60minutes/main656458.shtml.
107. Rachel Wnberg, Rhetoric, Realism and Benefit-Sharing: Use of Traditional Knowledge of
Hoodia Species in the Development of an Appetite Suppressant, 7J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 851, 859-
60(2004).
108. Id. at 870.
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threatened to sue the CSIR for a share of proceeds. 0 9 A memoran-
dum of understanding was eventually issued that acknowledges the
San's prior rights to the natural Hoodia as an appetite suppressant,
together with an agreement that promised royalties from any even-
tual commercial sales.110 However, even though the agreement is
hailed as a historic breakthrough in providing compensation to
indigenous groups, it remains controversial because it excludes the
possibility for other indigenous groups with prior knowledge about
Hoodia from obtaining benefits.'
d. Compensation Complications-A further wrinkle in addressing
biopiracy concerns is that even when parties are well-intentioned,
actual compensation-assuming that this is a positive development
to a given community-may remain a remote possibility. Indeed, in
the case of the licensed CSIR patent benefit-sharing, victory be-
came moot when Pfizer pulled out of its agreement with
Phytopharm."' Similarly, a recently hailed "landmark agreement"
between the University of California Berkeley and the Samoan
government promises to share commercial profits equally with the
Samoan people, who provided traditional knowledge leading to a
patent on a promising anti-AIDS agent."' However, the agreement
109. In the wake of negative publicity, it was reported that the CSIR initially told its col-
laborators that the San were extinct, such that benefit-sharing was a non-issue. See Leon
Marshall, Africa's Bushmen May Get Rich from Diet-Drug Secret, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Apr.
16, 2003, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/04/0416_030416_sanl.html; see
also Antony Barnett, In Africa the Hoodia Cactus Keeps Men Alive. Now its Secret is 'Stolen' to Make
Us Thin, THE OBSERVER, June 17, 2001, (noting that the CSIR defended their actions on the
grounds that they did not want to raise the San expectations with promises that could not be
met and that their organization policy was to share resulting benefits with those who provide
indigenous knowledge); Lindow, supra note 105 (noting that although the case sparked an
"international scandal," CSIR always intended to recognize the San contribution).
110. See Stahl, supra note 106.
111. See Wynberg, supra note 107, at 861 (noting that other non-San groups also occupy
the areas where Hoodia grows and probably share similar knowledge, such that they would
seem entitled to claim similar benefits-either because of actual knowledge, or opportunis-
tic behavior).
112. In 2003, Pfizer merged with Pharmacia and eliminated the group that was respon-
sible for developing the drug based upon Hoodia, leaving Phytopharm free to license the
patent to other parties. Press Release, Rphytopharm, Pfizer Returns Rights of P57 (July 30,
2003), available at http://www.phytopharm.com/press/rel%2080finalfinal.htm (on file with
the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
113. The agreement is considered notable both for its generous benefit-sharing provi-
sions, as well as proper use of prior informed consent. See Memorandum of Understanding
between the Gov't of Samoa and the Regents of the Univ. of Cal. Berkeley for Disposition of
Future Revenue from Licensing of Prostratin Gene Sequences, an Anti-Viral Molecule (Aug.
13, 2004), http:// www.paclii.org/pits/treatydatabase/2004/1.html (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); see also Press Release, Robert Sanders,
Landmark Agreement Between Samoa and UC Berkeley Could Help Search for AIDS Cure
(Sept. 29, 2004), http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/09/29_samoa.shtml
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (noting that Samoa's fifty
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may face difficulties because of a preexisting patent." 4 In particu-
lar, the patent belongs to the National Cancer Institute, which
exclusively licensed it to the AIDS Research Alliance (ARA) to de-
velop Prostratin for use in HIV treatment. 
1 1 5
In addition, the Berkeley agreement does not address a variety
of the previously discussed issues that often arise in connection
with patents and benefit-sharing. For example, although it is true
that some Samoan people assisted Western researchers in what ul-
timately resulted in a patented product, the native tree, the
Mamala, grows throughout tropical forests in the South Pacific,
such that it is possible that other indigenous communities may feel
excluded. " 6 To the extent that the Samoan story spreads to other
communities, they may be less inclined to share knowledge with
each other in the hopes that they can obtain their own exclusive
benefit-sharing agreement with a Western organization. Accord-
ingly, those who decry the incursion of benefit-sharing agreements
as creating new conflicts between communities and decreasing the
prior tradition of open sharing may see the Samoan agreement as
a paradigm example.
2. Misconception and Miscommunication-The divergent perspec-
tives concerning patent rights are further exacerbated by
misconceptions and miscommunications. In particular, rhetoric
concerning biopiracy is compounded by misunderstandings of
patent rights and often leads to defensive denials of problems by
Western nations and criticism of communities that fail to appreci-
ate the Western patent system. This section provides a few
illustrations to highlight the divergent perspectives, without
percent share will be allocated between the national government, villages, and the families
of the original healers that showed Western researcher Dr. Cox how to use the plant).
114. Samoan communities first disclosed information concerning use of the mamala
tree to treat hepatitis, back pain, diarrhea and other ailments to Paul Alan Cox, who was
doing an ethnobotanical study of traditional Samoan medicine. See, e.g., Alex Lash, Sanwa
Faces Patent Struggles, DEAL, Oct. 28, 2004, available at http://forests.org/articles/
print.asp?linkid=35911. The NCI initially screened the sample as a possible cancer treat-
ment, but instead discovered it to be a useful antiviral drug, resulting in the issuing of a
patent to NCI and Cox on Prostratin for use as anti-viral therapy in 1997. See, e.g., Beverly
Snell, Ethnobotanical Research: Progress with Profit-Sharing Agreements Between Samoa and US Re-
search Institutions, E-DRUG, Jan. 2005 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
115. U.S. Patent No. 5,599,839 (filed Apr. 17, 1995). Even more confusing, the Samoan
government had previously signed an agreement directly with the ARA that would give them
twenty percent of the profits of any drug developed using Prostratin, although the terms
were less generous than those of the Berkeley agreement. See, e.g., Victoria Griffith, Samoa to
Get Percentage of AIDS Drug Profits, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at 7.
116. See Lash, supra note 114 (noting other indigenous locations of the Mamala tree).
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attempting to provide an exhaustive portrayal of every instance
where this unfortunate dynamic has occurred.
Part of the problem stems from misunderstandings of the scope
of patent laws. Rhetoric regarding biopiracy is rife with statements
that inaccurately describe the scope of patent rights. For example,
Vanda Shiva, a well known activist against biopiracy, has described
a patent as "an exclusive right, which gives the patent holder a
monopoly to make, use, distribute and sell the patented prod-
uct."' 1 7 This misses the important subtlety that a patent is not an
affirmative right to use the invention, but rather a right to exclude
others from what is patented. Similarly, patents on compositions
derived from the neem tree issued to multinational companies"' 
8
provoked widespread protests from Indian farmers, scientists, and
political activists." 9 Recall that the naturally occurring tree was not
and could not be patented; the patents were granted because they
covered a chemical composition not previously existing in nature
that had the patentable quality of having a longer storage life
achieved through human intervention. 2 0 Nonetheless, there was
fear that the patent would prevent people from using the tree as
naturally found in nature. 2 ' This fear seems unfounded to anyone
with passing familiarity with Western patent laws because it is a
fundamental tenet of such laws that products of nature are not
patentable, although variations of those products that are created
through human manipulation may be patentable.
2 2
117. SHIVA, CORPORATE HIJACK OF BIODIVERSITY, supra note 63, at 13-14.
118. The fact that the patent owner was a large corporation, W.R. Grace, did not seem
to diminish the perception that the patents were a new type of western imperialism that
granted more rights to those who already had access to financial resources.
119. E.g., Vandana Shiva, The Neem Tree: A Case History of Biopiracy, THIRD WORLD NET-
woRK, http://twnside.org.sg/title/pir-ch.htm (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) (describing protests during the GATT Uruguay Round that arose in
part from concerns by farmers "incensed at what they regard[ed] as intellectual piracy"
because the patents were based upon centuries of indigenous experimentation as well as
Indian scientific research); Press Release, Background Paper on the Neem Patent Chal-
lenge, www.ifoam.org/press/neem -back.html (noting that a delegation of Indian farmers
and scientists are bringing 500,000 signatures of Indian citizens to Munich, Germany, to
protest neem patents, as well as a broad range of organizations supporting the patent chal-
lenge).
120. U.S. Patent No. 5,124,349 (filed Oct. 31, 1990).
121. See SHIVA, CORPORATE HIJACK OF BIODIVERSITY, supra note 63, at 13-14; see also
Anil Gupta, Patents on Neem-Will it Deprive Indian Farmers of the Right to use it, 15 BIOTECH-
NOLOGY L. REP. 6, 6-15 (1996) (suggesting that there is widespread confusion about the
implication of the neem patent on use of the natural product); Marden, supra note 73, at
290 (noting that there was a common misperception that the patented neem extract "some-
how confers a property right on the original entity itself").
122. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 477 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) ("The laws of nature, physi-
cal phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable."); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) ("patents cannot issue for the discovery of the
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However, some related concerns should give greater pause.
Some of those who protested the neem-related patents contended
that the neem tree is sacred and should not be unjustly commodi-
fled by multinational companies. Although the tree itself was not
commodified, the patents did impact the availability of natural
neem because multi-national companies set up factories to make
products based upon neem and the price of natural neem seed
rose, threatening its availability to local consumers. 123 As noted by
Vanda Shiva, "If such monopolies are granted to corporations ...
Indian cultures will over time be denied the free use of seeds, me-
dicinal plants and indigenous knowledge. Every day items like ...
Neem ... will go beyond our reach for food and medicine."
12 4
Misstatements are most detrimental when broadly advocated,
thereby further inflaming and ingraining anti-patent inclinations.
For example, in one case, the nongovernmental organization
RAF1125 transmitted an electronic press release broadcasting the
headline "Indigenous Person From Papua New Guinea Claimed in
U.S. Government Patent."'26 The text of the press release contin-
ued in the same doomsday tone to declare that "the United States
Government has issued itself a patent on a foreign citizen" who it
claimed "ceased to own his genetic material."027 To anyone familiar
with patent laws and principles, the statement that a human could
be patented is flat wrong since a human would not satisfy the nov-
elty requirement as something that is naturally occurring and thus
not "new." Moreover, since patents only provide a right to exclude
others from the patented invention, any invention based upon a
person would never bar the person from using his own genetic
phenomena of nature"); see also Lab. Corp. v. Metabolite Labs., 370 E3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 601 (2005) (mem) (considering on certiorari whether a
method patent can claim observation of a scientific phenomena as one step in achieving a
tangible result).
123. E.g., Shiva, Neem Tree Case History, supra note 119; SHIVA, CORPORATE HIJACK OF
BIODIVERSITY, supra note 63, at 13-14.
124. SHIVA, CORPORATE HIJACK OF BIODIVERSITY, supra note 63, at 14.
125. RAFI stands for the Rural Advancement Foundation International, and is now
known as the Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration [ETC Group]. ETC
Group, About Us, http://www.etcgroup.org/about.asp (last visited Jan. 1, 2006) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The focus of the group is the "conserva-
tion and sustainable advancement of cultural and ecological diversity and human rights," at
the global and regional level, with a focus on the impact of technologies on disadvantaged
societies. Id.
126. See, e.g., Gary Taube, Scientists Attacked for 'Patenting' Pacific Tibe, 270 SCIENCE 1112
(1995).
127. Id.
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material.2 s However, perhaps the most striking and ironic aspect of
the press release is that the accused researchers had already agreed
to provide the tribe with royalties from any commercial benefits, in
contrast to the cases of biopiracy that RAFI traditionally rallies
against. 129 In addition, the press release suggested that this was the
beginning of a dangerous path towards patenting all life forms,
with the clear implication-at least under a misperception of the
patent system-that people would be owned by untrustworthy pat-
ent owners. The press release seems to suggest that patents can
result in a type of pseudo-slavery.'30
In reality, the scope of the patent was much narrower than the
press release suggested. Rather than patenting an indigenous per-
son, the patent only covers a cell line initially derived from the
indigenous person.131
128. See generally TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 28 (providing the
right to exclude others from patented invention); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (a) (2000) (providing the
right to exclude from patented invention).
129. Taube, supra note 126, at 1112. The scientists responding to the charges observed
that "[t]here is a certain hysterical quality to all of this which smacks of a Frankenstein-like
fear of molecular biology." Id. Indeed, one sub-issue to the biopiracy debates might be an
underlying public suspicion of molecular biology and/or a presumption that such technol-
ogy can only be used for harm.
130. Ironically, although Western governments have criticized developing countries for
misunderstanding patent law, similar concerns about patents on humans have percolated
within the very societies that grant such patents. E.g., Howard Florey Inst. v. Fraktion der
Grfinen im Europfischen Parlament, 6 OJ. E.PO. 388, 397-98 (Opposition Div. 1995).
Moreover, in an express acknowledgement of such concern, the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office [USPTO] issued a statement in the early days of genetically modified animals to clar-
ify that patents on humans would be denied as unconstitutional. See Animals-Patentability,
1077 OFFICIAL GAZETTE PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE 24 (April 7, 1987) (stating that a patent
claiming an exclusive property right in a human being would be "prohibited by the Consti-
tution"). The Constitutional basis referred to by the USPTO is generally presumed to also be
the prohibition against slavery. See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later:
Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 469, 502 (2003) (noting that
the PTO statement apparently refers to the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against
slavery); cf Rachel E. Fishman: Patenting Human Beings: Do Sub-Human Creatures Deserve Con-
stitutional Protection ?, 15 Am.J. L. & MED. 461, 462 (1989) (noting that although the USPTO
did not refer to any specific provision of the Constitution, the Thirteenth Amendment
against slavery might have been the reference, although a misplaced one). Moreover, the
academic community has ridiculed the USPTO for even issuing such a statement when it is
clear under patent law that a human being per se would not be patentable as an unmodified
product of nature. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Non-Use Cost
Perspective, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1597, 1654-55 (1993); Fishman, supra at 474-75. However, there
is sufficient confusion that some student notes have argued to the contrary. See, e.g., Esther
Slater McDonald, Note, Patenting Human Life And The Rebirth Of The Thirteenth Amendment, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1359, 1383 (2003) (stating that the USPTO is correct that the Thir-
teenth Amendment would prohibit the patenting of a human embryo because the
"prohibition of slavery would supercede the Patent Clause's allowance of patents").
131. U.S. Patent No. 5,397,696 (filed Aug. 12, 1991).
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3. Patent "Imperialism"--The irreconcilable policies that under-
lie patent protection versus promotion of traditional rights have
led to accusations of patent "imperialism." To the extent that the
term imperialism is bandied about in conjunction with biopiracy
rhetoric and misstatements concerning patent law, divergent per-
spectives may become further entrenched. This section explains
the two main contexts in which the imperialism charge has been
used. First, the very existence of systems that permit patents to is-
sue based upon traditional knowledge is said to constitute a new
type of imperialism over indigenous cultures."2 Second, the TRIPS
agreement is considered imperialistic to the extent that it forces
countries opposed to patent rights to nonetheless acknowledge
and adopt these systems.' 33
The patent imperialism claims are best understood against the
historical backdrop of Western colonialism. In particular, there is a
strong sensitivity to prior history of Western territorial expansion
over lands that were seen as unowned, or at least occupied only by
"native" or primitive peoples, and thus free for conquest by West-
ern countries. During the colonial era, indigenous groups found
themselves forced out of their homes by Western claims of owner-
ship over territory they had previously regarded as owned by none,
except some higher spiritual order.'1' In the current twenty-first
century, indigenous societies fear a reprisal of the same situation
where their cultural and sacred knowledge is appropriated and
they are excluded from use. 6 The Western notion of individual
132. E.g., Shayana Kadidal, Subject-Matter Imperialism? Biodiversity, Foreign Prior Art and the
Neem Patent Controversy, 37 IDEA 371 (1997); Marden, supra note 73, at 280 (suggesting that
the "uncompensated 'harvesting' of biological resources from developing states can be seen
as an insidious new form of colonialism, since multinational companies reap huge benefits
while none of the profits flow back to the states providing the resources"); Laurie Anne
White, Interdisciplinary Perspectives: Indigenous Peoples, Intellectual Property and the New Imperial
Science, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 211 (1998).
133. See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated and Overprotec-
tive, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613 (1996); A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a
'Polite Form of Economic Imperialism, '29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996); Lakshmi Sarma,
Biopiracy: Twentieth Century Imperialism in the Form of International Agreements, 13 TEMPLE INT'L
& COMp. L.J. 107 (1999).
134. E.g., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (finding that the federal govern-
ment, rather than the Native Americans, had title to the land based upon the "right" to
conquer and occupy).
135. ECOSOC, Draft Declaration, supra note 12, Annex I (noting a historical concern
that indigenous peoples "have been deprived of their human rights and fundamental free-
doms ... [because of] colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories, and
resources").
136. See, e.g., Biopnzacy: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE, supra note 63, at 2-3 ("Columbus
set a precedent when he treated the license to conquer non-European peoples as a natural
right of European men .... These Eurocentric notions of property and piracy are the bases
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ownership of property was and remains anathema to notions of
community ownership as well as a communal relationship between
societies and their environment.
37
The Western conquest analogy is not entirely identical to the ex-
tent that the actual land and raw materials of indigenous material
are not being technically claimed by Western nations. Rather, the
raw materials are being utilized as starting material to develop sub-
sequent innovations that did not previously exist. According to
Western patent norms, there is nothing illegitimate about creating
patentable inventions based on natural materials. However, this
process assumes that natural biological materials are "free" (or in
the public domain) for use in this way in a manner that bears some
resemblance to the prior colonialism assumption that land was free
to be taken and improved upon. Just as land was considered sacred
during the colonial era, natural resources are often considered sa-
cred today, such that use of such resources would be considered
immoral.'isa
In addition, patent rights are seen as a tool that promotes and
elevates Western norms in a manner that necessarily fails to ac-
knowledge the value of traditional communities. Some have
suggested that Western notions of property and public domain si-
multaneously trivialize the contributions of indigenous peoples
while enabling such contributions to be appropriated under West-
ern notions of patent rights.19 In particular, the Western property
view that considers all things either privately owned, or in the pub-
lic domain and free for use by anyone, is inconsistent with the
on which the IPR laws of the GATT and World Trade Organization (WTO) have been
framed.").
137. See e.g., Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-
Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 11, 46 (1998) [hereinafter Aoki, Neocolonialism] (noting that there is a "serious ques-
tion" concerning whether the individualized Western notion of property is appropriate
"when discussing things like agricultural practices, cell lines, seed plasm and oral narratives
that 'belong' to communities rather than individuals").
138. See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Ruth Gana, The Myth of Development, the Progress of Rights: Human Rights to
Intellectual Property and Development, 18 LAw & POL'Y 315, 339, 341 (1996) [hereinafter Gana,
The Myth of Development]; Michael J. Huft, Indigenous Peoples and Drug Discovery Research: A
Question of Intellectual Property Rights, 89 NW. U. L. REv. 1678 (1995); James 0. Odek, Biopi-
racy: Creating Proprietary Rights in Plant Genetic Resources, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 141 (1994);
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and Technical
Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 919, 929 (1996); see also
Chidi Oguamanam, Localizing Intellectual Property in the Globalization Epoch: The Integration of
Indigenous Knowledge, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 135, 146 (2004) (suggesting that the
patent regime is "designed to recognize, legitimize and consequently empower Western
scientific narrative" without giving due regard to "cultural accounts of science outside the
Western paradigm").
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principles of many traditional communities that see some things as
not owned by anyone.'4° Accordingly, patent rights are particularly
suspect as a means to further consolidate Western resources-at
the cost of developing nations. As described by Professor Keith
Aoki, "Invaluable biological cultural resources [are] flowing out of
the countries of the South as 'raw materials' into the developed
nations of the North where they are magically transformed in the
laboratories of pharmaceutical and agricultural corporations into
protected intellectual properties.'
141
The TRIPS agreement can be seen as the ultimate act of imperi-
alism to the extent that it forces countries opposed to patents to
nonetheless tolerate and grant patents within their own countries.
Not only do many indigenous communities oppose patent rights,
but also the scope of patentable subject matter under TRIPS. In
particular, many communities object to patent rights over any type
of life forms, regardless of the amount of human intervention in-
volved. 42 This objection reflects their philosophy that life is sacred.
However, their philosophies are inherently irreconcilable with the
mandatory language under TRIPS that plant and animal varieties
must be granted protection.1
4
3
The negotiation of TRIPS is also considered an act of imperial-
ism to the extent that it was conceived by Western countries and
imposed upon developing countries that are widely acknowledged
to have had no negotiation power. In particular, just as dominant
Western nations previously "conquered" land without regard for
the rights and interests of indigenous populations, so too TRIPS
was imposed upon countries with less political power."" In addi-
tion, just as Western colonial conquerors claimed that they were
improving the lifestyle of natives (or savages), so too TRIPS was
presented as beneficial to developing countries based on the
140. See, e.g., Michael Blakeney, Bioprospecting and the Protection of Traditional Medical
Knowledge of Indigenous Peoples: An Australian Perspective, 19 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 298, 300
(1997) (noting that indigenous people may view traditional knowledge in terms of commu-
nity and individual responsibility, rather than in terms of property rights).
141. Aoki, Neocolonialism, supra note 137, at 49.
142. E.g., WTO Secretariat, Review of the Provisions of Article 27.3(b), Summary of Issues
Raised and Points Made, 2-3, IP/C/W/369 (Aug. 8,1992); GERVAIS, supra note 99, at 228-29.
143. TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27(3).
144. See, e.g., Aoki, Neocolonialism, supra note 137, at 20 ("Third World countries might
be thought of as being coerced into joining GATT, which literally said to Third World coun-
tries: If you want to export your goods ... you must protect the intellectual properties of
other nations."). In particular, because TRIPS was part of the new WTO world order, opting
out of the system was not an option. See, e.g., Gana, The Myth of Development, supra note 139, at
335 (noting that "the forces of globalization are so strong that it would be impossible, if not
self-destructive, for any country to attempt to isolate itself from the international economic
system").
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premise that patents spur innovation.' Not only has TRIPS not
resulted in spurring innovation or foreign direct investment in
these countries, but the premise is questionable for pre-
industrialized countries, given that most nations that presently
thrive on patent protection only adopted such protection at a later
period in their industrialization. For example, the United States
Office of Technology Assessment has noted that "[w]hen the
United States was still a relatively young and developing country,
for example, it refused to respect international intellectual prop-
erty rights on the grounds that it was freely entitled to foreign
works to further its social and economic development."' 4 Similarly,
the UK Commission on studying Intellectual Property Rights con-
cluded that "[d] eveloping countries should not be deprived of the
flexibility to design their IP systems that industrialized countries
enjoyed in earlier stages of their own development." 147
B. International Architecture: The Role of
International Agreements
This section describes the relevant international framework for
evaluating the relationship between TRIPS and biopiracy. The
dominant international agreements-TRIPS and the CBD-are
first described, together with relevant human rights norms. Then,
145. See, e.g., Michael Lehmann, TRIPs, the Berne Convention, and Legal Hybrids, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2621, 2622-23 (1994); see also Gana, The Myth of Development, supra note 139,
at 331-32 (describing long-term "promise of development" as a justification for modem
arguments demanding higher levels of intellectual property protection by developing coun-
tries).
146. U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN
AGE OF ELECTRONICS INFORMATION 228 (1986); see alsoJames Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and
the Future of Intellectual Property, 9 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 3 ("[C]ountries that now preach
the virtues of expansive minimum levels of intellectual property protection, did not them-
selves follow that path to industrial development."). See generally Gana, The Myth of
Development, supra note 139, passim (arguing that the modern regime of international intel-
lectual property protection fails to protect developing countries).
147. COMMISSION ON IPRs, supra note 15, at 8; see also Carlos M. Correa & Sisule F.
Musungu, The WIPO Patent Agenda: The Risks for Developing Countries, in TRADE-RELATED
AGENDA, DEVELOPMENT AND EQUITY WORKING PAPERS, 23, 198-200 (No. 12, Nov. 2002)
(noting that industrialized countries had varying evolutions of their patent systems that
enabled them to take into account the competitive strength of their industries); NAT'L RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 12
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL] (noting that
the report does not attempt to address less developed countries with the implication that
countries at different levels of economic development should be entitled to different patent
standards and also acknowledging that determining such standards is an "enormously com-
plex" issue).
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this section illustrates how TRIPS not only fails to promote CBD's
objectives, but also dominates over all international agreements
and norms in a manner that is inconsistent with its status as an in-
ternational trade agreement.
1. Relevant International Agreements: TRIPS, CBD, UN
a. TRIPS-TRIPS requires that patents be available for all "in-
ventions" in all fields of technology-subject to a few exceptions
that are later discussed-if they comply with the other require-
ments of TRIPS.148 For all inventions, patents must be granted if the
inventions meet the technical requirements of being "new, involve
an inventive step, and are capable of industrial application," or are
new, nonobvious, and useful, 49 and the patent application ade-
quately discloses the invention sufficiently for a person of similar
technical skill to carry out the invention. 5 0 Both the technical re-
quirements of the invention and the patent application are not
further defined in TRIPS, but are understood to be identical to
Western patent laws.'"' Importantly, the lack of an explicit defini-
tion of what constitutes "new" allows member states to self-define
these terms. For Western countries that already used such terms in
their patent laws, TRIPS permits continued use of the same stan-
dards.
15 12
148. See TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27(1). The term "invention"
is not defined in TRIPS, leading to some possible flexibility for countries to exclude unde-
sired subject matter claiming it is not adequately an invention. Although Western countries
tend to adopt a very broad definition of invention-considering it satisfied if a substance in
nature is isolated or purified-TRIPS does not require member states to follow such stan-
dards. See, e.g., Correa, Patent Rights, supra note 42, at 198.
149. TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27(1); id. n.5 ("For the pur-
poses of this Article, the terms 'inventive step' and 'capable of industrial application' may be
deemed by a Member to be synonymous with the terms 'non-obvious' and 'useful' respec-
tively.").
150. Id. at art. 29.
151. Compare TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27 with EPC, supra note
38, at art. 52(1) and Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2000); Compare TRIPS, Marrakesh
Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 29(1) with Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). In addition,
the policy may also be consistent with the objectives in TRIPS, as noted in Article 7, which
provides that "intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of techno-
logical innovation" since full disclosure of an invention is necessary to contribute to
dissemination of such innovation. See TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 7;
GERVAIS, supra note 99, at 239.
152. For example, in Europe, an invention is only considered new based on a test of
"absolute novelty"; in other words, if an invention was previously known anywhere in the
world, whether in oral or written form, it is no longer new and must be denied a patent. See
EPC, supra note 38, at art. 52(4). In contrast, the United States has a narrower definition of
new, sometimes referred to as "relative novelty;" under the United States rules, an invention
may be deemed new, and thus patentable even if it is known in another country-so long as
the knowledge is not documented in any fixed writing. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
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There are several possible exceptions available to member states
to the general rule that patent protection be available for all inven-
tions. Members may, but need not, exclude methods of medical
diagnosis and treatment for humans and animals.53 In addition,
they may exclude plants and animals, "other than micro-
organisms," from patentability, although "plant varieties [must be
protected] either by patents or by an effective sui generis system.1
54
In addition, TRIPS Article 27(2) permits members to exclude an
invention if a member believes that commercial exploitation of
such invention must be precluded to protect "ordre public or moral-
ity.
,, I5
Although TRIPS mandates compliance with certain patent rules,
the framework of TRIPS provides some leeway for national discre-
tion. 56 In particular, nations are free to provide more intellectual
property protection. For example, although TRIPS permits na-
tions to exclude some subject matter from patentabilty, such as
medical procedures, nations may still permit such subject matter to
be patented because TRIPS merely provides a minimum level of
patentability that member countries may exceed. In addition, al-
though TRIPS primarily regulates the substantive standards of
patentability, it also provides some guidelines, as well as discretion
for procedural requirements associated with patentability. In par-
ticular, TRIPS Article 62(1) provides that members "may require
... compliance with reasonable procedures and formalities" as a
condition for patent rights.15s
153. TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27(3) (a) (noting that members
may exclude "diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or
animals").
154. Id. at art. 27(3)(b). Notably, TRIPS required this provision to be reviewed four
years after the agreement because of controversy over the terms of this provision at the time
of its enactment. See GERVAIS, supra note 99, at 227-28.
155. TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27(2). However, an invention
cannot be excluded "merely because the exploitation is prohibited by... law." Id. Rather,
the focus is on whether commercialization of the invention-legal or not-would contra-
vene ordre public and morality. Although this provision has yet to be interpreted by a WTO
panel, it specifies that ordre public or morality may include "to protect human, animal or
plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment." Id.
156. Id. at art. 27(3) (a) (providing that members may exclude from patentability "diag-
nostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals").
157. Id. atart. 1(1).
158. Id. at art. 62(1). The term "reasonable procedure or formality" is not defined in
TRIPS, but the one WTO panel to opine on this issue suggested that it must be "tied to valid
reasons required to ensure a proper examination." Panel Report, Canada-Term of Patent
Protection, 6.115, WT/DS170/R (May 5, 2000) aff'd, WT/DS170/AB/R (Sept. 18, 2000),
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-search.asp?searchmode=simple (search for
document number 00-1965) [hereinafter Canada Patent Term].
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b. CBD--CBD governs access and use of genetic resources and
traditional knowledge. In particular, the CBD is a departure from
the prior perspective that the products of nature belonged to the
"common heritage of mankind," and were thus free for taking
without any regulation."9
The CBD states that member countries should "respect, preserve
and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous
and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity .... 160
In addition, the CBD further provides that members should "en-
courage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the
utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices."' 6' How-
ever, there are some notable caveats to what, at first glance,
appears to be an advancement of the interests of indigenous cul-
ture. In particular, the entire clause is couched in very vague
language-each member is obliged "as far as possible and as ap-
propriate" to take such measures, and even then, the measures are
"[s] ubject to its national legislation.
1 62
Subsequent meetings of the CBD Council of Parties have set
forth additional guidelines to promote the CBD provisions con-
cerning the protection of traditional knowledge. In particular, the
CBD issued the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources
(Bonn Guidelines) in 2002, which explicitly note that they are in-
tended "to provide [p]arties and stakeholders with a... framework
to facilitate access to genetic resources and ensure fair and equita-
ble sharing of benefits.' 63 Although the Bonn Guidelines are
159. See, e.g., Report of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization,
1983, International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, art. 1, U.N.
Doc. C/83/Rep (stating the "universally accepted principle that plant genetic resources are
a heritage of mankind and consequently should be available without restriction") (emphasis
omitted); WIPO, Matters Concerning Intellectual Property, supra note 44, at para. 33; see also
Zakir Thomas, Common Heritage to Common Concern: Preserving a Heritage and Sharing Knowl-
edge, 8 J. WORLD. INTELL. PROP. L. 241, 246-50 (2005) (tracing evolution from plant
resources as common heritage of all to biodiversity conservation as common concern, in-
cluding the implications for nations to recover financially from bioprospecting activities of
pharmaceutical companies).
160. CBD, supra note 6, at art. 8(j).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Bonn Guidelines on Access
to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their
Utilization, 11 (b), U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP.6/20 (May 27, 2002) [hereinafter Bonn
Guidelines]. The Bonn Guidelines provide objectives beyond those specified in the CBD
while simultaneously noting that they are intended to be merely a "useful first step in an
evolutionary process in the implementation of relevant provisions" of the CBD for access to
genetic resources and benefit-sharing. Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity, Feb. 9-20, 2004 Report of the Open-Ended Inter-Sessional Meeting on the
Multi-Year Programme of Work of the Conference of the Parties up to 2010, 6, U.N. Doc.
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merely advisory to member states, they attempt to nonetheless pro-
vide a template for national laws and policies that would effectuate
CBD goals with respect to three main areas. 164 First, the Bonn
Guidelines suggest that prior informed consent should be sought
from the providing country165 prior to accessing genetic resources
or traditional knowledge. 16 Second, the Bonn Guidelines suggest
that for any invention that concerns or makes use of a genetic re-
source or traditional knowledge in its development, a related
patent application should disclose the country of origin. 167 This
suggestion is noted to assist in tracking "compliance with prior in-
formed consent" and the "mutually agreed terms on which access
[to those resources] was granted.' 68 Finally, the Guidelines suggest
that countries should "[e]nsure the fair and equitable sharing of
benefits... arising from the commercialization or other use of ge-
netic resources, " 169 and provide specific examples of monetary and
non-monetary benefits that might be provided.
c. International Human Rights-UN Declarations-International
human rights provide an additional basis for recognizing and pro-
tecting traditional knowledge. The pertinent human rights include
rights recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, and international human
rights laws. For example, indigenous peoples have a right to full
enjoyment of all human rights and freedoms, including the right
to cultural sovereignty, which in their case may include a right to
control traditional knowledge relating to biodiversity, medicine
and agriculture.'
Multiple UN resolutions, reports, and statements consider biopi-
racy as one of several human rights issues that conflict with TRIPS.
UNEP/CBD/COP/7/5 (May 27, 2002). The Guidelines explicitly contemplate further con-
sideration of the issues raised by the Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing and that
this group will further advise the Conference on the Parties. Id. 1 8.
164. The Bonn Guidelines are not binding on members of the CBD, although parties
and governments are invited "to use the Guidelines" for national laws and policies. Bonn
Guidelines, supra note 163, 4, at 262.
165. Id. 28.
166. See id. 16(d) (noting that member nations with "users of genetic resources under
their jurisdiction should take appropriate legal, administrative, or policy measures, as appro-
priate, to support compliance with prior informed consent") (emphasis added); see also id.
16(b)(1); id. 16(b) (ix). In addition, the Bonn Guidelines provide specific principles and
procedures for such a system. Id. 26, 36.
167. Id. 16(d)(ii) (suggesting that countries consider "[m)easures to encourage the
disclosure of the country of origin" in applications for intellectual property rights).
168. Id. 16(d).
169. Id. 16(b)(ix).
170. Id. at app. II.
171. See, e.g., ECOSOC Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at arts. 1, 29.
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For example, Resolution 2000/07 specifically mentions biopiracy
and community control over genetic and natural resources as a
conflict that exists between implementation of TRIPS and realiza-
tion of human rights norms.172 Although the resolution "affirms"
the existence of human rights over intellectual property, it clarifies
that such patent rights are "subject to limitations in the public in-
terest,' ' 7 3 such that human rights obligations should be given
"primacy" over competing economic policies and agreements.74
The 2001 Report of the High Commissioner similarly mentioned a
need to protect traditional medical knowledge from biopiracy.Y
The Report is consistent with Resolution 2000/07 with respect to
its view that intellectual property rights must be considered in con-
text with human rights norms. For example, the Report advocated
a "human rights approach" to intellectual property rights, which
would necessitate that such rights be conceptualized as "more akin
to a privilege." 176 Such language suggests that the stated rights un-
der TRIPS should be taken as privileges that must be considered in
the context of human rights, even though human rights are not
expressly noted in TRIPS. In particular, the Report states that hu-
man rights "are inalienable and universal," such that they should
transcend state-granted rights.7 7 Once again, this suggests that
rights under TRIPS, which are state-granted rather than inalien-
able should, where appropriate, bow to the more universal human
rights. Moreover, the Report supports the World Health Organiza-
tion's report recommending "ways and means" to protect
172. U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, U.N. Sub-Comm'n on the Protection of
Human Rights, 52d Sess., Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Res. 2000/07, pmbl.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2007 ("[A]ctual or potential conflicts exist between the
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization of economic, social and cul-
tural rights in relation to ... 'bio-piracy' and the reduction of communities' control over
their own genetic and natural resources and cultural values."). The declaration also notes
that the CBD "echoes the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
on the right to self-determination and on the balance of rights and duties inherent in the
protection of intellectual property rights." Id.
173. Id. 11.
174. Id. 3. The resolution declares that implementation of TRIPS fails to reflect "all
human rights, including the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and
its applications, the right to health, the right to food and the right to self-determination." Id.
1 2. See also ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in
the Implementation of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Human
Rights and Intellectual Property, 7 8, 16, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/15 (Dec. 14, 2001) ("States
... must give particular attention ... to the adequate protection of the human rights of...
indigenous peoples .... National sovereignty over wealth and resources is an important
prerequisite for the effective promotion and protection of human rights.").
175. ECOSOC, The Impact of the Agreement, supra note 25, at 65, (citing Report of the Inter-
regional Workshop, supra note 84, at 35).
176. Id. 1 14.
177. Id.7 14.
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"traditional medicine knowledge from biopiracy," including "the
adaptation of IP systems so that they fully take into account the cul-
tural and other rights of indigenous and local communities."
178
With specific reference to the tension between TRIPS and the
CBD, the Report suggests that these tensions "could require
amendments, adaptations and additions to IP systems," although
the Report stops short of articulating such change, beyond its
broader exhortation of construing intellectual property rights in
conjunction with human rights.
179
In addition, there is a United Nations Draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples that, while not yet ratified,"'0 provides
further support for the protection of indigenous communities
from competing intellectual property rights based upon human
rights principles. 181 The Draft declares that such peoples have the
"right to .. . control, develop and protect their sciences ... includ-
ing human and other genetic resources, seeds, medicines,
knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora .... "'s' The Draft
may attempt to consider such control of science to be an intellec-
tual property right, since the same Article declares that indigenous
peoples are entitled to recognition of "full ownership, control and
protection of their cultural and intellectual property."83 However,
if intellectual property is intended to be defined as knowledge of
properties of biological material alone, that would be contrary to
Western definitions of intellectual property that typically consider
discovery of natural properties as outside the scope of protection.
178. Id. 65.
179. Id. 26.
180. Although the draft has not yet become a UN General Assembly resolution or dec-
laration, which would open it up for ratification, it has nonetheless been a starting point for
continued discussions among the United Nations Organization. See, e.g., ECOSOC, Res.
1995/32, 52nd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. E/Res/1995/32 (July 25, 1995); ECOSOC, Res.
2000/22, 45th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. E/Res/2000/22 (July 28, 2000); ECOSOC, Permanent
Forum on Indigenous Issues, 2nd Sess., Outcomes Achieved in Response to the First Session of the
Forum, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2004/3 (Mar. 17, 2003) (providing overview of developments and
recommendations at the first forum); G.A. Res. 57/191, U.N. Doc. A/Res/57/191 (Jan. 23,
2003) (noting the forum's review of all existing mechanisms within the UN concerning
indigenous issues and providing recommendations on how to streamline activities and pro-
mote effectiveness).
181. ECOSOC, Draft Declaration, supra note 12, Annex I (noting there is an "urgent
need to respect and promote the inherent rights and characteristics of indigenous peoples,
especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources, which derive from their politi-
cal, economic and social structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and
philosophies").
182. Id. at art. 29.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Lawrence Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexis-
tence, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. Rev. 47, 54 (2003) (noting that the Draft defines "protectable
subject matter more broadly than existing intellectual property" rights). However, some
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Even if the attempt to broaden the definition of intellectual prop-
erty to encompass traditional knowledge is not successful, the Draft
reinforces CBD concepts, such as the fact that informed consent,
and even restitution, be provided if "cultural, intellectual, religious
and spiritual property" is "taken without their free and informed
consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs.' 8 5 The
definition of "cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual prop-
erty" is unclear, but could conceivably embody some of the issues
of prior biopiracy cases, such as when a derivative of the sacred
neem tree was patented.
2. Conflict or Coexistence: TRIPS and CBD-There are two pri-
mary issues of conflict that have been identified regarding TRIPS
and the CBD 86 First, TRIPS is alleged to be complicit in biopiracy
for its failure to define patent requirements in a way that would
limit patents based on traditional knowledge of other countries.
Second, TRIPS has been criticized for failing to promote the CBD
goals of benefit-sharing and informed consent because such issues
are not included as requirements to patent protection. Although
there has been substantial discussion of whether these two agree-
ments technically conflict, 8 7 this section primarily outlines the
scholars have suggested that indigenous knowledge be protected under existing or pro-
posed regimes of intellectual property. See, e.g., David R. Downes, How Intellectual Property
Could be a 7bol to Protect Traditional Knowledge, 25 COLUM. J. ENV. L. 253 (2000); Michael
Halewood, Indigenous and Local Knowledge in International Law: A Preface to Sui Generis Intellec-
tual Property Protection, 44 McGiLL L.J. 953 (1999); Surinder Kaur Verma, Protecting Traditional
Knowledge: Is a Sui Generis System an Answer?, 7J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 767 (2004).
185. ECOSOC, Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at art. 12.
186. In addition, there is a third issue that is sometimes raised in discussions of conflict
between TRIPS and the CBD, but which does not directly address a conflict between the two
agreements; in particular, there is an argument that there is an inherent tension in philoso-
phies concerning whether "life" may be owned. This is not discussed in detail here, but is
addressed in the context of proposed strategies for addressing biopiracy. See infra Part IV.
187. See, e.g., Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Note by
the Secretariat: The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological
Diversity: Summary of Issues Raised and Points Made, IP/C/W/368 (Aug. 8, 2002) (providing
overview of positions made by different parties prior to August, 2002); CATHERINE MONAGLE
& AIMEE T. GONZALES, CTR. FOR INT'L ENVTL. LAW & WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE INT'L,
BIODIVERSITY & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: REVIEWING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN LIGHT OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
(2001), http://www.ciel.org/publications/tripsmay01.pdf (discussing requirements under
both the CBD and TRIPS, as well as the issues of whether TRIPS negatively impacts CBD
objectives); The Gala Foundation, Genetic Resources Action Int'l, TRIPS versus CBD: Conflicts
Between the WTO Regime of Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Biodiversity Management,
GLOBAL TRADE AND BIODIVERSITY IN CONFLICT, Apr. 1998, at 7-11 (arguing that TRIPS
threatens the implementation of CBD and suggesting measures to address the "contradic-
tion" between the agreements). Western countries have primarily asserted that there is no
conflict. See, e.g., Commission on Intellectual and Industrial Property, Policy Statement:
TRIPS and the Biodiversity Convention: What Conflict? (June 28, 1999),
http://ww.iccwbo.org/home/statements-rules/statements/1999trips-andbio-convention.asp
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arguments because the structural dominance of TRIPS, as dis-
cussed in the next section, plays a more critical role.
a. Patent Requirement-TRIPS's lack of definition for the term
"new" is alleged to promote a preexisting problem of biopiracy.
Specifically, United States patent law presently considers inventions
to be new and patentable without regard to what is known outside
the United States-if such information is not documented in writ-
ing."" To the extent that there is preexisting indigenous
knowledge, this knowledge is by its nature typically oral, such that
it would be excluded from consideration by the United States.
United States law is different from most Western countries and is
often seen as responsible for some of the most egregious cases of
biopiracy. ' 9 For example, although a patent on a method of con-
trolling fungi on plants using extracted neem oil was recently
revoked in Europe based upon evidence that the fungicidal effect
of neem seed extracts has been known for centuries in India,'90
such evidence would not preclude the existence of a United States
patent because the United States does not consider public use in
countries beyond itself as relevant prior art unless such use is
documented in writing.'91
b. CBD "requirement" (benefit-sharing and informed consent)-TRIPS
is also alleged to promote biopiracy to the extent that it enables
patenting of genetic material without ensuring that CBD provisions
are respected. In particular, there is concern that TRIPS provisions
do not mandate obtaining prior informed consent or practicing
benefit-sharing.' 92 These CBD goals, as recently affirmed and fur-
(stating policy of the International Chamber of Commerce that CBD and TRIPS are equally
binding, but no amendments to TRIPS are necessary because of lack of conflict, and in the
alternative, that TRIPS should control as the later in time agreement pursuant to interpreta-
tion under the Vienna Convention); Communication from the European Communities and
Their Member States, Review of Article 2 7.3(B) of the TRIPS Agreement, and the Relationship be-
tween the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, IP/C/W/383 (Oct. 17, 2002) (noting that there is no legal
conflict between TRIPS and the CBD, and recognizing openness to continued discussion).
188. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
189. See, e.g., McMannis, supra note 63, at 450. However, the issue of TRIPS complicity
in condoning the United States laws may become a moot point since this law may need to be
revised for both domestic and international concerns. See infra Part IV.B.
190. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (describing recent revocation of
neem patent; see also European Patent Spec. 0,436,257,B1 (filed Dec. 20, 1990).
191. See supra Part I.A.
192. See, e.g., Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes
of Meeting, Held in the Centre William Rappard on 21 and 22 Sept. 2000, 1 144, IP/C/M/28
(Nov. 23, 2000); Communication from Brazil, Review of Article 27.3(b), 21, IP/C/W/228
(Nov. 24, 2000) (noting that conflicts may arise between TRIPS and CBD to the extent that
patents may exist over naturally occurring resources, in violation of the CBD); Communica-
tion from India, 04, IP/C/W/196 (July 12, 2000) ("It is widely agreed that the TRIPS
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ther clarified in the Bonn Guidelines, are not embodied in TRIPS.
Accordingly, some countries have advocated that TRIPS should be
amended to mandate that patents inconsistent with CBD Article
15-which relates to access and benefit-sharing-not be granted.' 9
These countries argue that countering specific instances of biopi-
racy patents by utilizing revocation procedures is cost-prohibitive,
such that an international requirement under TRIPS is needed.1
4
These requirements have been suggested as useful in ensuring that
resources are appropriately accessed if patent applicants know that
they must not only be under an ethical obligation to seek prior in-
formed consent of the community from which the resource was
obtained, but also so indicate on their patent applications. More-
over, both proposals for reconciling TRIPS and the CBD are
suggested as helpful in ensuring that resources are appropriately
shared with communities that helped in the path towards a pat-
entable invention.
Western countries have countered that patent requirements
have no bearing on whether countries have national laws barring
improper access or on the extent to which such laws are adequately
enforced. For example, as noted by the European Union, because
the goal of intellectual property rights is not the regulation of ge-
netic resources, a patent office should not be required to act as a
de facto "enforcement agency for a third country's legislation on
access to genetic resources.' 95 Inclusion of these requirements in
patent applications has been suggested as an incomplete solution
since those who currently seek patents, which are public docu-
ments, might instead protect their inventions through trade
secrets, which by definition, are kept secret from the public. 196 In
Agreement is incompatible with the Convention on Bio-Diversity."); Communication from
India, 13-16, IP/C/W/195 (July 12, 2000) (expressing concern about the need to recon-
cile contradictions between CBD and TRIPS).
193. See, e.g., Communication from Bangladesh, The Challenge of Integrating LDCs into the
Multilateral Trading System, 39, GC/W/251 (July 13, 1999); IP/C/W/196, supra note 192,
4 (asserting that the first priority is to "incorporate a provision that patents inconsistent
with Article 15 of the CBD must not be granted").
194. See, e.g., Communication from Brazil et al., The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agree-
ment and the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, I 10-
12, IP/C/W/356 (June 24, 2002) (suggesting that TRIPS must be amended to mandate
disclosure of origin of biological resources or traditional knowledge, as well as informed
consent and evidence benefit-sharing because developing countries do not have the re-
sources to attack patents individually); Submission by India, Protection of Biodiversity and
Traditional Knowledge-The Indian Experence, 8-11, WT/CTE/W/156 (July 14, 2000).
195. Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States, Re-
view of the Provisions of Article 273(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, °21, IP/C/W/254 (June 13,
2001).
196. Communication from the United States, Review of the Provisions of Article 273(b), at
6, IP/C/W/162 (Oct. 29, 1999).
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addition, to the extent that some inventors would continue to file
patent applications, such a requirement would be administratively
unwieldy for patent offices,197 and would adversely impact inven-
tors, small businesses, and developing countries because of
necessary increased costs. Western countries have thus suggested
that a better approach would be to use contracts, in addition to
developing databases of traditional knowledge to facilitate the dis-
covery and documentation of such knowledge for patent
examiners.' gs Even some developing countries are amenable to
creation of databases, although they typically do not consider this a
complete solution.'
c. De facto domination of TRIPS-A related problem is that the
structure of TRIPS, including the unique WTO enforcement provi-
sions under the Dispute Settlement Understanding that governs all
WTO agreements, results in the dominance of TRIPS provisions
over competing international agreements, without rising to the
level of a clear conflict of treaties under international law. First,
this section will establish that the obligations stated under TRIPS
are clearly delineated in comparison to other international agree-
ments that are alleged to conflict with TRIPS. Second-and some
would say more importantly-the TRIPS obligations carry extreme
197. See, e.g., id.; IP/C/W/209, supra note 58, at 6 (suggesting that disclosure of origin
would be "a legal and administrative nightmare for all involved" without necessarily ensur-
ing the benefit-sharing desired). Other countries have countered that the requirement
would be no more burdensome than existing patent requirements. See, e.g., Submission by
Brazil et al., The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 1 12-13, IP/C/W/403 (June 24, 2003)
(arguing that because the patent applicant would be in the best position of knowing where
resources were derived from, a disclosure requirement would not be an undue onus on the
applicant); IP/C/W/228, supra note 192, 27 (noting that because there would probably be
few applications suspected of violating biodiversity provisions, administrative burden would
be minimal); IP/C/W/356, supra note 194, 13 (asserting that the suggested requirements
would be no more burdensome than existing requirements and would have the benefit of
creating predictability).
198. See, e.g., Communication by the United States, Article 27.3(b), Relationship Between the
TRIPS Agreenent and the CBD, and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, 1 31-32,
IP/C/W/449 (June 10, 2005); Communication by the United States, Article 273(b), Relation-
ship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore, 7, 29, IP/C/W/434 (Nov. 26, 2004); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard from 18 to 22
June 2001, 137, IP/C/M/32 (Aug. 23, 2001); IP/C/W/209 supra note 58, 6; see also
Communication from Switzerland, Review of Article 27.3(b): The View of Switzerland, 16-19,
IP/C/W/284 (June 15, 2001) (proposing an international database of traditional knowl-
edge related to genetic resources to enhance the patent process).
199. See. e.g., IP/C/W/228, supra note 192; Submission by India, Protection of Biodiversity
and Traditional Knowledge-The Indian Experience, 16-23, IP/C/W/198 (July 14, 2000). How-
ever, there is concern about whether the databases themselves could potentially facilitate
piracy. See, e.g., IP/C/M/32, supra note 198, 136; IP/C/W/228, supra note 192, 1 41;
IP/C/W/198, supra, 17.
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weight because failure to comply with TRIPS can result in trade
sanctions through the effective dispute resolution proceedings that
are tied to TRIPS/WTO.2 '° Each of these issues will be addressed in
more detail below.
With respect to the competing international agreement related
to the biopiracy problem, the obligations stated under TRIPS are
more clearly defined. Unlike TRIPS, the CBD tends to state broad
aspirations, rather than specific obligations.2 0 ' For example, the
CBD only states that sharing of commercial benefits from the use
of genetic resources is an "aim," not a firm requirement.2 2 Al-
though the CBD states this aim "shall be upon mutually agreed
terms, 2 0 3 the multitude of biopiracy claims suggest that arriving at
such terms is not readily achieved based on the CBD alone. Even
the more specific Bonn Guidelines are couched in caveats, such as
parties should be "encouraged," and "to the extent practicable." In
addition, the CBD does not create affirmative rights, so much as
suggestions that member states pursue certain actions. For exam-
ple, although the CBD is often noted as declaring that nations have
sovereign rights over their resources, the actual language does not
create an affirmative right. Rather, it recognizes a state's sovereign
right to its natural resources.0 4 Similarly, although Article 1 of the
CBD is often invoked against claims of biopiracy, this provision
only states the objectives of the CBD, but not any actual interna-
tionally enforceable right. 05
Even the few CBD provisions that are stated in more affirmative
language have relatively little impact compared to the TRIPS
provisions, which are backed by stronger enforcement provisions.
TRIPS is ultimately enforceable under the WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Proceedings, which is uniformly regarded as one of the most
200. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU]; see also id. art. 23; id. at app. 1 (noting TRIPS as one of the agreements covered by the
DSU).
201. Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting- The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of Inter-
national Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 29 (2004) [hereinafter Heifer,
Regime Shifting]; Marc Pallemaerts, International Environmental Law in the Age of Sustainable
Development: A Critical View of the UNCED Process, 15J.L. & CoM., 623, 660-61 (1996).
202. CBD, supra note 6, at art. 15(7); see also id. at art. 8 (providing that member coun-
tries "shall, as far as possible and as appropriate ... encourage the equitable sharing of the
benefits" with regard to traditional knowledge) (emphasis added).
203. Id. at art. 15(7).
204. CBD, supra note 6, at art. 15(7).
205. See id. at art. 1 ("The objectives of this Convention, to be pursued in accordance
with its relevant provisions, are ... the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out
of the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources
.. . )
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effective means of enforcing international law.2°6 This stands in
marked contrast to the CBD system which permits, but does not
mandate, a system for resolving disputes that arise under the
agreement.27 Even if the parties willingly submit to the voluntary
CBD system, there is no means to enforce any final decision.0 8
UN resolutions are even less specific than the aspirational state-
ments in the CBD. The draft declaration on rights of indigenous
communities exemplifies lofty language that lacks enforceability.
One clause states that indigenous peoples have the "right to main-
tain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual and material
relationship with.., resources which they have traditionally owned
or otherwise occupied or used."2 9 For example, although the UN
has recently taken an active role in alleging that TRIPS under-
mines the realization of human rights, UN reports and resolutions
primarily advocate that human rights should be given "primacy"
with respect to interpretation of TRIPS's requirements, but without
defining what "primacy" means, or how to effectuate this goal.210
Similarly, recognized UN rights have no simple mechanism of en-
forcement.
21
'
206. TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 64; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss &
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Set-
tlement Together, 37 VA.J. INT'L L. 275 (1997); Laurence R. Helfer, Intellectual Property Rights in
Plant Varieties: An Overview with Options for National Governments, FAO LEGAL PAPERS ONLINE
#31, July 2002, at 20-21, http://www.fao.org/legal/prs-oL/Lpo3l-2.pdf. The DSU provides
that if countries fail to comply with WTO decisions, they may suffer trade sanctions. DSU,
supra note 200, at art. 22 (describing procedures for compensation and suspension of con-
cessions if a member fails to comply with a WTO panel ruling).
207. CBD, supra note 6, at art. 27(3). Member states are directed to "seek solution by
negotiation" if there is a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the CBD.
Id. at art. 27(1). There are no guidelines provided for how such negotiations should be
conducted. If they fail, the parties are to jointly seek mediation by a third party, but the CBD
does not itself specify any rules for how the mediation shall be conducted. Id. at art. 27(2).
Finally, if mediation is unsuccessful, parties may seek either arbitration or litigation with the
International Court ofJustice. Id. at art. 27 (3).
208. See, e.g., Chantal Thomas, Should the World Trade Organization Incorporate Labor and
Environmental Standards ?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347, 356 (2004).
209. ECOSOC, Draft Declaration, supra note 12, at art. 25; see also id. at art. 24 ("Indige-
nous peoples have the right to their traditional medicines and health practices, including
the right to the protection of vital medicinal plants, animals and minerals."). To the extent
that some patents have issued on agricultural resources that are traditionally used by in-
digenous communities, perhaps this clause would be violated. On the other hand, it is also
possible that indigenous peoples can maintain their spiritual and material relationship with
resources when a derivative of such resources is patented, since a patent does not have any
bearing on the use or ownership of the original resource.
210. See supra Part II.B.l.
211. See, e.g., Erica-Irene Daes, Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples, 95 Am. Soc'y
INT'L L. PROC. 143, 148 (2001) (noting that the UN system "still lacks any meaningful en-
forcement machinery short of a military intervention, which is plainly a matter of last
resort"). See generally FERENCZ, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW: A WAY TO WORLD PEACE: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1983) (noting that human rights under the Univer-
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Since each international regime provides its own rights and en-
forcement, the regime with the strongest enforcement ability-
TRIPS-will effectively dominate other international norms, al-
though the agreement itself does not explicitly suggest such a
result. In particular, although conflicts with other international
norms could be raised in a proceeding under the WTO, this would
at most result in consideration of TRIPS in light of other norms.
Moreover, it may be particularly difficult for an alleged conflict be-
tween TRIPS and another international norm to even be addressed
in an official WTO dispute proceeding.
There is no specific, mechanism, apart from the all-purpose dis-
pute settlement proceedings or limited action of the WTO TRIPS
Council, to consider the extent to which TRIPS conflicts with, or
even nullifies, other international norms. The Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) requirements, in turn, require a violation of
TRIPS's requirements (or other WTO requirements not at issue
here)." However, because there is no official requirement that
TRIPS not impinge on other international treaties, arguable con-
flicts would not generate anything analogous to a legal cause of
action, leaving those who believe agreements to be inconsistent, or
even irreconcilable, without a remedy under TRIPS. At most, a
perceived conflict between TRIPS and other treaty norms may arise
as a defense for failure to fully implement TRIPS requirements.
However, treaty conflicts are narrowly interpreted 1 3 and WTO
sal Declaration of Human Rights have been notoriously difficult to enforce). In particular,
the only UN organ that has authority to issue immediately binding directives is the Security
Council, but its stated purpose of preserving peace does not seem to implicate biopiracy
conflicts, or the rights of indigenous peoples. Similarly, although the Commission on Hu-
man Rights was established to deal with Human Rights violations that might cover the rights
discussed here, the Commission notably has no power to make binding decisions. Jeremy A.
Rabkin, The Politics Of The Geneva Conventions: Disturbing Background to the ICC Debate, 44 VA. J.
INT'L L. 169, 171-72 (2003). Moreover, to the extent that human rights involved with biopi-
racy are only in draft resolution, they stand even less chance of being enforced.
212. DSU, supra note 200, at art. 23 (providing grounds for nullification or impair-
ment).
213. Technically, the official bodies that interpret TRIPS-the WTO panels and the Ap-
pellate Body-are to apply the "customary rules of interpretation of public international
law," which in turn utilize the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which presumes
treaties relating to the same subject matter are compatible. See Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Opened for Signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S.
321 (1980). In addition, customary interpretations of conflicts view conflicts very narrowly,
such that there is no technical conflict if both treaty provisions can possibly be complied
with, even if not maximally fostered. Indeed, some scholars have noted that it is difficult to
imagine that there would be a true conflict found between TRIPS and another international
agreement. E.g., Helfer, Regime Shifling, supra note 201, at 29. In addition, theoretically, there
should be no conflict between TRIPS and other international agreements because most
agreements state that members should not enter into conflicting agreements. See Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217A, at art. 30, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen.
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jurisprudence thus far shows little likelihood of being receptive to
claims that a failure to implement TRIPS is excusable to avoid a
conflict with other treaty commitments. International law scholar
Professor Lawrence Heifer has suggested that other international
agreements could be considered soft law to interpret TRIPS, al-
though he admits that WTO jurists have yet to address this issue
directly. 15
Moreover, legal arguments concerning such conflicts are
unlikely to even reach resolution by dispute settlement panels to
the extent that the United States continues to use the threat of uni-
lateral trade sanctions to "resolve" disputes before they are even
considered by a formal WTO panel. In particular, the U.S. has con-
tinued to utilize a domestic trade act referred to as "Special 301,"
which enables it to identify countries that provide inadequate pro-
tection for intellectual property rights. 16 Ultimately, a country that
is listed under this procedure, on either a "Watch list" or a "Priority
Watch List," may suffer unilateral U.S. trade sanctions if no
changes are made to address the U.S. concern. 7 These sanctions
are exclusive of any sanction that would be provided pursuant to
the WTO Dispute Settlement proceedings. The United States has
used this procedure to force countries to comply with TRIPS re-
quirements before they are technically required to do so (because
of phase-in periods), and to mandate requirements that are left
ambiguous in TRIPS. For example, the United States imposed
trade sanctions on Argentina before a WTO panel was ever created
mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); CBD, supra note 6, at art. 22(1); TRIPS, Marrakesh
Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 1 (1).
214. In particular, the ATO panel reports suggest that a treaty conflict only exists where
compliance with one treaty rule necessarily compels violation of another. See Appellate Body
Report, Guatemala-Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, 61,
WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 2, 1998); Panel Report, Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Auto-
mobile Industry, § 5.356, WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998); see also Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note
201, at 76 ("WTOjurists are likely to reject claims that violating TRIPs is necessary to avoid a
conflict with other treaty commitments."). Moreover, given that the CBD norms are not
strict requirements, it would seem difficult for TRIPS requirements to compel complete
violation of them.
215. Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 201, at 77-79.
216. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901-06 (2000).
217. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (2000). Beyond the threat of trade sanc-
tions, the United States has also sometimes tied (or threatened to tie) foreign aid to the
level of intellectual property protection. See, e.g., Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 3201-06 (2000); United States-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-07 (2000). See also Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appro-
priations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-153 (1998) (amending 42 U.S.C.
7671c by adding subsecs. (d)(5), (d)(6), (e)(3), and (h)) (suspending economic assistance
to South Africa in retaliation for South Africa's defense of its compulsory licensing law
against attack by pharmaceutical companies contending that it was not consistent with
TRIPS).
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and indeed, the USTR asserted to the WTO that the countries had
resolved their dispute."' Although a developing country may hope
for a favorable resolution at the WTO, this would still not immu-
nize the country from the trade sanctions pursuant to Special 301.
Indeed, the threat of being listed on a "watch list" has prompted
countries into action, including signing bilateral agreements, or
modifying their laws prior to complying with purported interpreta-
tions of TRIPS.1 In light of this dynamic, developing countries are
likely hesitant to rely on defenses they believe are legitimate since
they may face the wrath of the U.S. before a formal adjudication at
the WTO.
220
The de facto dominance of TRIPS over other international
agreements and norms is implicitly understood, even if not con-
doned, by developing countries who have focused on the
WTO/TRIPS structure since 1999 as a method of addressing their
concerns.2 2 1 In particular, some developing countries utilized a
preexisting framework for reconsidering one article of TRIPS
218. See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution According to the Conditions Set
Forth in the Agreement, Argentina-Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection
for Agricultural Chemicals, WT/DS171/3, WT/DS196/4 (June 20, 2002); Request for Consul-
tations by the United States, Argentina-Certain Measures on the Protection of Patents and Test
Data, WT/DS196/1 (June 6, 2000); Request for Consultations by the United States, Argen-
tina-Patent Protection of Pharmaceuticals and Test Data Protection For Agricultural Chemicals,
WT/DS/171/1, (May 10, 1999). See also Hernan L. Bentolila, Lessons from the United States
Trade Policies to Convert a "Pirate". The Case of Pharmaceutical Patents in Argentina, 5 YALE J. L. &
TECH. 57 (2002-03), available at http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/yjolt/files/20022003
Issue/Bentolila.pdf. (discussing unilateral actions taken by the United States to force Argen-
tina to adopt patent protection beyond what was required under TRIPS).
219. See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative, The Work of USTR-
Intellectual Property, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_- Sectors/IntellectualProperty/The_- Work
of USTR-__IntellectualProperty.html (last visited March 6, 2006). See generally SELL, supra
note 1.
220. Indeed, this was one reason that developing countries sought the Doha Public
Health Declaration to clarify that they could utilize compulsory licensing for public health
crises, such as the AIDS epidemics. See Proposal by the African Group, et al., 10,
WT/GC/W/450 (Oct. 4, 2001).
221. The de facto dominance raises issues beyond the present focus of reconciling pat-
ent rights and competing rights under the CBD and human rights norms. In particular, to
the extent that TRIPS obligations are considered to have been negotiated as an interna-
tional contract, the de facto dominance challenges the presumption that the end result is
one that was properly bargained for. See generally Peter M. Gerhart, Why Laumaking for Global
Intellectual Property is Unbalanced, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 309 (2000) (suggesting that
TRIPS can be conceived as either a contract that exchanged acceptance of TRIPS for market
access and limits on the use of unilateral threats by industrial countries, or as a complete
result of coercion by the United States). There is widespread scholarship documenting the
resistance of developing countries to adopting TRIPS---even before it became the de facto
dominant international agreement. See, e.g., Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPs: Background, Principles
and General Provisions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPs
AGREEMENT 3, 8-10 (Carlos M. Correa & A. A. Yusuf eds., 1998) (describing genesis of
TRIPS as initiated by developed countries).
485
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subject to explicit review, Article 27(3), to raise the issue of TRIPS's
dominance over the CBD, although as initially contemplated, the
review probably did not include this issue. Even though initial pro-
posals were met with resistance from Western countries, with
responses ranging from the inappropriateness of addressing biopi-
racy as beyond the proper scope of review to comments on the
impracticability of the proposals, 2 developing countries continued
to press their proposals. At the Doha Round in 2001, the Ministe-
rial Declaration explicitly recognized this issue and charged the
Council of TRIPS, the organizational body (open to all WTO
members) responsible for administering TRIPS,2 3 "to examine,
inter alia, the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the
Convention on Biological Diversity" with respect to "the protection
of traditional knowledge and folklore ... This charge expressly
noted that the perspective of developing countries, the "develop-
ment dimension," should be considered. 22' The TRIPS Council has
yet to act on this, but developing countries have continued to press
their agenda with further communications that provide more de-
tails concerning proposals to alleviate the biopiracy problem.226
Unfortunately, present proposals by developing countries have a
number of issues that prevent their global acceptance, as further
explained in the next section.
222. See, e.g., Communication from United States, Review of the Provisions of Article
27.3(b), IP/C/W/162 (October 29, 1999).
223. TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 68.
224. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 82, 19. "In undertaking this work, the
TRIPS Council shall be guided by the objectives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8 of
the TRIPS Agreement and shall take fully into account the development dimension." Id.
225. Id.
226. In an attempt to further assist the process, several countries provided a checklist of
issues to help facilitate a "more focused, structured and result oriented discussions." Submis-
sion by Brazil et al., The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD): Checklist of Issues, at 1, IP/C/W/420 (March 2, 2004). Developing
countries have continued to make proposals, as well as rebut objections of other countries.
See, e.g., Submission from India et al., The Relationship Between the TRIPS agreement and the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge--Elements of
the Obligation to Disclose Evidence of Benefit-sharing Under the Relevant National Regime,
IP/C/W/442 (March 18, 2005); Submission by Brazil et al., The Relationship Between the
TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of Traditional
Knowledge-Technical Observations on U.S. Submission, IP/C/W/449, IP/C/W/459 (Nov. 18,
2005).
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III. THE FALLACY OF PRESENT INTERNATIONAL PROPOSALS
Although the dominance of TRIPS over competing interna-
tional agreements and norms has made it an obvious focal point
for discussion as well as proposed solutions, 7 there is a need to
seriously evaluate whether TRIPS can, in fact, deliver. This section
analyzes present proposals to amend TRIPS with an eye towards
the feasibility of such proposals. In addition, because discussion
has moved beyond the WTO/TRIPS forum, this section also con-
siders the implications of the forum-shifting discussion on the
resolution of the tension between patent rights and traditional
knowledge.
A. Present Proposals to Amend TRIPS
Developing countries have been primarily proposing two spe-
cific amendments to the patent requirements under TRIPS in
order to address the perceived biopiracy problem.228 The proposals
would make patent rights contingent on compliance with new re-
quirements designed to ensure that CBD goals are satisfied.229 An
227. See, e.g., Joint Communication from the African Group, Taking Forward the Review of
Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, at 2, IP/C/W/404 (June 26, 2003) ("any protection of
genetic resources and traditional knowledge will not be effective unless and until interna-
tional mechanisms are found and established within the framework of the TRIPS
Agreement.").
228. Most recently, a group of developing countries have suggested that evidence of
benefit-sharing be demonstrated in patent applications. Submission from Bolivia, et al., The
Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the
Protection of Traditional Knowledge-Elements of the Obligation to Disclose Evidence of Benefit-Sharing
Under the Relevant National Regime, IP/C/W/442 (Mar. 18, 2005). This is the third major issue
from the previously issued March 2004 checklist of topics for consideration by the
WTO/TRIPS Council. Id. at 1.
229. See, e.g., IP/C/W/403, supra note 197, at 1 (June 24, 2003); IP/C/W/356, supra
note 194, at 5. Developing countries have suggested that applications not be processed if
either requirement is not satisfied. Submission from Bolivia, et al., The Relationship Between
the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Protection of Tradi-
tional Knowledge-Elements of the Obligation to Disclose Evidence of Prior Informed Consent Under the
Relevant National Regime, at 4, IP/C/W/438 (Dec. 10, 2004). In addition, they have suggested
patent-based, as well as criminal and administrative penalties if noncompliance is not dis-
covered until after patent issuance. Submission from Brazil et al., Elements of the Obligation To
Disclose the Source and Country of Origin of Biological Resources and/or Traditional Knowledge Use in
an Invention, at 4, IP/C/W/429/Rev.1 (Sept. 27, 2004). For example, patent-based penalties
include revocation of the patent or narrowed claims if the patent does not meet the stan-
dard requirement of novelty. Id. In addition, they have suggested full or partial transfer of
rights if the disclosure would have shown that another person or community should have
been an inventor. Id.
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initial requirement is that patent applications that use or are based
upon genetic resources or traditional knowledge disclose the
source, as well as the country of origin of such resources.2 30 A sec-
ond requirement is that the patent application include evidence of
prior informed consent of any materials used from another coun-
try and satisfaction of the CBD mandate that access to genetic
resources be subject to the prior informed consent of the contract-
ing party providing such resources."' The disclosure of origin
requirement is suggested as potentially helpful in addressing biopi-
racy by providing information relevant to prior art while the prior
informed consent is seen as facilitating compliance with the
CBD. 32 In particular, in some biopiracy cases, prior art was not
known to patent examiners until an issued patent was challenged
by developing countries; the disclosure of origin is intended to
alert patent examiners to the fact that there may be relevant prior
art in the noted country.233 Accordingly, the proposed requirement
is suggested to be an improvement over the existing system
whereby patents are issued if the patent examiner is not informed
of prior art during the examination. 4 Similarly, the informed con-
sent requirement is suggested as mandatory to avoid prior
problems with patents issuing based upon the unauthorized use of
resources.
Although neither proposed requirement is new to discussion in
either the WTO forum or in the broader international community,
there is nonetheless notable opposition to the substance of the re-
quirements. There has been a long-standing and substantial
discussion about whether a mandatory versus permissive require-
ment to disclose the country of origin of applications, and a
requirement of informed consent, would be compatible with
TRIPS obligations.25 In addition, even assuming the requirements
230. See, e.g., id. Some developing countries believe that this requirement would be a
"prime candidate to move the discussion forward" as well as an area in which there was a
possibility for "convergence of views." Id. at 1-2.
231. See, e.g., IP/C/W/438, supra note 229.
232. Id. at 2.
233. E.g., IP/C/W/429/Rev.1, supra note 229.
234. Id. at 2. Moreover, it is noted to be similarly useful for challenges to issued patents.
Id.
235. For example, some have suggested that because TRIPS is a minimum standard
agreement, no additional requirements may be imposed. See, e.g., WIPO Intergovernmental
Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and
Folklore, Report, n.236, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/17 (June 21, 2002) (noting that the United
States believed that a requirement establishing a "substantive requirement of patentability"
would be incompatible with TRIPS); NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF
PATENT RIGHTS 153 (2003) (noting that conditions having nothing to do with assessing
patentability requirement are probably TRIPS inconsistent); Graham Dutfield, Sharing the
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were TRIPS compliant, Western countries have also objected to the
proposed requirements because they are not sufficiently linked to
the claimed subject matter to be relevant to patentability. For ex-
ample, the disclosure is proposed to be required not only where
the genetic resources or traditional knowledge are part of the
claimed invention, but also if they were used during the process of
development, or "facilitate" the development of the invention. s6
Western countries maintain-despite protests from developing
countries-that the proposals are unworkable because they are
perceived as creating an undue administrative burden on patent
237
offices. Moreover, Western countries suggest that other ap-
proaches would be better suited than the proposed amendments.
In particular, Western countries suggest contracts for benefit-
sharing, as well as an increase in the use of traditional knowledge
databases to reduce the possibility of patents being improperly
granted.23s Developing countries have repeatedly rejected such
Benefits of Biodiversity: Is there a Role for the Patent System?, 5J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 899, 921
(2002) (suggesting that it may not be TRIPS compatible to require disclosure of source,
although description of the relevant traditional knowledge would likely be compatible);
Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property: A TRIPS-Compatible Approach,
2005 MIcH. ST. L. REv. 137, 160-65 (2005) [hereinafter Gervais, A TRIPS-Compatible Ap-
proach] (suggesting a Doha-type declaration to avoid some of the mentioned TRIPS-
compatibility problems); Cynthia Ho, Disclosure of Origin and Prior Informed Consent for Applica-
tions of Intellectual Property Rights Based on Genetic Resources: A Technical Study of Implementation
Issues, 3.1.10-3.1.32, UNEP/CBD/WG-ABS/2/INF/2 (Sept. 29, 2003) (prepared for the
Convention on Biological Diversity), available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/meetings/
abs/abswg-02/information/abswg-02-inf-02-en.pdf [hereinafter Ho, Disclosure of Origin]
(suggesting that some variations would have TRIPS compliance problems); Jens Schovsbo,
The Disclosure of the Origin of Components of Biotechnological Inventions in Relation to the Implemen-
tation of the Convention on Biological Diversity, prepared for the Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
3.3.1-3.3.3 (2000), available at http://odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/tema/handelspolitikk/
032121-220011/dok-bu.html (concluding that mandating disclosure of origin as a require-
ment would be impermissible with TRIPS Article 27, but that a permissive requirement
could be consistent with TRIPS Article 29); Memorandum from Joshua Sarnoff to Stephen
Price (June 23, 2004), available at http://www.piipa.org/DOO_Memo.doc (arguing that a
requirement would be TRIPS compatible). While it is possible that a voluntary requirement
would be consistent, that is not the type of requirement favored by developing countries. In
addition, there is another argument that compliance with TRIPS is possible if the require-
ments were construed not as requirements of patentability under TRIPS Articles 27-29, but,
rather, as procedural requirements necessary to obtain patents under TRIPS Article 62.1. See
Schovsbo, supra, 3.3.2; Ho, supra, 3.1.15-3.1.23.
236. See, e.g., IP/C/W/429/Rev.1, supra note 229, at 3. In addition, the disclosure is also
considered relevant if the resources are "necessary" either as background to development of
the invention, or a "prerequisite for the development of the invention." Id.
237. See, e.g., IP/C/W/449, supra note 198, 36-38 (suggesting that developing coun-
tries have not mitigated the concern that the proposed requirements would be unduly
burdensome).
238. See, e.g., supra note 198. See generally Communication from the United States, Views
of the United States on the Relationship Between the Convention on Biological Diversity and the TRIPS
Agreement, IP/C/W/257 (June 13, 2001).
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alternatives as inadequate because of the lack of uniformity and
enforceability associated with any solution beyond TRIPS.2 9 More-
over, developing countries suggest that while contracts and
databases may be useful adjuncts to their proposed amendments to
TRIPS, they are incomplete solutions. 4°
1. Bleak Prospects for any amendment to TRIPS-Even if the sub-
stantive objections to the proposals could be overcome,
effectuating amendments within the WTO in general, and for
combating biopiracy in particular, are highly unlikely. First, for
TRIPS to be changed, there must be substantial agreement by
member states since two thirds of member states must generally
agree.2 ' In addition, politics may stall action by the WTO Council
and before member states formally adopt an amendment; for ex-
ample, in the single instance where the WTO Council adopted an
amendment, the action took place on the eve of a WTO ministerial
meeting and after years of negotiations.242 There is also the political
reality implicated by the dominance of the TRIPS agreement. In
particular, because the TRIPS provisions largely reflect the existing
laws, as well as interests of Western countries, such countries have
no incentive to alter them."3 Unlike prior attempts to achieve in-
239. See, e.g., IP/C/W/404, supra note 227, at 2 (noting that contracts and databases
can only be supplementary aids to an explicit obligation within the TRIPS agreement);
IP/C/W/403, supra note 197, at 5.
240. See, e.g., IP/C/W/403, supra note 197, at 5 (noting that databases alone are an in-
complete solution because documentation is an ongoing and costly process that will inevitably
fail to completely document the "vast breadth and depth" of traditional knowledge in each
relevant country and that contracts are also ineffective because of vastly unequal bargaining
strengths). Developing countries also have reservations about using a database to document
traditional knowledge because it might put sacred knowledge into the public domain that is
currently only known to a small number of people. A widely available database is feared to
potentially result in greater use of traditional knowledge, which would be contrary to their
desires. IP/C/W/403, supra note 197, at 5. Even if patent examiners all had access to the
database and could verify whether inventions were based upon traditional knowledge,
because of the difference of opinion between developing and Western countries with re-
spect to whether inventions based upon traditional knowledge are properly patentable, a
database might only increase the number of patents considered inappropriate to developing
countries.
241. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1125, 1149, at art. X(1) (1994); see also Gervais, A TRIPS-Compatible Approach, supra
note 235, at 139 (noting that while TRIPS may be vulnerable to criticism, the prospect of
actual amendment is slim and likely to take years to negotiate-let alone one that would
satisfy "every need and concern of holders of traditional knowledge").
242. See WTO, Implementation of Paragraph 11 of the General Council Decision of 30 August
2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the DOHA Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, IP/C/41 (Dec. 6, 2005); Tove Gerhardsen, WTO Strikes Agreement on TRIPS and
Public Health on Eve of Ministerial, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, June 12, 2005, http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=168&res=1024&print=0.
243. This is particularly true because WTO panels have primarily taken a very literal
reading of TRIPS, resulting in affirmation of strong patent rights. See, e.g., Jacques Werner,
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ternational agreement on intellectual property rights, it is widely
noted that TRIPS could not have been concluded but for the abil-
ity to leverage other parts of the WTO in a "package deal."2" Now
that negotiations on the WTO as well as side agreements such as
TRIPS are concluded, developing countries are left with no bar-
gaining power to uproot the status quo.
The dim prospects for an amendment are underscored by the
single amendment adopted by the WTO Council after years of pro-
tracted discussion that remains to be ratified by member countries.
The pending amendment involves an exception to one of the cur-
rent procedural requirements under TRIPS Article 31 regarding
compulsory licensing. Under Article 31, a government may grant a
third party the right to make, use, or sell the patented invention
without permission from the patent owner, as an exception to the
typical patent rights. 245 Often, this enables a country to promote
generic production of patented drugs. To prevent the exception
from entirely swallowing the typical patent right, there are severalprocdurl reuirment ., _ 46
procedural requirements specified, one of which includes a
requirement that the use be predominantly domestic.47 For exam-
ple, the domestic use restriction would prevent India, which has
adequate manufacturing capacity, from producing inexpensive
The TRIPS Agreement under the Scrutiny of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: The Case of Patent
Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products in India, I J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. RIGHTS 309 (1998) (noting a very strict textual approach of the parties). But see
Ghosh, Traditional Knowledge Debate, supra note 90, at 502 (suggesting that literal reading of
TRIPS language could enable interpretation of other provisions of TRIPS that provide flexi-
bility, including the possible creation of a sui generis or other regime to protect traditional
knowledge).
244. See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES 11 (2000) (noting that developing countries believed that by signing
onto WTO and TRIPS, they could avoid unilateral actions by developed countries); Gervais,
A TRIPS-Compatible Approach, supra note 235, at 161 (noting that TRIPS was a "package
deal"). See a!soJAYSHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES 11-47 (2001) (providing a detailed discussion of the negotiation of
TRIPS and emphasizing the importance of the uniform position of the North versus the
relatively divided position of Southern countries); Gana, The Myth of Development, supra note
139, at 334 ("[T]he TRIPS Agreement accomplishes, through the potential threat of eco-
nomic ostracism, what could not be accomplished through negotiations independent of the
international economic framework.").
245. TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 31. See also id. at art. 29 (provid-
ing a right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the
patented invention).
246. For example, compulsory license must be negotiated for a specific use, reasonable
compensation must be provided, and the license must be limited in time. See id. at arts.
31 (c), 31 (f), 31 (h). In addition, in case of emergencies, the patent owner must first be con-
tacted to try to negotiate a voluntary license. Id. at art. 31 (b). Even if this is not possible, the
patent owner is to be contacted as soon as possible about the license. Id.
247. Id. at art. 31 (f) ("[A] ny such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply
of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use.").
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antiretroviral drugs for export to other countries. Moreover, coun-
tries such as those in sub-Saharan Africa could not effectively
utilize the compulsory licensing provision because although they
could legally authorize a third party to make the patented com-
pound without consent of the patent owner, they have no domestic
company with adequate manufacturing capacity to take advantage
of such authorization. Most parties agreed that TRIPS did not in-
tend for sub-Saharan Africa to be deprived of AIDS drugs because
of their lack of domestic manufacturing capacity; rather, the pre-
vailing belief was that the negotiators of TRIPS did not
contemplate such a situation. Accordingly, after the problem sur-
faced and public opinion turned against such a clearly inequitable
law, member states at the Doha Ministerial Conference unani-
mously agreed in 2001 that the WTO Council should expeditiously
work towards a solution, as stated in the Doha Public Health Decla-
ration.248 The WTO Council first provided a solution in 2003, in the
form of a waiver of some of the requirements of TRIPS article 31,
to be effective until transformed into an official amendment of
TRIPS, but because of continued opposition by some countries,
adoption of the amendment by the WTO Council was stalled until
December 2005, and will nonetheless not become effective until
official ratification by member states, with a hopeful target date of
December 2007-long after the initially targeted date of 2004.249
The broader context of the Doha Public Health Declaration
shows not only the difficulties of effectuating amendment, or even
clarification of TRIPS terms, but also the importance of issue-
framing. Developing countries had long been concerned about
maintaining adequate flexibility to address domestic issues under
TRIPS.25 ° In the months immediately prior to the Doha Public
248. WTO, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 1 6,
WT/MIN/(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Public Health Declaration].
249. See General Council Decision of 30 August 2003, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the
DOHA Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 11, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2 2003)
("This decision, including the waivers granted in it, shall terminate for each Member on the
date on which an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions takes effect
for that Member"). Moreover, the Decision explicitly contemplated that an amendment be
adopted during 2004. See id.
250. Developing countries believed that the policy statements in Articles 7 and 8 would
more broadly enable them to foster their own social policy concerns. See, e.g., Panel Report,
Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, 5.17, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000)
[hereinafter Canada-Generic Drugs] (noting Columbia's assertion that the preamble to
TRIPS indicates that WTO members must respect national legislation "designed to achieve a
public policy objective"); IP/C/W/195, supra note 192, 3, 8, 14-16 (suggesting that the
preamble of TRIPS, as well as Articles 7 and 8 are relevant to requiring TRIPS be amended
to require disclosure of the country of origin for inventions based upon biological materi-
als); see also Jerome Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection
under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAWYER 2 (1995) (suggesting that
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Health Declaration, developing countries expressed particular
concern that because of pressure from Western countries, they
would not be able to utilize some of the built-in TRIPS flexibilities,
such as compulsory licensing of patented drugs to address national
AIDS epidemics. 25 ' Despite global acknowledgement of a serious
health crisis, there was not a general consensus concerning the
role of patents or TRIPS. Patent proponents initially suggested that
other issues, such as inadequate health care infrastructure, were
primarily to blame.2 2 However, an increasingly successful public
campaign by NGOs, as well as the WHO and the UN, helped to
frame the issue as a matter concerning the right to health.252 Such
framing made the issue difficult to deny.
Nonetheless, effective issue-framing alone may not be enough to
create the impetus for change. For example, although access to
life-saving antiretroviral drugs seemed a compelling issue, this was
not the sole cause of consensus behind the Doha Public Health
Declaration. Rather, Western countries that had previously been
resistant to acknowledging a problem were able to view the situa-
tion in a different light after facing their own potential national
health care crises. In particular, the United States and Canada had
a different perspective about the need for nations to utilize com-
pulsory licensing in the case of national emergencies when they
were confronted with potential anthrax crises if stockpiles of the
patented antibiotic Cipro could not be secured. 54 Although TRIPS
Articles 7 and 8 could provide developing countries with "a considerable degree of domestic
control over intellectual property policies").
251. Indeed, the draft declaration that developing countries proposed prior to the Min-
isterial conference suggested that members
shall, within or beyond the framework of the WTO, refrain from imposing or threat-
ening to impose sanctions and refrain from employing the grant of incentives or
other benefits in a manner which could curtail the ability of developing and least-
developed country Members to avail themselves of every possible policy option to
protect and promote public health.
WT/GC/W/450, supra note 220, 10. In addition, the draft preamble specifically alluded to
unilateral action by Western countries. See id., pmbl. ("f[Acknowledging the vulnerability of
developing and least-developed country Members to the imposition or the threat of sanc-
tions and to the prospect of being deprived of incentives or other benefits, including those
imposed or offered, as the case may be, beyond the framework of the WTO.") (emphasis added).
252. See, e.g., Amir Attarran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents on Antiretrovirals Drugs
Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa, 286JAMA 1886, 1890-91 (Oct. 17, 2001).
253. See, e.g., SELL, supra note 1, at 52, 146-50.
254. See, e.g., Brook K Baker, Arthritic lexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of WTO
Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 613, 624-25 (2004) (noting that negotiations "took a sharp turn
in the wake of the anthrax scare in the United States" such that the "prospects for a pro-public
health TRIPS accord soared," resulting in unanimous approval of the Doha declaration);
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permits such action in the event of a "national emergency," the
prior Western position was that sub-Saharan Africa and other coun-
tries with AIDS epidemics did not face a sufficient emergency that
would enable them to avoid initial negotiations. The United States
and Canada were accused of hypocrisy for precluding other na-
tions from utilizing compulsory licensing in the face of epidemics
that threatened to decimate entire populations while giving no
thought to use of the same measure when a handful of North
American citizens were at risk.255 The Doha Public Health Declara-
tion was concluded in the wake of this international ridicule.
Beyond the utility of fortuitous circumstances and hypocrisy, a
broader lesson is that an important component of modifying West-
ern mindsets is framing the problem in a manner that is analogous
to Western problems to secure Western sympathies. Until Western
nations faced their own health crises, they readily dismissed the
concerns of other nations in favor of the familiar mantra by West-
ern drug companies that strong patent rights are essential to
promoting innovation. The ability to challenge a perspective that is
inclined towards the pharmaceutical industry may prove particu-
larly challenging in the case of biopiracy allegations since the
conflict between patent rights and the protection of traditional
knowledge involves the valuation of spiritual and cultural values-
values that have no value in Western countries, or at least not
within current patent frameworks-above commercialization and
promotion of innovation. This is an important challenge for fram-
Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from
Seattle toDoha, 3 CHI.J. INT'L L. 27, 42-43 (2002) (noting that the anthrax scare, threatened
shortage of Cipro, and the effectiveness of developing countries, in conjunction with an
active international NGO movement helped to make the Doha Declaration possible); see also
Dan Ackman, A New Deal on Cipro, FORBES, Oct. 24, 2001, http://www.forbes.com/
2001/10/24/1024topnews-print.html (noting that Canada initially issued a compulsory
license for Cipro, but later negotiated an agreement with the patent holder); Emma Young,
US Accused of Double Standards on Drug Patents, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 2, 2001,
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dnl512 (noting a number of contributing fac-
tors to the United States' shift in position, including that India and Brazil threatened to
block further WTO trade talks without concessions on access to medicine, that the French
trade secretary accused the U.S. of double standards, and that even some U.S. senators sug-
gested that the government should permit compulsory licensing of the Cipro patent, in
direct contravention to the U.S. position for other countries).
255. See, e.g., Paul Blustein, Drug Patent Dispute Poses Trade Threat; Generics Fight Could De-
rail WTO Accord, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2001, at El (noting the global implications of the
Cipro patent fight, including WTO negotiations scheduled to take place at Doha); Sarah
Bosely, Drug Dealing, GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 2001, at 2, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
Archive/Article/0,4273,4283652,00.html (comparing the two anthrax deaths to the thou-
sands of daily deaths in Africa from HIV in context of U.S. hypocrisy in enforcing patents in
developing countries, such as Thailand and South Africa); Geoff Dyer & Adrian Michaels, A
Bitter Pill for the Drug Makers, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2001, at 27 (noting a double standard be-
tween U.S. action concerning Cipro versus action against South Africa and Brazil).
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ing realistic solutions to address biopiracy, as is later discussed in
more detail. However, before considering new approaches, it is
helpful to first understand how poor and incomplete issue-framing
is hampering the present proposals to amend TRIPS. This is help-
ful to not only understand the current stalemate in negotiations,
but also important in considering realistic ways forward.
2. Past Problems with Issue Framing-The present proposals to
amend TRIPS, as well as the related communications explaining
such proposals, illustrate the difficulties of issue framing within the
context of TRIPS. This section shows how the developing country
proposals to amend TRIPS are insufficiently analogous to Western
problems to elicit Western support. Some of the efforts at first
glance seem to invoke Western values, but ultimately display a lack
of understanding as they advocate solutions that are inconsistent
with intransigent Western beliefs about the scope of patent law, or
are inconsistent with TRIPS.
The suggestion to require patent applicants to disclose the ori-
gin of an invention based on prior art needs is a close, but
ultimately incomplete framing of the biopiracy problem within
Western values. Developing countries have suggested that a manda-
tory disclosure of an invention's origin is necessary to ensure all
relevant prior art is available to patent examiners.2 56 Prior art, is a
fundamental concept in Western patent law since patents are only
• • 258
to be granted if no prior art exists for the same invention. How-
ever, while the proposal appropriately used this important patent
term, its explanation did not illustrate how it would improve prior
art. In particular, rather than focus on prior art that would invali-
date patents in all countries, developing countries noted that the
origin of an invention would be helpful in determining whether an
invention should be unpatentable as contrary to "ordre public or mo-
rality.",2 59 Although possibly true, the ambiguous TRIPS exception
256. IP/C/W/429/Rev.1, supra note 229, '3-6. In addition, it is suggested that such
information would continue to be useful after the issuance of a patent for challenges to
patents, as well as infringement cases.
257. As defined by WIPO, "prior art is generally understood to constitute the body of
knowledge which was available to the public before the filing date" of a patent application.
WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Suggestions for the Further Development of
International Patent Law, 11-13, WIPO Doc. SCP/4/2 (Sept. 25, 2000).
258. Id. 11 (noting that "[i]dentifying the relevant prior art is one of the cornerstones
of patent examination" because it determines whether an invention satisfies the novelty and
inventive step requirement and continues to be relevant after the grant of the patent with
respect to its validity).
259. See, e.g. IP/C/W/429/Rev.1, supra note 229, 13 (suggesting that disclosure of
source would be useful in determining whether claimed inventions are excluded under
paragraphs 2 and 3 of TRIPS Article 27). Similarly, the suggestion that the existing TRIPS
exception to patentable subject matter based upon ordre public and morality is "meaningless,"
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that permits, but does not require countries to decline to patent
inventions that are contrary to "ordre public or morality" is one
that is merely an option and not all countries need to have such an
exclusion in their laws.2'6 Because it is only optional, the proposal
of developing countries may be of little utility for Western coun-
tries that do not have such an exclusion from patentability.
Moreover, an issue with morality is not relevant to prior art.
Accordingly, it is perhaps not surprising that Western countries
have countered that the proposal merely provides information
largely irrelevant to prior art.
261
Similarly, framing the proposed disclosures as similar to existing
Western patent disclosure requirements ultimately fails because the
proposals are not sufficiently identical to be embraced by the exist-
ing structure. In particular, developing countries have suggested
that the proposed amendments should be adopted because "dis-
closure requirements of various types are already an accepted
norm in international patent law practice."26 Indeed, TRIPS does
require that an application adequately describe an invention to
others of similar skill and also explicitly allows for certain other
types of disclosures.163 On the other hand, none of the listed disclo-
sure requirements under TRIPS required Western countries to
modify their laws. In addition, TRIPS expressly contemplated dif-
ferent disclosure obligations amongst member states. For example,
TRIPS expressly notes that disclosure of the best mode of carrying
out an invention known to the applicant may be required by na-
tional law, but TRIPS does not mandate such a requirement.
2 64
The attempt to frame this as similar to other disclosures may
overlook the important fact that all of the other noted disclosures
without explicit clarification that the objectionable subject matter may be excluded, is not
only likely to be dismissed, but also considered an incomplete understanding of patent law.
See IP/C/W/404, supra note 227, at 2.
260. TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27(2). In addition, even assum-
ing the proposal had cited the patent provisions that must be adopted by all countries, such
as the requirement that an invention be new, the proposal is still incomplete in its failure to
consider varying definitions of what constitutes "new" or even what constitutes prior art.
Notably, the origin of an invention would not necessarily be relevant to prior art in the
United States because the United States does not consider undocumented knowledge out-
side its borders to constitute prior art. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2000).
261. See, e.g., IP/C/W/434, supra note 198, 13; IP/C/W/449, supra note 198, 30.
262. IP/C/W/429/Rev.1, supra note 229, 5. In addition, it is broadly noted that
"there are a number of other disclosure requirements including disclosure of best mode."
Id. 1 9. In the same breadth, it is also noted that there are a number of members that re-
quire disclosure of source and country of origin of biological resources and/or traditional
knowledge. Id. What is unstated is that these members do not include any of the current
opponents to including a mandatory requirement.
263. See TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 29.
264. See id.
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under TRIPS-either required or permitted-are directly related
to patentability. In contrast, several aspects of the proposed disclo-
sure requirements would not be immediately relevant to
patentability, although they might assist with benefit-sharing of
subsequent commercial resources if a patent were granted.
Some attempts to frame the biopiracy issue might fail immedi-
ately because they directly contradict deeply held Western beliefs
concerning the appropriate realm of patent law by suggesting that
TRIPS should accommodate and promote social norms outside the
patent system. For example, some countries have asserted that that
the patent requirements under TRIPS result in misappropriation
of their genetic resources or traditional knowledge.265 However,
there is a strong difference of opinion with regard to whether pat-
ent law (and TRIPS) should be responsible for regulating other
issues. Developing countries strongly believe that TRIPS should
assist in the promotion of CBD norms; in particular, they have as-
serted that protection of genetic resources and traditional
knowledge should be acknowledged as a matter of equity to enable
preserving "the invaluable heritage of humankind that biological
diversity and traditional knowledge constitute."26 Western coun-
tries, on the other hand, are accustomed to patent laws operating
exclusive of regulatory measures, such as measures to protect
health and safety or the environment. 267 For example, the United
States has noted that "[p]atent law was not designed to regulate or
enforce misconduct issues, such as misappropriation of traditional
knowledge or genetic resources, but to promote the progress of
the useful arts."2 Accordingly, attempts to rely on basic principles
of "equity" in intellectual property law to address biopiracy269 fail
265. For example, one communication/proposal stated that "the TRIPS Agreement...
has not provided adequate and equitable means to prevent patents mainly in developed
Members that have amounted to and resulted in the misappropriation of genetic resources
and traditional knowledge mainly from developing Members." IP/C/W/404, supra note 227,
at 2. See also IP/C/W/420, supra note 226, at 1 (noting that a solution under TRIPS is re-
quired to prevent misappropriation and support CBD objectives).
266. IP/C/W/404, supra note 227, at 1-2 (suggesting that member states should be en-
titled to honor their public policy goals of food security, nutrition, and elimination of
poverty, with the implication that mandating protection of plant varieties would be contrary
to such goals).
267. IP/C/W/434, supra note 198, 1 25. However, none of the cited regulatory schemes
involve a situation where a patent is considered to commodify something sacred.
268. Id.
269. Developing countries cite Article 7 as suggesting that intellectual property rights
should promote "all sections of society." In particular, the argument is that because of eq-
uity, granting patents tainted by biopiracy should be improper. IP/C/W/438, supra note
229, 5. A closely related argument to general equity under intellectual property laws is that
the proposed new requirements would be analogous to the established patent law doctrine
of inequitable conduct. IP/C/W/403, supra note 197, at 4. Although disclosure of origin of
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because Western countries easily retort that TRIPS is intended to
primarily address patent requirements and that the current patent
rules reflect a "delicately balanced patent system" that already takes
into account social policy. '70 For example, Western countries re-
peatedly note that statements in TRIPS Article 8 concerning the
consideration of social policies beyond patent law is qualified by
the caveat that such social policy measures are only permissible
"provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of
the Agreement."2 7 Moreover, broader statements in proposals that
stress the potential for the proposed disclosures to enhance the
credibility of the patent system by "contributing to the realization
of the stated principles and objectives of TRIPS ", 72 are similarly re-
jected by those who believe the present system is already credible.
In addition, some proposals may be doomed because they raise
issues beyond biopiracy that resurrect intransigent issues of prior
disagreement between developing and Western countries. For ex-
ample, one communication that attempted to explain a proposal
to amend TRIPS simultaneously criticized patents on "life forms"
as unethical, such that they should be precluded from patentabil-
ity.273 The criticism is a reference to TRIPS Article 27(3) (b), which
biological resources is not presently a requirement, some proposals suggest that a corollary
of such a requirement would be that failure to comply would have the same consequence,
i.e. revocation or unenforceability of a patent. Although disclosure of origin of biological
resources is not presently a requirement, some proposals suggest that a corollary of such a
requirement would be that failure to comply could result in revocation or unenforceability
of a patent. See WIPO Intergovernmental Committee On Intellectual Property and Genetic
Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore, Draft Technical Study on Disclosure Require-
ments Related to Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge, 1 149-50, WIPO/GRTKF/
IC/5/10 (May 2, 2003) (providing a range of potential consequences, including refusal to
grant an application, as well as subsequent invalidation of a patent). Moreover, reliance on
the inequitable conduct doctrine itself may be shaky in light of the recent suggestion that
the doctrine is overbroad and should potentially be abandoned. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUN-
CIL, supra note 147, at 121-23 (proposing elimination of inequitable conduct defense as one
possible method of reducing patent litigation costs).
270. IP/C/W/434, supra note 198, 3.
271. See, e.g., Assafa Endeshaw, The Paradox of Intellectual Property Lawmaking in the New
Millennium: Universal Templates as Terms of Surrender for Non-industrial Nations; Piracy as an
Offshoot, 10 CARDOZOJ. INT'L & CuMp. L. 47, 63 (2002) (suggesting that it would be naive to
think that the language in Article 8 could be interpreted in favor of non-industrialized coun-
tries when the enactment of TRIPS itself was forced upon them).
272. IP/C/W/438, supra note 229, 1 6; see also IP/C/W/429/Rev.1, supra note 229, at 3
(noting that existing patent laws on disclosure are broadly intended to ensure the quality of
patents, as well as to ensure transparency, such that these same goals would be enhanced by
an obligation to disclose the source).
273. See IP/C/W/404, supra note 227, at 2 (noting that because "[p]atents on life forms
are unethical," and "contrary to the moral and cultural norms of many societies in Members
of the WT'O," TRIPS should prohibit them). Moreover, this issue may have been particularly
inflammatory because it suggests that the present exception within TRIPS to exclude patents
that violate morality is "meaningless" unless patents on life forms are prohibited. Id.
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requires that animals beyond micro-organisms be patentable. 74
There are a significant number of developing countries who main-
tain that patents on "life" are inappropriate. However, this is an
uphill battle against an existing TRIPS provision that requires the
contrary. The issue of whether higher life forms should be pat-
entable was a contentious issue at the time TRIPS was negotiated,
such that negotiators of TRIPS agreed to review the provision four
years after TRIPS was concluded as a means to reach sufficient
consensus.2 15 The provision has been reviewed since then but the
divide between Western and developing countries has only
grown-Western countries want to eliminate exclusions from pat-
entability while developing countries want to scale back the
existing provisions. Accordingly, language that resurrects this
contentious issue is likely to resurrect conflict, rather than consen-
sus.
B. Competing Forums and Focus
The possibility of implementing change within the TRIPS/WTO
forum seems increasingly remote if the dominant players can-and
are-moving to other forums to enact ever-increasing standards of
intellectual property. In particular, although countries continue to
discuss the issue of inappropriate access to genetic resources and
traditional knowledge within the WTO, those arguments form an
incomplete picture in light of other international negotiations and
agreements. First, the US, EU, and to a lesser extent Japan, have
been quietly enacting bilateral and multilateral trade agreements
that mandate standards of patent protection beyond TRIPS in what
are called "TRIPS-plus" agreements. 2 77 Moreover, the draft Substan-
tive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), which is currently being discussed
274. TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27(3) (b).
275. See, e.g., TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27(3) (b).
276. See, e.g., GERVAIS, supra note 99, at 227-32. Indeed, the discussions concerning the
review of Article 27(3) (b) have been described as "among the 'most controversial' in the
work of the TRIPS Council." Id.
277. FrAs negotiated by the United States are available at the Office of the United
States Trade Representative [USTR] Homepage, http://www.ustr.gov. See also GRAIN, TRIPS
plus Bilateral Agreements, http://www.grain.org/brl/?typeid=15 (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (providing an alphabetical list of TRIPS-plus agree-
ments). In addition to trade agreements, bilateral investment agreements have also been
enacted that condition trade on the level of intellectual property protection. See, e.g., CAR-
LOS M. CORRA, GRAIN, BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: AGENTS OF NEW GLOBAL
STANDARDS FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS? (2004), http://
www.grain.org/briefings~files/correa-bits-august-2004.pdf.
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under the auspices of WIPO, is a TRIPS-plus agreement with
broader reach than any of the prior free trade agreements because
it is aimed at establishing uniform patent standards for a much
broader scope of countries than any of the prior free trade agree-
ment.
28
Developing countries have tried to utilize the draft SPLT nego-
tiation as an opportunity to initiate discussions and specific
proposals to address biopiracy. For example, Article 2 of the draft,
entitled "General Principles and Exceptions," states that
"[n]othing in this Treaty ... shall limit the freedom of a Contract-
ing Party to take any action it deems necessary for the preservation
of essential security interests or to comply with international obli-
gations, including those relating to the protection of genetic
resources, biological diversities, traditional knowledge and the en-
vironment."279 Similarly, Articles 13 and 14 include language that
explicitly supports an enhanced disclosure requirement under na-
tional patent law; "A contracting party may also require compliance
with the applicable law on public health, nutrition, ethics in scientific
research, environment, access to genetic resources, protection of tradi-
tional knowledge and other areas of public interest in sectors of vital
importance for their social, economic and technological develop-
ment.
,280
278. See e.g., WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Study on the Interface be-
tween the SPLT, the PLT and the PCT, 13, WIPO Doc. SCP/6/5 (Sept. 24, 2001); WIPO
Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, arts. 3-14,
WIPO Doc. SCP/9/2 (Mar. 3, 2003). See also GRAIN, WIPO Moves Toward World'Patent System
(July 2002), http://www.grain.org/briefings-files/wipo-patent-2002-en.pdf (noting that if
successful, the SPLT "could make ... TRIPS ... obsolete" to the extent that TRIPS only
provides the minimum, whereas the SPLT "will spell out the top and the bottom line");
Carlos M. Correa & Sisule E Musungu, The W1PO Patent Agenda: The Risks for Developing Coun-
tries (South Centre Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity Working Papers, Paper
No. 12, 2002), available at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/wipopatent/
wipopatent.pdf.
279. WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Draft Substantive Patent Law
Treaty, art. 2(2), WIPO Doc. SCP/10/2 (Sept. 30, 2003); see also id. at art. 2(3) (noting that
"[n]othing in this Treaty ... shall limit the freedom of a Contracting Party to protect public
health, nutrition and the environment or to take any action it deems necessary to promote
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to its socio-economic, scientific and techno-
logical development"). This language was first proposed for inclusion in 2002 by the
Dominican Republic and Brazil to ensure sovereign rights to achieve policy goals, "including
those whose purpose is the protection of traditional knowledge and genetic resources
against unlawful appropriation and biopiracy." WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of
Patents, Proposals by the Delegations of the Dominican Republic and Brazil Concerning Articles 2, 13,
and 14 of the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, Annex I, p. 2, WIPO Doc. SCP/8/5 (Nov. 5,
2002).
280. WIPO Doc. SCP/9/2, supra note 278, at arts. 13(2), 14(2) (grounds for refusal or
invalidation of a patent). This language was proposed in 2002 to ensure national flexibility.
WIPO Doc. SCP/8/5, supra note 279, at Annex 1, p. 2 .
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The suggested SPLT language proposes fairly modest changes to
the international landscape. In particular, the language in Article 2
only refers to a particular country's ability to take action to protect
its own interests, but does not impose any requirements on other
members.281 In addition, the language in Articles 13-14, while stat-
ing more detail, is still only a permissive requirement for member
states to adopt if they so choose.282 A permissive requirement is
generally believed to be less useful for addressing biopiracy prob-
lems
Despite the lack of legal force behind such proposals, there has
still been substantial opposition. Actual substantive discussion of
these proposals was tabled from the moment the language was in-
troduced. In particular, the initial draft that included the new
language bracketed the text and added a critical footnote at each
juncture that stated: "The SCP agreed ... to include this para-
graph ... but to postpone substantive discussions on this
provision."28 4 However, in the most current draft, an anticipated
date of discussion was eliminated entirely; instead, the footnote
merely indicates that substantive discussions have been post-
poned.285 In addition, the draft only relates to optional imposition
of provisions outside the patent system, as clarified by other provi-
sions that explicitly state that "[n]o contracting party may require
compliance with any requirement relating to the examination of
an application or the grant of a patent on a claimed invention dif-
ferent from or additional to the requirements provided .... ,286 In
other words, unlike the TRIPS agreements, parties cannot deviate
from the patentability requirements such that developing countries
could be precluded from modifying their own patent laws to re-
quire the disclosures that they are proposing.
Moreover, there have been increasing hurdles to actual discus-
sion of the merits of the developing countries' proposals. In
particular, in April 2004, the three dominant countries that issue
281. Id. at art. 2. In addition, as seen in the context of the WTO, statements in pream-
bles and general principles are often discounted by other countries as irrelevant to
interpretation of treaty requirements.
282. Id. at arts. 13-14.
283. Dutfield, Sharing the Benefits of Biodiversity, supra note 235, at 921 (noting that a
mandatory disclosure would be most useful, although expressing concern that it be consid-
ered a procedural requirement under TRIPS to ensure compatibility); Cynthia Ho, Disclosure
of Oriin, supra note 235, at 17-23 (analyzing TRIPS compatibility problems with a manda-
tory disclosure requirement).
284. WIPO Doc. SCP/9/2, supra note 278, at art. 2, n. 1.
285. SeeWIPO Doc. SCP/10/2, supra note 279, at art. 2(2), n.1.
286. Id. at art. 13(3); see also id. at art. 14(2) (stating that "[n]o Contracting Party may
require compliance with any requirement with respect to the grounds for invalidation or
revocation of the patented claim or patent additional to or different from those provided").
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patents-the United States, Japan, and the European Patent Of-
fice-proposed that the upcoming May 2004 meeting on the SPLT
should be refocused on a narrower "first package" of issues using a
"pragmatic approach aimed at [an] early and realistic result" that
would likely "lead to near-term agreement."2 87 In particular, the
proposal aimed to focus on prior art to the exclusion of the devel-
oping countries' proposed language to address protection of
traditional knowledge and genetic resources. The stated impetus
for this proposal was that "several provisions" in the draft treaty
"have been extremely controversial and of a high political sensitiv-
ity," such that they consume much of the debate and "hampered
the desired progress." '288 In addition, in an attempt to preempt
criticism of this approach, the proposal was touted to "improve
patent quality and address concerns regarding protection of tradi-
tional knowledge," while at the same time setting aside initially
"certain contentious issues. ", 9
The next meeting of the Standing Committee on the Law of
Patents did initially follow the proposed "first package" of issues
proposed by the Western countries, although no agreement was
reached during the meeting.29° Western countries noted that they
were receptive to discussing the traditional knowledge issue-but
that it was not necessary and possibly even improper to discuss
within the SPLT context.2 9' For example, Japan stressed that recent
changes to the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) had alleviated the
need for further consideration of this issue 2 and Ireland, speaking
287. WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Proposal from the United States of
America, Japan and the European Patent Office Regarding the Substantive Patent Law Treaty, at 1-2,
WIPO Doc. SCP/10/9 (Apr. 22, 2004). See generally WIPO Standing Committee on the Law
of Patents, Information on Certain Recent Developments in Relation to the Draft Substantive Patent
Law Treaty (SPLT), WIPO Doc. SCP/10/8 (Mar. 10, 2004) (noting discussions and proposals
for streamlined approach to SPLT issues).
288. WIPO Doc. SCP/10/9, supra note 287, at 1.
289. Id. at 2.
290. WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Summary By the Chair, 45,
WIPO Doc. SCP/10/10 (May 14, 2004). According to the summary of the Chair of the
Committee, a number of delegations expressed support for the proposal, but others op-
posed the proposal, "emphasizing the need to consider ... the interrelationship of those
provisions ... such as the disclosure of the origin of genetic resources and traditional
knowledge, public health, patentability criteria and the general exceptions." Id. 1 7.
291. The Ireland delegation noted that the EU member states have previously noted a
willingness "to engage in a positive manner" to reach agreement in discussions on genetic
resources and traditional knowledge, but opposed discussing these issues within the SPLT.
WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Report, 42, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/11
(June 1, 2005) [Hereinafter WIPO, Report].
292. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 9 I.L.M. 978. Japan sug-
gested that the object of harmonization should be to "lower costs" for obtaining broad
patent protection and that traditional knowledge concerns have "been recently improved"
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on behalf of the EU noted that the draft SPLT was simply "not the
appropriate context" to consider issues that had the ability to pre-
vent consensus and were "not directly linked to substantive patent
law."2 93 Developing countries, on the other hand, primarily op-
posed the proposal294 and voiced varying degrees of concern about
eliminating discussion of protecting genetic resources and tradi-
tional knowledge. 295 Egypt and India expressed concern about
harmonizing patent standards without simultaneously considering
grounds for refusing patent applications based upon protection of
genetic resources.296 In particular, conclusion of an initial package
of topics was suggested as necessarily precluding subsequent
consideration of the protection of genetic resources and tradi-
tional knowledge. 297 The unstated implication is that once Western
countries attain the desired patent standards, developing countries
are left with no bargaining power to force consideration of the
under the PCT by incorporating periodicals that relate to such knowledge. WIPO, Report,
supranote 291, 7917-18.
293. Id. 42.
294. China stated that it did not oppose a narrowing of scope in principle, but ex-
pressed hope that WIPO would take an active and productive role in creating a legal
framework for protecting traditional knowledge and genetic resources. In addition, China
expressed support for including these provisions within discussion. SCP/10/1 Prov.2, supra
note 291, at 6; see also id. at 8 (noting that India was amenable to a more limited focus pro-
vided that it included topics of particular interest to developing countries, such as disclosure
and other issues connected with genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore).
295. Some countries opposed limiting the scope of discussion, but did not have exten-
sive comments. For example, the South African delegation preferred continuing with the
broader framework of the draft SPLT, but that even if there was a reduce scope, it should
nonetheless include discussion of traditional knowledge and genetic resources. Id. 40.
Similarly, the Delegation of Algeria was opposed to limiting the scope and explicitly noted
that doing so would fail to "take account the interests of all concerned in the intellectual
property system, including those relating to the protection of genetic resources and tradi-
tional knowledge." Id. 31. Other countries were also opposed to limiting the discussion,
but not expressly because of traditional knowledge of genetic resource issues. For example,
Argentina noted that there was not broad consensus regarding the initial discussion of a
draft SPLT on behalf of developing countries to begin with, such that it preferred more
comprehensive discussion in the hopes of permitting a balance between patent owners and
society. Id. 9 32. In addition, public health and the general balance of patent owners versus
users was noted by a number of representatives. See, e.g., id. 28 (noting that India pre-
ferred that the term "users" be broadly construed).
296. See WIPO, Standing Comm. on the Law of Patents, 10th Sess., Geneva, May 10 to
14, 2004, Draft Report, 99 26, 28, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/11 Prov. (June 14, 2004) (stating that
"it was not possible to harmonize the conditions for novelty and inventive step without tak-
ing account of certain general exceptions as grounds for the refusal of an application, in
particular provisions for the protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge").
Similarly, the Russian Federation delegation opposed restricting the scope of discussion
because it perceived that many issues were interrelated, without specifically addressing the
issue of genetic resources or traditional knowledge. Id. 1 27.
297. Id. 28.
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biopiracy issue." The lack of bargaining power is reminiscent of
the problems that developing countries face within the WTO,
where their attempts to secure amendments to TRIPS have met
with great resistance from primarily Western countries that have no
need to modify TRIPS since the existing provisions reflect the in-
terests of Western nations that initiated the negotiation of TRIPS.
Despite continued discussions within both the WTO and WIPO
forums, developing countries have not made substantive progress.
Developing countries continue to promote proposed amendments
to TRIPS that would make patent rights contingent on satisfying
CBD norms.29 However, Western countries continue to oppose an
amendment to TRIPS.00 Similarly, no progress has been made
within WIPO discussions on the issue of reconciling TRIPS and the
CBD.3 01 Accordingly, looking beyond the existing forums of discus-
sion is required.
IV. TOWARDS A TEMPLATE FOR ADDRESSING
SOCIO- CULTURAL CONCERNS
This Part provides a multi-faceted approach towards dealing
with not only biopiracy problem, but also broader conflicts be-
298. Moreover, some countries, such as Brazil, discussed traditional knowledge within a
broader argument concerning the need to consider the rights of users. Brazil noted that
because an international treaty was a matter of public, rather than private interest, consid-
eration of the impact of intellectual property rights on users was important, including a
broad interpretation of users such that it would protect traditional knowledge and genetic
resources. Id. 1 29.
299. See generally IP/C/W/442, supra note 228, passim (providing detailed description of
proposed requirement of evidence of benefit-sharing); Communication from Peru, Article
27.3(b), Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the CDB, and the Protection of Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore, passim, IP/C/W/447 (Nov. 7, 2005) (supporting TRIPS amendment
and providing additional information concerning recent activity in Peru, as well as Andean
countries to combat biopiracy); IP/C/W/459, supra note 226, passim (providing detailed
description of proposed requirement of evidence of benefit-sharing).
300. See, e.g., IP/C/W/449, supra note 198, at 3-8 (arguing that the proposed amend-
ment is ill-conceived because it would not completely address the articulated problem and
that national solutions would be more appropriate). See generally Council for Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, The Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the
Convention on Biological Diversity: Summary of Issues Raised and Points Made, IP/C/W/368/Rev.
1 (Feb. 8, 2006) (providing a detailed description of proposed amendment, as well as oppo-
sition).
301. See, e.g., WIPO Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge Panel Seeks to Continue Un-
changed, IP-WATCH, July 2005, at 7. See generally Communication from United States, Article
2 7.3(b), Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the CDB, and the Protection of Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore, IP/C/W/469 (March 13, 2006) (repeating U.S. position that there is
no conflict between TRIPS and the CBD, and that the proposed disclosure requirements are
an inappropriate solution to achieve objectives outside the patent system).
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tween patent law and socio-cultural concerns. First, this Part pro-
poses an alternative framing of the problem around issues of
sovereignty, rather than piracy, in hopes of reducing alienation and
miscommunication. In addition, what has previously been consid-
ered the biopiracy problem of developing countries is
reconceptualized as a problem for Western countries to set the
stage for reform of global patent laws. Finally, this Part suggests a
new method that can adequately deal with a broad range of con-
flicts arising in patent law, ranging from the biopiracy issues of
developing countries, to the frontiers of human cloning.
A. Issue-Framing
The first step towards achieving consensus is to eliminate some
of the current dialogue that is impeding substantive communica-
tion. This section examines the problems of the piracy label and
suggests that it be discarded as an initial step. In addition, this sec-
tion provides an alternative approach for framing the perceived
conflict between patents and traditional knowledge.
1. Biupiracy Issue-Framing-Close, but Not Compelling-The term
biopiracy itself can be considered as an initial approach to frame
the problem in the Western language of piracy. After all, the piracy
concept was highly effective when used by pharmaceutical compa-
nies to lobby the United States to accord greater protection for
intangible, yet highly valued domestic products.0 2 On the other
hand, the piracy term has not had the same power in effectuating
the interests of developing countries. As discussed earlier, develop-
ing countries and their sympathizers have repeatedly characterized
the actions and laws of Western governments and corporations as
pirating their natural resources and traditional knowledge, most
typically by using the label of biopiracy. However, the typical West-
ern reaction is that what is taken-natural resources and
information-fails to rise to the level of intellectual property and
303thus cannot be pirated in the Western sense.
Ironically, the reverse argument was successfully used to lobby
the U.S. government to pursue increased international intellectual
property laws. Although there is technically no intellectual property
infringement in a country that does not have intellectual property
laws-for one cannot break a law that does not exist-industry
302. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., supra Parts IA, II.A.2.
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advocates nonetheless successfully claimed that piracy of intellec-
tual property rights was occurring and depriving the U.S. of its just
profits.3 0 4 In other words, the piracy argument underlying enact-
ment of TRIPS ignored the strict legal parameters of intellectual305
property laws.
Understanding why biopiracy claims have been ineffective is im-
portant for considering future issue-framing. Although the
arguments are analogous, there are important distinctions with
respect to structural incentives and power relationships. For exam-
ple, the U.S. lobbying was backed by intellectual property attorneys
as well as economists who alleged that their argument was essential
to bolster the national economy.3 6 In contrast, accepting the ar-
gument of developing countries would have a negative implication
for Western economy and trade flow.0 7 Those who most care about
preventing biopiracy are indigenous communities, who by defini-
tion are small groups that are often marginalized. These groups
are hardly in the position to develop strong lobbying within their
national governments, let alone lobby other nations with interests
that are likely not similarly aligned. In addition, whereas the piracy
argument advanced by corporate interests portrayed the United
States as a victim of unsavory activities of other nations, the biopi-
racy argument implies that the United States and other Western
countries are the predators. No one is likely to embrace being por-
304. See SELL, supra note 1, at 50-51. See generally Oddi, supra note 133, at 433 (noting
that from a strict legal perspective, if a country does not have a patent system, there can be
no piracy, or even patent infringement).
305. In particular, unless an international agreement dictates otherwise (i.e., the situa-
tion prior to TRIPS), each nation may choose to enact--or not to enact-intellectual
property laws in accordance with national priorities. Technically, when a nation elects not to
adopt any intellectual property laws, there are no "rights" that can be pirated because the
nation has opted not to provide any such rights. However, there is one theory of intellectual
property rights that transcends national boundaries, in particular, if such rights are con-
ceived of as reflecting the natural rights of inventors and authors, rather than an
instrumental perspective that grants rights for the purpose of promoting social welfare. See
generally Oddi, supra note 133. Indeed, this was the underlying theory behind the successful
adoption of the United States negotiating position that resulted in the new global norms of
international intellectual property protection. See, e.g., SELL, supra note 1, at 44-51.
306. Id.
307. As noted by one commentator,
In a 1986 U.S. Department of Commerce survey, U.S. companies claimed they lost
$23.8 billion yearly due to inadequate or ineffective protection of intellectual prop-
erty .... [However] if the contributions of Third World peasants and tribespeople
are taken into account, the roles are dramatically reversed: the United States would
owe Third World countries $302 million in agriculture royalties and $5.1 billion for
pharmaceuticals.
SHIVA, BIopIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE, supra note 63, at 56.
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trayed as a predator. Moreover, this is particularly true with respect
to the United States-or at least those corporate entities-that
have already co-opted the piracy argument to portray themselves as
in need of protection.
Accordingly, attempts by developing countries to use the same
piracy lingo for a problem that is contrary to the interests of those
who first co-opted the phrase are unlikely to yield success. Rather, a
new framework is necessary. The failure of the biopiracy charac-
terization suggests a need to reframe the issue in a way that is
familiar to currently opposing parties without directly challenging
ingrained Western perceptions.
2. National Sovereignty-This section suggests that developing
countries focus on advocating their interest and right to protect
national sovereignty as a theme that might be accessible to Western
countries. Although international agreements by definition require
nations to surrender some aspect of sovereignty, national sover-
eignty continues to be an issue of concern and discussion even
after such agreements are adopted. For example, although TRIPS
was signed more than ten years ago, discussion has been continu-
ous concerning the appropriate balance between global rules and
national sovereignty under TRIPS, as well as other agreements
governed by the WTO.0 9 In addition, intellectual property rights
remain creations of national law, regardless of globalization trends,
308. See, e.g., Olivier Cattaneo, The Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement: Considerations for
the WTO Panels and Appellate Body, 3J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. RTS. 627 (2000) (suggesting that
balancing national sovereignty and interpretation of TRIPS may be challenging); Ruth L.
Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
735 (1996) (providing an early critical view of TRIPS as unduly subordinating the needs of
developing countries in the area of flexibility of intellectual property protection in return
for arguable benefits in the areas of textiles and agriculture); James Thuo Gathii, Rights,
Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS Epidemic, 14 FLA.. INT'L L. 261, 322 (2002) (arguing that
TRIPS reduced the sovereignty rights of countries to select an intellectual property regime
most appropriate for national priorities); Robert Howse, The Canadian Generic Medicines
Panel: A Dangerous Precedent in Dangerous Times, 3J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. RTS., 493 (2000).
309. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulation by World Trade
Rules, 13 TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 271 (2000); Steve Charnovitz, Environment and Health Under
WTO Dispute Settlement, 32 INT'L LAw. 901, 912-16 (1998) (noting potential WTO constraints
on domestic health policy under the SPS agreement); Sara Dillon, Fuji Kodak, the WTO and
the Death of Domestic Political Constituencies, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 197 (1999) (suggesting
that the Fuji-Kodak dispute is symbolic of social and cultural concerns being subservient to
WTO legalism); Andrew Green, Climate Change, Regulatory Policy And The WTO How Constrain-
ing Are Trade Rules?, 8 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 143 (2005) (discussing some flexibility in domestic
regulatory policy under the WTO, but also some constraints on domestic policy); Edward T.
Hayes, A Comparative Analysis of the Regulation of State and Provincial Governments in NAFTA and
GATT/WTO, 5 CHI.J. INT'L L. 605 (2005); Youngjin Jung & Ellen Jooyeon Kang, Toward an
Ideal WTO Safeguards Regime-Lessons from U.S. -Stee 38 INT'L. LAW. 919 (2004) (discussing
whether the escape clause under GAT[ provides sufficient flexibility to address national
domestic crises).
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such that national sovereignty is an issue of continuing importance
to all countries. Even as Western countries try to impinge on the
national sovereignty of others, Western countries are adamant
about preserving their own sovereign interests.
Although the issue of national sovereignty may often have dif-
ferent implications for developing versus Western countries, there
is one area where consensus has been reached-the need for na-
tions to balance patent rights against domestic public health needs.
Patent norms that limit the ability of nations to address public
health crises are a universal issue-as acknowledged in the Doha
Public Health Declaration, which was a uniform declaration by all
member states at the Doha round in support of the need to respect
public health in the context of TRIPS."' In addition, this issue was
also recognized in WTO disputes among Western countries, focus-
ing on Canada's right to limit patent rights in the interest of
promoting greater access to generic medicine.3 Granted, there
may be more dissension on the precise balance between patent
norms and public health needs. However, there exists at least a
starting point for discussion. All nations recognize national sover-
eignty and invoking this issue does not pose an immediate threat
to the interests of other nations. In addition, a focus on sovereignty
is a natural fit for indigenous communities that are already claim-
ing sovereignty in the human rights context.
1 2
There are some notable instances where national sovereignty in-
terests in promoting public health ultimately triumphed over
competing calls for stronger patent rights associated with TRIPS.
For example, Brazil successfully countered an AIDS epidemic with
compulsory licensing of drugs, while being aggressively pursued by
the United States for noncompliance with TRIPS.313 The TRIPS is-
310. See Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 248, at pmbl.
311. See id. (affirming importance of public health); Canada Generics, supra note 250,
passim (discussing whether Canada's exception to patent infringement constituted a "limited
exception" permissible under TRIPS); see also Panel Report, Canada Patent Term, supra note
158, at 6.52-6.54, 6.83-6.89. (discussing the interpretation of patent term requirements
under TRIPS that inherently implicates the balance between patent rights and public health
since the patent term dictates the time of exclusivity when lower-cost generic equivalents
cannot yet be sold); Press Release, Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association, Pharmacy
Bills Stay High Thanks to WTO Ruling on Patent Extensions: Canadians Delayed Access to
Lower Cost Generic Drugs (Mar. 7, 2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform) (reporting on WTO panel ruling, including a forecasted $200 million in costs
to consumers in prescription fees because of a delay into entry of lower-cost generic drugs).
312. See supra Part II.B.
313. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Global Reach Of HIV/Aids: Science, Politics, Econom-
ics, and Research, 17 EMORY INT'L L. Rav. 1, 36-37 (2003);Jose Marcos Nogueira Viana, /P
Rights, the VWTO and Public Health, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 311, 311-13 (2002); see also Abbott,
The TRIPS-Legality of Measures Taken to Address Public Health Crises: A Synopsis, 7 WIDENER L.
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sue eventually subsided in the wake of public opinion that ap-
plauded Brazil's success. 4 A similar situation occurred in South
Africa when the United States government, as well as pharmaceuti-
cal companies, initially challenged the sale of generic retroviral
drugs.1 ' While a technical argument could be made that the South
African law did not fully comply with the TRIPS requirements on
compulsory licensing, the legal issue was overwhelmed by angry
protests, as well as negative publicity. Bowing to public pressure,
the companies dropped the case 316 and the United States' position
changed as well, as reflected by an executive order providing that
the "United States shall not seek, through negotiation or other-
wise, the revocation or revision of any intellectual property law or
policy of a beneficiary sub-Saharan African country ... that regu-
lates HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medical technologies.
1 7
Western countries have stated that they understand the impor-
tance of national sovereignty in the context of balancing
intellectual property rights and other social concerns, although
their actions have not always matched their rhetoric. For example,
Western nations have asserted that TRIPS contains adequate flexi-
bility for nation states to consider issues of domestic priority.31"
SYMP.J. 71, 75 (2001) (noting that the U.S. has alleged TRIPS violations even where use was
authorized under Article 31 for health emergencies).
314. See, e.g., Stephen Buckley, U.S., Brazil Clash Over AIDS Drugs, 'Model' Treatment Pn)-
gram Seen at Risk in Dispute on Patents and Pricing, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2001, at Al;
Chakravarthi Raghavan, U.S. Beats a (Tactical) Retreat over Brazil's Patent Law, THIRD WORLD
NETWORK, June 25, 2001, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/tactical.htm (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
315. See, e.g., James Thuo Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Pol-
icy Consistently with Facilitating Access to Affordable AIDS Drugs to Low-End Consumers, 53 FLA. L.
REV. 727, 768 (2001) (noting that U.S. put South Africa on the watch-list under super 301 of
the Trade Act, which could ultimately lead to retaliatory trade action after South Africa en-
acted the compulsory licensing law); Carla Power et al., Paying for AIDS, NEWSWEEK INT'L,
Mar. 19, 2001, at 16-17 (noting that a conglomerate of forty-one major drug companies
sued the South African government in the South African courts to block the 1997 Medicines
Act).
316. See, e.g., Drug Firms Drop AIDS Case, BBC NEWSLINE, Apr. 19, 2001, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/Africa/1284633.stm (noting that the case was dropped to
"[secure] a quiet exit from [a] case that left them mired in bad publicity").
317. Exec. Order No. 13,155, 65 Fed. Reg. 30,521 (May 10, 2000). In addition to nega-
tive publicity, politics may have played a role. At the time, then Vice President Gore was
known to have accepted money from pharmaceutical companies that promoted strong pat-
ent rights. An AIDS advocacy group, ACT UP, utilized this information to disrupt his
presidential campaign with banners that stated "Gore's Greed Kills." See, e.g., Kathy
Chanault, Will the AIDS Plague Change US Trade Policy?, Bus. WK., Sept. 13, 1999, at 58 (noting
that the U.S. decided not to pursue a WTO complaint after AIDS activities threatened to
make this an issue in Gore's campaign). According to one source, the effect was immediate
in withdrawing objections to the South African law during the same week that Gore an-
nounced his intent to run for president. SELL, supra note 1, at 152.
318. See, e.g., Canada-Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS170/R, supra note 158.
SPRING 2006]
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 509 2005-2006
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
However, such assertions are belied by the Western imposed
TRIPS-plus agreements that eliminate the flexibility of TRIPS by
setting absolute standards for developing countries. 9 Currently,
the duality that exists between asserting that TRIPS has flexibilities,
and negotiations for agreements that eliminate those flexibilities,
has been an issue primarily noticed (and criticized) by NGOs and
academics.3 2 0 However, to the extent that this issue is publicized
further, there could be the potential for change. In particular, just
as the medicine access debate reached beyond the offices of trade
representatives into the popular press, greater transparency of the
biopiracy issue might provide sufficient leverage to change interna-
tional negotiating stances.
Past history has shown that hypocrisy can be a component of fos-
tering change. For example, returning once again to the
anthrax/Cipro "crisis" that the United States faced, the United
States abruptly modified its position towards compulsory licensing
under TRIPS as a result of widespread public ridicule regarding
the apparent hypocrisy in its stance.3 However, this "about-face,"
in response to public criticism does not reflect a complete enlight-
enment on the part of government officials. For example, although
the United States participated in the uniform adoption of the
Doha Public Health Declaration, it subsequently contested the
319. See infra notes 326-327 and accompanying text (concerning elimination of TRIPS
flexibilities in TRIPS-plus agreements).
320. See, e.g., GRAIN, TRIPS-PLUS MUST STOP: THE EUROPEAN UNION CAUGHT IN BLA-
TANT CONTRADICTIONS 3 (March 2003), http://www.grain.org/briefingsfiles/trips-plus-eu-
2003-en.pdf; CARLOS M. CORREA, GRAIN, BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: AGENTS OF
NEW GLOBAL STANDARDS FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS? 4
(Aug. 2004), http://www.grain.org/briefingsfiles/correa-bits-august-2004.pdf (providing
study of implications of both free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties under
commission of GRAIN and noting that arguments for minimizing TRIPS flexibilities
through bilateral dealings are prompted by business interests); OXFAM INT'L, OXFAM BRIEF-
ING NOTE: UNDERMINING ACCESS TO MEDICINES: COMPARISON OF FIVE US
FAs 2 (June, 2004), http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what we.do/issues/health/downloads/
undermining-access-ftas.pdf; DAVID VIVAS-EuGuI, TRIPS ISSUE PAPERS 1: REGIONAL AND
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERI-
CAS (FTAA) 13-16 (2003), available at http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/FTAA%
20(A4).pdf. See generally Peter Drahos, BFIS and BIPS-Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001); Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in
International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125 (2003-04).
321. See, e.g., Patent abuse, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001 (noting that "Western governments
are guilty of double standards" in comparison of the 11 confirmed cases of anthrax infection
versus the 25 million people faced with dying of AIDS in Africa for lack of medical treat-
ment); see also supra notes 254-255 and accompanying text (discussing hypocrisy in context
of Doha negotiations).
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scope of certain provisions, arguing that they should be more nar-
rowly interpreted.
2 2
3. TRIPS-Plus-The ongoing negotiations of TRIPS-plus agree-
ments present an opportunity to highlight a serious incursion on
the national sovereignty of developing countries. Although devel-
oping countries can be conceived of as willingly entering into these
agreements, it is well established that developing countries have
enormous pressure and incentive to cooperate with countries that
have not only lucrative export markets, but also power to control
their credit.3 2 3 As one commentator noted, "the ruling elites of
most non-industrialized countries act swiftly to rush to accept and
put into law every demand and whim of these industrialized coun-
tries. The evidence is so overwhelming that to cite examples would
be superfluous."024 Indeed, the conclusion of TRIPS is widely ac-
knowledged to have only been accomplished because developing
countries wanted the market access that the WTO offered, even
though they did not subscribe to the rules under TRIPS. 25
The new and pending agreements present greater problems to
national sovereignty because they impose rules that provide less
flexibility than TRIPS. In particular, agreements that mandate
developing countries to provide patents without any exclusions
from patentability are more restrictive than TRIPS because TRIPS
at least provides nations with the possibility of excluding patents on
322. See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 82, 5(a). For example, although the
declaration specifically notes certain diseases as illustrative of national epidemics that would
justify use of compulsory licensing, the United States has subsequently suggested that these
are the only instances where compulsory licensing may be adequate-in complete contradic-
tion of the explicit text. See, e.g. MARY MORAN, MIEDICINS SANS FRONTIERES, RENEGING ON
DOHA (May 2003), http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/msfO52003.pdf; Deadlock over Scope of
Diseases Threatens to Kill Solution, CPTEcH, Nov. 27, 2002, http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/
ngosl1272002.html; TRIPS Consultations on Implementing Doha Recessed, THIRD WORLD NET-
woRK., Nov. 29, 2002, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/5246a.htm (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Brook K Baker, Doha Redux-U.S. Enters New Phase
of Bad Faith Bargaining (July 2, 2003), http://www.cptech.o rg/ip/wto/p6/hgap
07022003.html.
323. See Frederick Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Latest Developments and Trends
in IP and Health, ICTSD-UNCTAD Dialogue on Ensuring Policy Options for Affordable Ac-
cess to Essential Medicines, Bellagio, Oct. 12-16, 2004, at 7, available at http://
www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Abbott-Bellagio3revl.pdf (noting that de-
spite limitations inherent in FrAs with the United States, developing countries continue to
enter into these on the belief that the overall agreements are beneficial, with compromise in
some areas, such as pharmaceutical protection as necessary for broader gains); Endeshaw,
supra note 270, at 64 (noting that fear of access to "lucrative markets" in the United States
and Europe or the threat of withdrawal of credit from international institutions are a major
force behind the move towards adopting FIAs).
324. Endeshaw, supra note 271, at 64.
325. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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inventions that are contrary to morality. 26 Although this clause has
never been definitively interpreted under TRIPS, it is important to
developing countries who have invoked the provision as a reason
that Western countries should be concerned about biopiracy pat-
ents. 7
Moreover, to the extent that some countries such as India and
South Africa have enacted patent laws that bar patents for inven-
tions which fail to disclose the origin of materials used in the
invention in an attempt to limit biopiracy patents within their own
countries, new bilateral or international agreements may preclude
such efforts.32 ' This may be considered a serious incursion of na-
tional sovereignty when considered in the context of existing
vehement protests against Western countries that allegedly grant
biopiracy patents based upon their own standards.329 Essentially, if
developing countries are prohibited from tailoring their patent
laws to prevent patents issuing within their own countries based
upon biopiracy, they will be forced to accept an even greater evil
than what they have been lobbying against. In particular, while de-
veloping countries have argued that Western patents based upon
indigenous materials are immoral, they would most certainly be
opposed to laws that would force them to condone such practice
within their own countries.
Sovereign interests in dictating the appropriate balance between
patent rights and public health is a major issue in bilateral TRIPS-
plus agreements. Prior agreements negotiated by the United States
have already been criticized for having an undue impact on public
health of developing countries.3 ° Even the recently concluded
326. See TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 27, 12.
327. See generally WTO, Index of Dispute Issues, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop.e/
dispu-e/dispusubjects..indexe.htm#bkmk87 (last visited Mar. 8, 2006) (providing no
dispute based on TRIPS Article 27(2)). However, some commentators have nonetheless
opined on the scope of this provision. See, e.g., M. Bruce Harper, TRIPS Article 27.2: An Ar-
gument for Caution, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 381 (1997); INT'L CTR. FOR
TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV. AND U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV.,
ICTSD-UNCTAD CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT ON IPRs: RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND
DEVELOPMENT 375-76 (Feb, 2005), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/
ResourceBookIndex.htm.
328. E.g., Patent Act, § 25 (2002) (India) (providing additional grounds for revocation,
including the fact that an applicant did not disclose or wrongly disclosed the geographical
origin of biological material used in the invention); Decision 486: Common Intellectual
Property Regime, Community of Andean Nations, art. 26, Sept. 14, 2000 (unofficial transla-
tion), available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/normativa/D486e.htm
(providing that patent applications must include documentation of an agreement on access
to genetic resources or traditional knowledge).
329. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
330. See generally MSF, ACCESS TO MEDICINES AT RISK ACROSS THE GLOBE: WHAT TO
WATCH OUT FOR IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES (2004); OXFAM
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agreement between the United States and Australia-the first such
agreement between Western countries-raised concern about ac-
cess to health issues. 31 In fact, the impact of the new patent
requirements on Australia's government-subsidized drug program
was a potential deal-breaker.132 In addition, the impact of FTAs on
public health will likely arise again since the United States Trade
Representatives have stated that they consider each free trade
agreement to be a template to use for subsequent agreements-a
"one size fits all" standard that seems completely at odds with ad-
dressing a variety of national sovereignty issues.
3 3 3
ITN'L, UNDERMINING ACCESS TO MEDICINES: COMPARISON OF FIVE U.S. FrAs (2004); Freder-
ick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the
Contradictory Trend in Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements, Quaker United Nations Of-
fice (QUNO) Occasional Paper 14, Apr. 2004, available at http://www.geneva.quno.info/
pdf/OP14Abbottfinal.pdf.
331. See, e.g., Peter Drahos et al., The FTA and the PBS: A Submission to the Senate Select
Committee on the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement (2004), available at http://
www.drs.org.au/articles/2004/FrA/Doc/drahos%20et%20a%20senatesub.htrn; Medicines
Sans Frontieres, International Implications of the Free Trade Agreement between Australia
and the United States, http://www.msf.org.au/docs/reports/us.austjfta.pdf (providing
overview of AUSFTA provisions that are considered to have negative health implications not
only for Australia, but also for other bilateral agreements entered into by the United States);
Letter from Pieta-Rae Laut, Executive Director, Public Health Association of Australia, to
Australian Parliament (May 25, 2004), available at http://www.phaa.net.au/
AdvocacyIssues/pbs.htm (expressing concern about implication of AUSFTA on Australia's
drug pricing system); Submission of Richard Denniss & Clive Hamilton, The Austl Inst., to
the Senate Select Committee on the Free Trade Agreement Between Australia and the
United States of America, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/
freetrade_ctte/submissions/subl7l.pdf; see also Free Trade Agreement, arts. 17.9-.10, U.S.-
Austl., May 18, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/
Australia_FTA/Final_Text/assetuploadfile148_5168.pdf.
332. See, e.g., Elizabeth Becker & Robert Pear, Drug Dispute Snags US-Australia Pact, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at W1; Ian Heath, Examining the Impact of the Australia-United States
Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA) on Intellectual Property, Keynote Address at Recent De-
velopments in Protecting and Commercializing Intellectual Property 5 (Aug. 10, 2004),
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/news/ausfta.pdf. In addition, there was broader disap-
proval for negotiation of this agreement under fast-track legislation. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REc.
S1498-99 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (criticizing the Bush Ad-
ministration's use of Trade Promotion Authority in a manner inconsistent with the Doha
Declaration).
333. As explained by the Acting Director of the USPTO
the US has developed models or prototypes of the kind of bilateral treaties it wishes
to have with other countries. Once a model treaty is ratified by the Senate, U.S. trade
negotiators know that if they stick to its terms in other negotiations there is a good
chance the treaties flowing from these negotiations will also be approved.
Pirates of the 21st Century: the Curse of the Black market: Hearing Before the Sen. Subcomm. On Over-
sight of Gov'tal Mgmt., the Fed. Workforce & the Dist. of Columbia, 108th Cong. (April 20, 2004)
(statement ofJon W. Dudas, Acting Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property
& Acting Director of the USPTO).
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Although a focus on national sovereignty of indigenous com-
munities may be a natural tool in addressing the encroachment of
TRIPS-plus agreements, relying on sovereignty alone to address
biopiracy is unlikely to be a successful strategy. Although nations
acknowledge the importance of national sovereignty, the continu-
ing negotiations of bilateral agreements that limit such sovereignty
suggest that acknowledgement alone will not result in desired ac-
tion. This is especially true since many TRIPS-plus FTAs have been
negotiated since the Doha Public Health Declaration, which pur-
ported to acknowledge national sovereignty in addressing public
health needs. Moreover, sovereignty may be complicated in the
context of biopiracy because sovereign nations may have differing
interests from the indigenous groups that oppose biopiracy.334 Ac-
cordingly, although sovereignty is a preferable focus over piracy, it
is not a complete solution.
B. Questioning Western Patent Law, Policy and Politics
This Part moves beyond issue-framing to address fundamental
patent law and policy issues that lie at the heart of the biopiracy
problem. In particular, this Part provides a new mechanism to work
with the existing Western patent system to address biopiracy as well
as other current complaints of the Western system. As noted in the
discussion of current proposals to amend TRIPS, a major flaw of
proposed patent solutions to date has been an attempt to impose
solutions that would address biopiracy without adequate considera-
tion of the intransigence of those in favor of the existing patent
laws. Although there will continue to be strong proponents of the
patent system, there are specific areas that present an opportunity
for dialogue and potential change. To the extent that some of
these areas share commonality with the problems underlying bio-
piracy, a re-examination of Western patent law may offer a "win-
win" solution.
1. Reconsidering the Premise of TRIPS-Plus and Uniform Patent
Law-This section questions whether the underlying goal behind
the proliferation of TRIPS-plus agreements to raise global patent
rights335 to the level of Western countries is appropriate in light of
334. See supra Part II.A.1.
335. Although this section focuses on patent rights, other intellectual property rights
incorporated in TRIPS-plus agreements have also been questioned. For example, many have
suggested that the present copyright system does not adequately balance incentives to inno-
vate with other societal needs. There has been substantial discussion concerning the
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increasing domestic discussion in Western countries concerning
the appropriate balance between patents and public policy.3 6 In
addition, this section highlights the questionable premise of such
agreements, as a first step towards breaking the momentum to-
wards TRIPS-plus agreements. This is important to the issue of
biopiracy since, as previously noted, many TRIPS plus agreements
further exacerbate existing biopiracy concerns. In particular, this
section highlights some major areas of concern that have been
raised concerning the impact of Western patent laws.
2. Western Patent Problems
a. Patent Rights versus Public Health-Balancing patent rights
against access to medicine is not merely a third world concern;
rather it is a major problem for Western countries that tend to
promote strong patent rights, yet are facing increasing difficulties
in providing access to medicine. In recent history, pharmaceutical
appropriate level of copyright protection in light of new technology, for example, in the case
of file-sharing. See, e.g., MGM Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, passim (9th Cir. 2004); In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation, 334 E3d 643, passim (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, passim (9th Cir. 2001); see also U.S. Copyright Office, Supreme Court Rules in MGM v.
Grokster, http://www.copyright.gov/docs/mgm/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2006) (providing links
to legal briefs in the Grokster case); Emily Bazelon, Grok Around the Clock: Share Those MP3s
Now-The Supreme Court may try to stop you soon, SLATE, Mar. 29, 2005, http://slate.msn.com/
id/2115919/. Recent expansion of copyright protection has also been criticized. See, e.g.,
Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
and Interoperability, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 487 (2005). In addition, after Congress extended
the copyright term for all existing and future works another twenty years, there was criticism
of the legislation as unsupported and even unconstitutional. See, e.g., Brief for Intellectual
Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186 (2003) (No. 01-618); Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous Economists
Weigh in on Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, and Network Effects, 18 HARV. J.L. & TCH.
435, 438-57 (2005); Robert P. Merges & Glenn H. Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright
and Patent Power, 37 HARV.J. ON LEGIs. 45 (2000).
336. One topic in recent United States discussions is the issuance of permanent injunc-
tions, which by statute are to consider competing equity concerns, but have mostly issued as
a de facto matter following strong direction from the Federal Circuit, such that a change to
the current law is proposed in pending legislation and also subject to review by the United
States Supreme Court. See Ebay v. Mercexchange, 401 E3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Patent
Reform Legislation, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (minimizing proposals for in-
junctive relief in the original H.R. 2795 proposal). Other commentators have also
questioned or criticized the TRIPS-plus trend, although primarily in the context of protect-
ing public health, rather than addressing biopiracy. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa,
Internationalization of the Patent System and New Technologies (Mar. 2002) (revised version of a
paper submitted to the Conf. on the Int'l Patent System, WIPO, Geneva, March 25 to 27,
2002), http://www.wipo.int/patent/agenda/en/meetings/2002/presentations/correa.pdf
(noting that "it does not seem advisable, at least from the perspective of developing coun-
tries, to promote the further international harmonization of a system that has gone far
beyond its essential function: to foster and reward genuine inventiveness"); supra note 331
and accompanying text (criticizing FTA with Australia for having potential negative impacts
on health care).
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companies and their lobbyists have successfully argued that strong
patents rights are essential to providing incentives to create impor-
tant advances in technology, as well as to subsidize research that
does not result in marketable products. 37 However, there is a grow-
ing global sentiment that patented drugs and medical tests unduly
increase costs because the right to exclude others legally permits
owners to charge higher prices, such that patients are precluded
from accessing needed medical care. In the United States, this
sentiment is reflected by proposed legislation to create exceptions
to patent infringement claims for medical tests involving gene pat-
ents, 339 as well as allowing importation of patented drugs.34 As an
example, a number of Western countries, including Canada, Bel-
gium, and the Netherlands, took action to challenge Myriad
Technologies' patented gene for detecting breast cancer, out of
concern that enforcement of this patent would cause serious hard-
ship on accessibility of health care.34' Most recently, and of
particular interest for the TRIPS-plus trend is Australia's concern
337. See, e.g., SELL, supra note 1, at 43-48; Robert Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPS: The
Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining
WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 1069,
1088-89 (1996).
338. See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How THEY
DECEIVE Us AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2004) (suggesting, among other things, that pat-
ents increase costs by encouraging firms to engage in competitive and wasteful use of
resources in attempts to find "blockbuster" drugs that are highly marketable and profitable);
NAT'L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., CHANGING PAT-ERNS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVA-
TION: A RESEARCH REPORT BY THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT
RESEARCH AND EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION (2002), available at http://www.nihcm.org/
innovations.pdf; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., GENETIC INVENTIONS, INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES: EVIDENCE AND POLICIES (2002),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf; Lori B. Andrews, The Gene
Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives with Health Needs, 2 Hous. HEALTH L. & POL'Y.
J. 65 (2002).
339. Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2002) (proposing to amend the patent act to exempt medical practitioners
utilizing genetic diagnostic tests from patent infringement remedies); 148 CONG. REC. E353,
E354 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (introduction of The Genomic Research and Diagnostic Ac-
cessibility Act of 2002, HR 3967, and The Genomic Science and Technology Innovation Act
of 2002, HR 3966, by Hon. Lynn N. Rivers). In addition, although this bill has not been
reintroduced in Congress, a similar issue has attracted legislative and policy attention in
Japan. See, e.g., INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE COUNCIL, APPLICATION OF METHODS RELATED TO
MEDICAL ACTIVITY TO THE PATENT LAw (2003), available at http://www.jpo.gojp/
shiryoue/toushine/shingikai_e/appli-med-pl.htm.
340. See, e.g., Safe Importation of Medical Products and Other Rx Therapies Act of
2005, H.R. 753, 109th Cong. (2005); Safe Importation of Medical Products and Other Rx
Therapies Act of 2005, S. 184, 109th Cong. (2005).
341. Press Release, Institut Curie, European-wide Opposition Against the Breast Cancer
Patents (Sept. 26, 2002) (expressing concern that if the Myriad patent covering breast can-
cer predisposition and other similar gene patents were not eliminated, or at least narrowed,
it would negatively influence health care because of the financial strain).
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about the health implications of the recently negotiated USFTA
that reflects the strongest global patent rights.342 Interestingly, there
was brief concern that the patent provisions might impede the abil-
ity of the United States to enact legislation permitting the
importation of patented drugs into the United States to partially
address a growing concern about access to affordable drugs. When
the proposed legislation failed to garner enough support to pass,
the issue faded. However, it nonetheless reflects a partial realiza-
tion that ever-increasing patent rights may clash with public health
needs, even for Western countries.
b. Promoting or Impeding Research-There are also serious con-
cerns raised regarding the impact of patent rights on research and
innovation. The process of scientific discovery generally involves
cumulative development from past research; indeed, many believe
that the progress of scientific research would be fostered if re-
search were less encumbered by patent rights. 34 3 When patents are
introduced into the field of scientific discovery, subsequent devel-
opment may be stymied. Although the potential of patents to
impede research has always been a theoretical issue, it has become
a growing reality as a result of changes in the culture of academic
research, and what is patented. In particular, more scientists, in-
cluding those from universities, are patenting results of research,
rather than providing them to the public domain for free use by
all. 44 In addition, the type of technology patented is increasingly
more fundamental, such that patents may have the potential to
preclude, or at least impede subsequent research on commercial
products.3 4 5 An increase in patents on research tools, such as gene
sequences, that are necessary for subsequent research on methods
of medical treatment, diagnosis or drugs, have been particularly
problematic since the research tools are often far "upstream" of
the end commercial products, such that the path towards research
and commercialization is littered with preexisting patents.346 A
342. See supra notes 331-332 and accompanying text.
343. See, e.g., Clarissa Long, Proprietary Rights and Why Initial Allocations Matter, 49 EMORY
L.J. 823 (2000); HUGO Intell. Prop. Comm. Statement on Patenting of DNA Sequences: In
Particular Response to the European Biotechnology Directive (April 2000), http://
www.gene.ucl.ac.uk/hugo/patent2000.html.
344. See, e.g., Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discovery and its Normative Implica-
tion, 75 CHI-KENT L. REV. 15 (1999).
345. See, e.g., THE ROYAL SOCIETY, KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN: THE EFFECTS OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY POLICY ON THE CONDUCT OF SCIENCE 3.21-23 (2003) available at
http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id=11403; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 147, at 25-27.
346. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 147, at 70-75 (highlighting in-
stances where patented research tools precluded access). Although access issues continue to
be problematic, the U.S. Supreme Court recently opened the door slightly in Merek KGaA v.
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patent owner may refuse to license use to others, or the fee to li-
cense use may be cost-prohibitive. In addition, as more research
tools are patented, there is a serious logistical problem of negotiat-
ing amidst a thicket of preexisting patents to conduct research-
even assuming that the cost of using each patent can be over-547
come. Access by subsequent researchers is particularly an issue if
initial pioneering patents are very broad.
There are additional troubling issues for Western patent law be-
yond patented research tools. Patents on business methods are
stated to over-reward behavior that needed no patent incentive and
create problems for subsequent businesses as well as research. In
addition, for all subject matter, there is always a concern regarding
the scope of enforcement of patent rights. Until recently, most re-
searchers in academic and other non-profit settings assumed that
they were immune from patent infringement suits. 348 However, the
Federal Circuit has ruled otherwise.349 In addition, although the
Federal Circuit ruling is only applicable to United States patents,
the broader issue of how strong patent rights can be reconciled
with enabling researchers with the ability to build upon past inno-
vation is a current issue for all Western countries.
All of the foregoing issues are contributing to an atmosphere
that is increasingly questioning what used to be unquestionable
Western patent law doctrine. Some scientists who are particularly
concerned about the impact of patents on subsequent research are
taking affirmative steps to opt-out of the patent system and pre-
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2381-84 (2005), in a 9-0 vacation of the Federal
Circuit opinion, rejecting prior narrow readings of a limited statutory exception to in-
fringement for some types of clinical testing under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e) (1).
347. The problem is particularly acute with respect to biomedical and gene-based pat-
ents. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, supra note 338, at 79-81 (discussing gene patents as
impediments to research); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genetics and the Law: Patenting the Human
Genome, 39 EMORY L.J. 721, 725-29 (1990); Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-701
(1998); Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and Gene
Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L. REv. 735 (2000) (pro-
posing alternative mechanism to patents to alleviate research impediment problem that
currently exists with gene patents); Jordan Paradise et al., Patents on Human Genes: An Analy-
sis of Scope and Claims, 307 SCIENCE 1566, 1566-67 (2005).
348. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 147, at 23 (noting that "[u]ntil very
recently it was widely believed that purely research uses of patent inventions were shielded
from infringement liability by an experimental use exception").
349. Madey v. Duke, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In addition, even before the
Madey decision, there was already concern about the scope of experimental use. See generally
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use,
56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017 (1989); Maureen O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1177 (2000) (proposing that patent law create an exception to
infringement analogous to the existing fair use provision that limits liability to copyright
infringement).
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preemptively publish their research results immediately, to create
prior art that precludes others from obtaining patents on such re-
search.3 5 0 Although this is not yet a widespread phenomenon, its
very existence indicates concern among the scientific community
about the potential for patents to stifle research; it is a strategy that
has attracted the attention of academic commentary as well."' In
addition, some have advocated open-source models, even within
the traditionally patent-dominated area of biotechnology, to en-
sure that researchers have adequate access to necessary tools.1
52
c. Patents on Questionable Subject Matter-Although the scope of
patentable subject matter has been expanding on both domestic
s
53
and international levels, s 4 such expansion is not uniformly
embraced. There is increasing concern about whether some types
of subject matter should be unpatentable. For example, the
350. This is an extension of some celebrated instances. For example, the human ge-
nome research group led by Craig Venter patented all the isolated sequences they
discovered while a competing group, financed by the federal government, published all of
their research in the public domain to promote accessibility. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Intel-
lectual Property at the Public-Private Divide: The Case of Large-Scale cDNA Sequencing, 3 U. CHI. L.
ScH. ROUNDTABLE 557 (1996).
351. See, e.g., Alexander K. Haas, The Wellcome Trust's Disclosures of Gene Sequence Data into
the Public Domain & the Potentialfor Proprietary Rights in the Human Genome, 16 BERKc. TECH. L.J.
145, 145 (2001); Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MIcH. L. REv. 926, 926-27
(2000); The SNP Consortium, http://snp.cshl.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2006) (de-
scribing project to make genetic sequences available to the public without patent
restrictions).
352. See, e.g., Arti Rai, Open and Collaborative Research: A New Model for Biomedicine, in IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECH (Robert
Hahn ed., forthcoming 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=574863; Kenneth N. Cukier, Open Source Biotech: Can a Non-proprietary Approach to
Intellectual Property Work in the Life Sciences., ACUMEN J. LIFE Sci., Sept-Oct. 2003 (providing
an overview of current problems with patents for life sciences, as well as description on some
early open source activities); Carina Dennis, Biologists Launch Open-source Movement, 431 NA-
TURE 494 (Sept. 30, 2004); Andrew Pollack, Open Source Practices for Biotechnology, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 2005, at C8; see also UNCTAD/ICTSD Regional Dialogue on Intellectual Property
Rights (IPRs), Innovation and Sustainable Development, Nov. 8-10, 2004, Meeting Report, at
7, available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/dialogue/docs/Report_ 20 0 4-11-8.pdf
(noting that meeting participants suggested consideration of an open source model as an
alternative to patent protection). An alternative option that has been proposed is to develop
patent pools along the lines of what already exists for copyrighted songs, whereby one or-
ganization can handle all the licensing of individual songs. See, e.g., JEANNE CLARK ET AL.,
PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION To THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 8
(Dec. 5, 2000), available at www.uspto.gov/web/offices/oac/daoo/opla/patpoolcover.html
(noting that patent pools could address blocking patents in biotechnology).
353. Domestic expansion of patentable subject matter in recent years includes the area
of internet business method patents, as well as computer software.
354. The scope of patentable subject matter may be broadened in some TRIPS-plus
agreements by either eliminating TRIPS exceptions to patentable subject matter or by man-
dating that the "highest international standards" be adopted. This may require adoption of
the prevailing standard, including the broad scope of patentability under United States law.
See supra notes 326-327 and accompanying text (describing TRIPS-plus agreements).
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Canadian Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion, refused to follow the
United States, the EU, and Japan in patenting a genetically modi-
fied mouse.55 In addition, although the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the patentability of plants, some amicus briefs urged the
Court to rule otherwise on grounds of public policy, arguing that
patent rights undermined farmers' interests and ultimately public
health.56
With technical advances in cloning and human embryonic stem
cells, there is increasing public discomfort with patents on prod-
ucts of such research, which has prompted calls for modifying
patent laws to prohibit patents on immoral inventions. An early
example lies in the history of the EU Directive for Protecting Bio-
technological Inventions, passed only after incorporation of
language that addressed ethical considerations, including the ex-
clusion of specific types of controversial subject matter such as
embryo cloning methods. Even in the United States, which has
expressly rejected consideration of moral implications for more
than twenty years,5  there are renewed discussions of whether the
patent system is inappropriately encouraging immoral inventions,
such that moral implications should be reinstated as a reason to
bar patentability.35 9 In addition, there have been attempts to legisla-
tively limit the scope of patentability.
3s6
d. Uniform Patent Laws are Questionable-TRIPS-plus agreements
are also questionable to the extent that they promote uniform
355. Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45. See also
Dan Burk, Reflections in a Darkling Glass: A Comparative Contemplation of the Harvard College
Decision, 39 CAN. Bus. L.J. 219 (2004) (suggesting that the Canadian decision may provide
an interesting experiment in patent policy because of its divergent approach from United
States interpretation of the same express patent language). Although the decision is based
on a narrow statutory interpretation, it nonetheless reflects some hesitancy even among
Western countries concerning the scope of patent rights.
356. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001); Brief for
Malla Pollack and Other Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal, J.E.M. AG
Supply, 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (No. 99-1996).
357. See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing genesis of EU Biotechnology Directive and differ-
ences among member countries with respect to ethical aspects of patentability).
358. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
359. See Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 130; Benjamin Enerson, Note,
Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions: The Risk of Reviving the Moral Utility Doctrine,
89 CORNELL L. REv. 685 (2004) (opposing resurrection of the moral utility doctrine).
360. In particular, Sen. Brownback had proposed an amendment to a terrorism bill that
aimed to narrow the scope of patentable subject matter. Unpatentability of Human Organ-
isms, SA 3843, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REc. S5556 (daily ed. June 13, 2002). Although the
direct proposal failed, when it was redrafted to limit funding to the PTO for issuance of
similar patents, it passed. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199,
§ 634, 118 Stat. 3 (2003) (purporting to disallow the PTO from using government funds to
"issue patents on claims directed to or encompassing a human organism").
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rules for all countries.' First, there is an equity argument to the
extent that countries that currently advocate uniformly strong lev-
els of patent protection actually benefited from relatively [lax]
patent rights to accommodate national interests at a time of eco-
nomic development-a benefit that subsequent countries no
longer have under TRIPS and TRIPS-plus agreements. 62 There are
additional problems with uniform rules for all countries. Uniform-
ity tends to result in rules that are incapable of adapting to
changing circumstances of individual countries, as well as to chang-
ing technology. The typical development of law often benefits from
cross-fertilization of ideas from diverse systems. Indeed, the prem-
ise of comparative patent law has traditionally been to gain wisdom
from the experiences of different nations.16' As noted by the
United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights, "international rules concerning intellectual property
should not necessarily be uniform if this might lead to forms of
intellectual property protection inappropriate for development
goals., 364 Rather, the Committee recommended the adoption of
"special and differential treatment" for developing countries, as
have others who have examined the implications of imposing
Western-style patent rules on developing countries.63
Smaller-scale experiments with uniform patent laws have pro-
vided mixed results. For example, the United States successfully
created more uniformity in the validity of patents when it created
the Federal Circuit as the exclusive appellate court to hear patent
appeals. 366 However, in the two decades since its creation, there has
361. Although TRIPS-plus agreements need not be identical, the approach of the
United States Trade Representatives in using each FTA as a template for subsequent negotia-
tions suggests a trend towards uniformity.
362. See supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text (noting this as part of an argument
for why TRIPS is an act of Western imperialism).
363. See, e.g., Kara Belew, Stem Cell Division: Abortion Law and its Influence on the Adoption
of Radically Different Embryonic Stem Cell Legislation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Germany, 39 TEx. INT'L L.J. 479 (2004); Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting
Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory
Licensing and a Fair Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1623 (2001); Horacio Rangel-Ortiz,
Comparative Law Alleviates Biotech Uncertainty: When Providing Much-Needed Clarification on the
Patentability of Biotechnological Inventions, the Mexican Patent Office Considered How Other Coun-
tries Had Dealt with the Issue, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., June 1, 2005, at 79 (noting that the
Mexican Patent Office had recently proposed guidelines for patenting biotechnology after
meeting with EPO and WIPO representatives to gain wisdom from comparative perspec-
tives).
364. U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2001/15, supra note 174, at 15.
365. Id.
366. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982)
(effective Oct. 1, 1982). For more extensive discussion of the creation of the Federal Circuit,
as well as an evaluation of its performance, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus, The Federal Circuit:
A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 8-22 (1989); Paul M.Janicke, To Be or
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been increasing concern that the Federal Circuit has been creating
uniform law that overly protects patent rights. One problem is the
fundamental structure of a single appellate court; by definition this
system lacks the countervailing balance that typically occurs when
there are other circuit courts to hear similar issues and potentially
develop other approaches. In addition, because the Federal Circuit
is the exclusive appellate court, there are no circuit splits that typi-
cally lead to resolution of contentious issues by the United States
Supreme Court.167 This systemic anomaly has been noted as one
possible contributing factor to a host of problems at the Federal
Circuit, including an overly sympathetic stance to patent propo-
nents that fails to promote a proper balance between patent
incentives and public interests. 68
e. Moving Forward: A Moratorium?-These issues may seem to
suggest that a moratorium on development of further interna-
tional patent norms, or at least TRIPS-plus standards would be
appropriate. Indeed, NGOS have already been urging for a cessa-
tion of TRIPS-plus standards in bilateral agreements.369 There is
precedent for considering and utilizing a moratorium during times
of legal uncertainty. In the TRIPS agreement itself, there was an
initial moratorium imposed on non-violation complaints370 which
Not to Be: The Long Gestation of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST LJ.
645 (2002).
367. See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 147, at 86 (noting that the Fed-
eral Circuit "is in most instances the final arbiter of patent law"); Mark Janis, Patent Law in
the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 387 (noting that the Federal Circuit
is effectively the court of last resort for patents since historically, the U.S. Supreme court
rarely reviews Federal Circuit cases). Interestingly, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has
slightly widened the opportunity for greater regional circuit participation in some patent
cases. See, e.g., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826,
834 (2002); Elizabeth Rogers, The Phoenix Precedents: The Unexpected Rebirth of Regional Circuit
Jurisdiction over Patent Appeals and the Need for a Considered Congressional Response, 16 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 411, 437-72 (2003).
368. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1035, 1075, 1110 (2003) (noting that the Federal Circuit,
unlike other generalist courts hears cases predominantly from patent attorneys who are less
likely to make sweeping legal and policy arguments). In addition, the Federal Circuit may
have "insular tendencies" that also create problems. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 147, at 86.
369. See OXFAM INT'L, supra note 320, at 3.
370. TRIPS, Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 64.2 (declaring moratorium un-
til January, 2000). See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two
Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L
L. 275 (1997). In addition, there were calls to extend the moratorium. See, e.g., Frederick M
Abbott, Nullification or Impairment Causes of Action under the TRIPS Agreement and the Fifth Min-
isterial Conference: A Warning and a Reminder, Quaker United Nations Office Occasional Paper
11, Jul. 2003, available at www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Occasional/Non-
violation.pdf; HAOCHEN SUN, TRIPS AND NON-VIOLATION COMPLAINTS: FROM A PUBLIC
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continues to exist following recent calls to extend the morato-
rium. Similarly, there were proposals to implement a moratorium
on dispute settlement actions to ensure access to low cost generic
versions of AZT drugs. 72
However, a moratorium on regional agreements is politically
unlikely, if not impossible. The USTR has a strong mandate to con-
tinue to negotiate and implement trade agreements with ever-
stronger terms for intellectual property laws.373 Moreover, even
countries that stand to lose in these agreements are nonetheless
eager to sign them for believed trade benefits, no matter how illu-374
sory. In addition, even if a moratorium could be negotiated, it
would not abolish the many existing bilateral agreements. Al-
though a moratorium has intuitive appeal to developing countries,
only a less radical approach will have any likelihood of adoption.
Accordingly, the next section considers realistic ways forward.
3. Reconsidering "Fundamental" Patent Law and Policy-This sec-
tion advocates a critical review of fundamental issues of Western
patent law and policy that share some commonality with issues un-
derlying biopiracy disputes.375 This review goes beyond issue-
framing, it inherently couches concerns from a Western
perspective which, as prior history shows, increases the opportunity
for change. The timing of this review may be particularly well
suited for addressing biopiracy because there is an existing
HEALTH PERSPECTIVE (Nov. 2002), http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Papers/Sun-
TRIPS.pdf.
371. See, e.g., Tove Gerhardsen, Non-Violation Complaint Moratorium Extended in Latest
Hong Kong Draft, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Dec. 18, 2005, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/
index.php?p=184&res=1024&print--0.
372. See, e.g., Joint Communication from the African Group, Proposal on Paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/W/351 (June 24, 2002)
(suggesting that there should be moratorium on disputes against members that take meas-
ures to address national health concerns in countries with inadequate manufacturing
capacity); Second Communication from the United States, Paragraph 6 of theDoha Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/W/358 (July 9, 2002) (suggesting that the
most expeditious solution would be either a moratorium on dispute settlement, or a waiver
of the Article 31 (f) requirement that compulsory licensing be predominantly for domestic
use).
373. See, e.g., Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, §°2102(b) (4) (a) (i)(II), 116 Stat.
933, 995-96 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §°3802(b)(4)(a)(i)(II) (2004)) (noting that a primary
objective of the United States regarding trade-related intellectual property rights is to en-
sure that "provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement... entered into by the
United States reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in United States law").
374. See supra notes 323-324 and accompanying text.
375. There are additional issues of current concern among Western patent law that
could potentially also be considered alongside traditional knowledge concerns. For exam-
ple, there is a strong concern that patents are impeding adequate access to health. This
could be an area of emphasis with respect to the indirect impact of patenting traditional
knowledge on the health and sustainability of developing countries.
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concern among Western countries that present patent laws and
• l • 376
policies are in need of reconsideration. Biopiracy, as well as cur-
rent issues arising in Western countries, raises questions about the
appropriate balance between promoting scientific invention and
competing social and cultural priorities. 77
a. Patents and Morality/Ethics-One ethical issue at the intersec-
tion of patents and biotechnology is whether patents unduly
commodify life. This is not an entirely new issue, but is gaining
broader discussion as patents come increasingly closer to people's
conceptions about the building blocks of life. In the early nineties,
patient John Moore wanted to claim patent or property rights in
technology derived from his diseased spleen, but the majority of
the California court that heard his case declined to find any such
interest and sided with providing patent rights solely to the doctor
in the interest of promoting the biotechnology industry.37s How-
ever, Judge Mosk noted in his dissent that because society
acknowledges the importance of protecting the human body as
"the physical and temporal expression of the unique human per-
sona," there are prohibitions against indirect abuse of the body
376. Western countries are involved in serious reflection of patent law and policy, as re-
flected in the recent promulgation of many governmental and non-governmental reports.
See generally AUSTL. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTELL. PROP., PATENTS AND EXPERIMENTAL USE
ISSUES PAPER (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.acip.gov.au/library/patentsexpuse.PDF
(providing a comparative analysis of experimental use, with proposed policies for Australia);
W.R. CORNISH ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPRs) AND GENETICS: A STUDY
INTO THE IMPACT AND MANAGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHIN THE
HEALTHCARE SECTOR (uly 2003), available at http://www.phgu.org.uk/about.phgu/
resources/word/s-iprl.doc; FED. TRADE COMM., To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, Supra note
147, at 41; NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA (2002), avail-
able at http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/patentingdna/introduction; THE
ROYAL SOCIETY, KEEPING SCIENCE OPEN: THE EFFECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY
ON THE CONDUCT OF SCIENCE (2003), available at http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/
displaypagedoc.asp?id=1 1403; Background Study for the European Commission within the
Framework of the Expert Group on Biotechnological Inventions, Patenting DNA Sequences
(Polynucleotides) and Scope of Protection in the European Union: An Evaluation, (2004) (prepared by
SvenJ.R. Bostyn), available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/bostyn/patentingdna.pdf.
377. The role of patents in promoting innovation more generally could be further stud-
ied since there is little evidence to support the claims of Western nations that strong patent
rights will promote the local economy, or increase the amount of foreign direct investment.
See generally KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(2000); WTO and WHO Secretariats, WTO Agreements & Public Health: A Joint Study by the
WHO and the WFO Secretariat (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/rese/
bookspe/whowtoe.pdf; WIPO, WIPO Patent Agenda: Options for Development of the Interna-
tional Patent System, at 24, WIPO Doc. A/37/6 (Aug. 19, 2002). However, unlike the issues
proposed, directly challenging the ability of patents to promote innovation may face sub-
stantial opposition.
378. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 494 (Cal. 1990).
[VOL. 39:3
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 524 2005-2006
Biopiracy and Beyond
through economic exploitation for the sole benefit of another.3 7 9
He suggested that this issue "haunts the laboratories and board-
rooms of today's biotechnological research-industrial complex.
30
In a concurring opinion, Judge Arrabian suggested that for scien-
tists to claim the right to appropriate and exploit a patient's tissue
for profit without compensation to the patient, would be to im-
properly treat the human body as a commodity."8' More recently,
the Nuffield Council evaluated the ethics of patenting DNA on be-
half of the British Royal Society and found that there is an "anxiety
about what might be termed 'private appropriation of the genetic
commons."'38 2 The Nuffield Council found that "human DNA se-
quences hold a special status as our common heritage" and thus,
there is an ethical concern over patenting such subject matter.383
The issue of commodification of life has special pertinence to
biopiracy patents. In particular, although the underlying technol-
ogy that is patented may be different, the argument is essentially
the same-patents on some types of inventions devalue important
social issues. For Western countries, the current issue is whether
gene patents and stem cell patents unduly commodify human life,
based upon the belief that such material has special status as com-
mon heritage. For indigenous communities, patents based upon
their sacred resources and traditions are considered to defile the
sanctity of their culture.8 4
There is a parallel discourse concerning the commodification of
life between Western and developing countries. The counterargu-
ment that is made in both instances is that opposition to such
patents is overstated because a patent does not constitute private
ownership in life itself, such that the fears are overstated. In par-
ticular, Western countries note that because a patent right is one of
379. Id. at 515 (MoskJ., dissenting).
380. Id.
381. See, e.g., Moore, 793 P.2d at 497 (Arabian,J., concurring) (noting that the request of
plaintiff to recognize and enforce a right to sell his body tissue for profit would be tanta-
mount to equating human tissue as "equal with the basest commercial commodity").
382. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 376, at 5.
383. Id. See generally Barbara Knoppers, Status, Sale and Patenting of Human Genetic Mate-
rial: An International Survey, 22 NATURE GENETICS 23 (1999); David B. Resnik, Patents on
Human-Animal Chimeras and Threats to Human Dignity, 3 Am. J. BIOETHics 35 (2003) (noting
that patents on DNA threaten human dignity because it contributes to a trend towards com-
plete commodification of human beings); Melissa Sturges, Note, Who Should Hold Property
Rights to the Human Genome? An Application of the Common Heritage of Humankind, 13 AM. U.
INT'L L. Rav. 219 (1997).
384. In addition, indigenous communities have also opposed patents on living matter,
such as plant resources; patents are seen as leading to commercialization, which is seen as
threatening the relationship that communities have with protecting their environment.
385. See supra notes 257-261 and accompanying text.
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exclusion, it does not give control over life itself. For example, a
patent on a method of creating an oil-eating bacteria provides its
owner with the right to exclude all others from creating such bac-
teria, but is not an unrestricted right in the bacteria itself. Laws
outside the patent realm can-and often do-restrict the ability of
patent owners to make or use what they have patented.8 6 The im-
plication is that since there is no technical control over living
matter, commodification is a non-issue. In addressing opposition to
perceived immoral patents, proponents of the patent system typi-
cally refer to the effectiveness of the patent system in promoting
science and technology. For example, in addressing the concerns
of developing countries with respect to biopiracy patents, the
United States has stated that "[t]he patent system has been and
continues to be a highly effective tool for technological and eco-
nomic development.31 7 Similarly, the United States has asserted
that "[i] t is no accident that countries with strong patent systems,
where exclusions from patentabilty are few, are also countries with
strong private industries covering the broad range of technology,
providing jobs and contributing to the creation of capital that can
be invested further."Om However, even if strong patent rights pro-
mote economic status-which itself is a questionable proposition-
this ignores the extent to which other values might be prioritized
over absolute wealth, such as cultural norms concerning the sanc-
tity of life.
The proper role of ethics in patent law has historically been an
issue for sovereign consideration. However, in an increasingly
global economy, ranging from the creation of the EU to bilateral
and multilateral agreements, the role of ethics may need to simi-
larly be considered on a more global basis. This is particularly true
since while the grant and enforcement of patents technically re-
mains limited to national boundaries, there is no limit to where the
underlying patented technology may be derived. In particular,
whereas patentable subject matter limits may have previously been
able to reflect cultural perspectives on the appropriate limits of
what should be patentable, this is impossible if there are multiple
cultures involved.
Even amongst Western countries, there may be important dif-
ferences of opinion regarding the appropriate scope of
patentability. This was readily seen in the discussions concerning
386. See, e.g., IP/C/W/209, supra note 58, at 4 (noting that a patent owners have a right
to exclude others, but that the patent owner does not have any affirmative rights, such that a
patent would not give control over the human source that originated the gene).
387. IP/C/W/434, supra note 267, 33.
388. IP/C/W/209, supra note 58, at 4.
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the need for an EU Biotechnology Directive. The original 1997
proposal attempted to mirror US law to increase the competitive-
ness of the EU biotechnology industry.89 However, this proposal
was rejected because of inadequate consideration of ethical is-
sues. 90 Some of the member states, including the Netherlands,
Belgium and Italy were opposed to the proposal because of a gen-
• • 391
eral opposition to the patenting of plants and animals. In an
interesting parallel to the current discussion on biopiracy, there
was a suggestion to include in the text of the EU Biotechnology
Directive some language to require patents to state the geographi-
cal place of origin of the invention, as well as evidence that the
material was used in accordance with access regulations-two of
the very proposals that developing countries have been urging be
adopted via TRIPS amendments.12 In addition, even after the Di-
rective was passed, member states continued to protest the
directive, including filing a formal challenge with the European
Court of Justice. One argument was that the Directive would un-
duly deprive member states of their right to utilize TRIPS Article
27(3) (b) to exclude certain plants and animals from patentability.
The European Court of Justice expressly rejected Netherlands's
claim that the Directive contradicted the CBD. Indeed, echoing
the prior discussion of the CBD's subordination to other interna-
tional agreements, the court noted that the CBD "is more in the
nature of a framework agreement" that merely "proposes a series
of approaches which Contracting Parties... are to adopt, in many
cases only as far as possible and as appropriate." The scope of the
Convention is rather wide; the suggested measures are rather
varied and in most cases couched in general terms.3 Moreover, the
Court of Justice echoed the position currently taken by Western
countries with respect to biopiracy:
389. Commission Prposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological In-
ventions, at 6, COM (1988) 496 final (Oct. 17, 1988) [hereinafter EU Biotech Directive]. See also
Communication from the Commission to the Council, Biotechnology in the Community, at 34, COM
(1983) 672 final (Oct. 3, 1983) (noting the necessity of taking actions "for the promotion of
competitiveness in modem biotechnology" in Europe).
390. Decision on the Joint Text Approved by the Conciliation Committee for a European Parlia-
ment and Council Directive on the Legal Protection for Biotechnological Inventions, 1995 O.J. (C 68)
26; Joseph Straus, Patenting Human Genes in Europe--Past Developments and Prospects for the
Future, 26 IIC 920, 942-46 (1995).
391. See, e.g., Sigrid Sterckx, Some Ethically Problematic Aspects of the Proposal for a Directive
on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 123, 125, 127
(1998).
392. EU Biotech Directive, supra note 389, 16 ("whereas the free and informed consent
of the person from whose body material is taken is required in order for an application to be
made for a patent in respect of the use of that material.").
393. Case C-377/78, Netherlands v. Parliament and Council, 2001 E.C.R. 1-7079, 179.
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[I] t is not for patent legislation to provide for broader matters
such as monitoring the source of biological material in re-
spect of which patent protection is sought. The Directive does
not-nor can it-affect the ability of developing countries to
establish controls over their genetic resources in order to pre-
394vent the unregulated plundering of such resources.
Although the Court of Justice opinion speaks in definitive lan-
guage, member states have not all uniformly transformed the EU
Directive into national law.
391
In addition, although there is no place under current laws for a
consideration of implications on other countries, patent laws have
been known to evolve over time. Sometimes patent laws have
changed in response to calls by industry groups to strengthen pat-
ent rights.396 However, patent laws have also changed in response to
public policy concern. For example, the USPTO twice modified its
guidelines for patent examination to accommodate public con-
cerns about unduly lax patenting of gene patents that were feared
to put the future of genetic development in the hands of a few in-
dividuals who had not adequately discovered or described all
aspects of the isolated gene sequences. 97 Also, national courts and
legislatures have often made modifications to law to better balance
proprietary patent rights with needs to access medicine. In particu-
lar, many nations have an exception to patent infringement to
enable manufacturers of generic drugs to produce enough of the
patented product during the patent term to obtain regulatory ap-
proval, thus expediting the availability of lower cost generic drugs
398
once the patent expires.
394. Id., 181.
395. Interestingly, some member states continued to believe that national laws imple-
menting the EU Directive should include some aspect of the watered-down preamble
relating to the need for informed consent. See, e.g., Deryck Beyleveld, Why Recital 26 of the EC
Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions Should be Implemented in National
Law, INTELL. PROP. Q., Issue 1, 2000, at 1. Indeed, Belgium has proposed changing its law to
nullify patents that fail to comply with disclosure of origin. See, e.g., Geertrui van Overwalle,
Belgium Goes its Own Way on Biodiversity and Patents, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 233, 234
(2002) (noting proposal, but suggesting application problems).
396. This is the case in the United States, where federal law has been designed to make
patentability in the area of biotechnology easier. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000). Similarly,
amendments to create "extraterritorial infringement" under United States patent laws were
also a result of efforts of the biotechnology industry to ensure that their research was not
pirated abroad. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (g) (2000).
397. See, e.g., Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1097-99 (Jan. 5, 2001);
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1, "Written
Description" Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (Jan. 5, 2001).
398. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1) (2000) (providing exception from patentability for
generic drug manufacturers to prepare data for submission to FDA); Law No. 24.766, Dec.
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While the role of morality in patent law may seem highly analo-
gous to present objections concerning biopiracy patents, the
morality issue may be the most difficult to address because of his-
toric problems of reaching consensus on this thorny question.
Discussion of the proper place of morality in patent law is impor-
tant, but not a recommended short-term strategy for addressing
biopiracy problems. Indeed, this strategy has already been utilized
by developing countries to no avail. However, there are other issues
with Western patent law that share commonalities with biopiracy
that could bring more immediate resolution to the biopiracy prob-
lems, as will be discussed in the next section.
b. Western Patent Problems as Templates for Addressing Problems of
Biopiracy-This section considers a panoply of issues that can serve
as templates to address various aspects of biopiracy-related con-
cerns. Because these issues are already under consideration by
Western countries, there is no uphill battle in convincing such
countries of the importance of the issues. While this approach does
not offer the simplicity of a single amendment to TRIPS, it may
provide the more important advantage of actual success. Some of
these issues have in fact been raised by developing countries in
conjunction with allegations of biopiracy. However, they tended to
be noted in conjunction with more inflammatory statements that
challenged ingrained Western patent law principles, such that they
were likely not given serious consideration.39 Accordingly, this sec-
tion highlights current issues that may provide some success with
the goal that they be the primary focus of advocacy, rather than
biopiracy alone.
c. Inadequately Inventive?--One current issue is whether Western
patent systems currently grant patents inappropriately for what are
inferior inventions. There are actually two sub-issues, both of which
may have relevance for addressing biopiracy. First, there are seri-
ous concerns about whether existing patent rules are rigorously
applied by patent offices. More specifically, there is an issue with
regard to the standard for patenting isolated or modified genes
30, 1996, art. 8, B.O. 18/12/96 (Arg.); Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, 55.2(2) (1985) (Can.);
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court ofJustice] "Clinical Trials II," Klinische Versuche II,
April 17, 1997, 1998 R.P.C. 424 (F.R.G.) (providing, under a decision by the German Federal
Court ofJustice, an exception from patentability for tests carried out with view of obtaining
data for marketing approval); see also 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000) (creating immunity for
medical doctors from infringing certain patented medical procedures); Clinical Trials III
(Decision of the Supreme Court 1999), in 30 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 448, 448-
49 (1999) (providing interpretation ofJapanese patent law to create exemption from patent
infringement for clinical trials conducted to obtain government approval for generic prod-
ucts).
399. See supra part III.A.
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that may have special relevance for patents based upon genetic re-
sources or traditional knowledge of developing countries.
The quality of patent examinations has been a systemic concern
for all inventions. In particular, the USPTO has been a target of
criticism, both because of its process of rewarding patent examin-
ers based upon the number of applications examined, as well as for
issuance of invalid inventions.40 In recent years, the USPTO was
subject to particular criticism for issuance of internet business
method patents that were not truly novel.4°' In response, the
USPTO added an additional layer of examination, established ad-
ditional technical training for examiners of business method
patents, and also began to compile a database to help address a
deficit in the documented prior art for software and business
methods, which were traditionally not patented or published. °2
However, the USPTO continues to be the subject of criticism; re-
cent reports by the Federal Trade Commission and National
Research Council have continued to suggest that the USPTO is not
adequately applying the standards of novelty and nonobvious-
ness.4 ' As noted by the NRC, the existing internal quality review by
the USPTO "does not inspire confidence. ""'
In addition, the definition of what constitutes a sufficiently novel
chemical compound to be patentable under Western law is also of
current concern. The United States has long held that isolated and
purified genes and gene sequences are sufficiently analogous to
chemicals, such that they should be considered patentable.
Other Western countries have generally followed suit in embracing
patent laws that mirror the US, although such action may be more
a function of a desire to capture the commercial proceeds that
emanate from the profitable biotechnology industry in the U.S.,
400. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 147, at 47. In addition, some have
suggested that the USPTO is subject to special workload pressures as the technology in pat-
ent applications has become increasingly complex, yet the number of patent examiners has
actually been reduced by twenty percent in recent years. Id. at 51.
401. Amazon.com's "one-click" method of shopping on the internet is one example.
402. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Business Methods Patent Initiative; An Action
Plan (2000), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/actionplan.html; U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, Patent Quality Improvement: Expansion of the Second-Pair-of-Eyes Re-
view, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/action/q3pl7a.htm (last modified
April 4, 2003); Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Under Secretary of Com-
merce for Intellectual Property Dickinson Unveils New Initiative Focusing on Business
Method Patents (March 30, 2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
com/speeches/00-22.htm.
403. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 147, at 47 (noting that "there is no
lack of examples of issued patents that appear dubious on their face").
404. Id. at 50.
405. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seeds v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
[VOL. 39:3
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 530 2005-2006
Biopiracy and Beyond
than a principled consideration of the social implications of such
patents. 4 6 However, some are beginning to question this policy as
the implications of gene patents are becoming more obvious. In
particular, many have noted that gene patents are impeding access
to genetic testing, as well as subsequent research. Accordingly,
there are renewed calls to reconsider the long-standing approach
to patented genes and gene sequences.4 0 7 This reconsideration
could be opportune for addressing the biopiracy problem to the
extent that some patents are genetically engineered equivalents of
plants that are known through traditional knowledge to have me-
dicinal value.
Gene patents discovered with the assistance of nonscientists are
a special subset of gene patents that raise an additional issue be-
yond those applicable to all gene patents. In particular, only the
scientist who isolates the genetic material is considered the inven-
tor of such patents. However, the fact that traditional communities
or Western patients provide instrumental assistance in expediting
the process is another reason to question the inventive contribu-
tion that leads to such patents. Developing countries have alleged
that patent rights are inequitable when communities provide sub-
stantial input for the patented invention, yet are excluded from
any resulting patent bounty. Similarly, Western patients who con-
tribute biological material to facilitate and expedite the process of
finding medical treatments are affronted by resulting patents that
may impede their access to discovered medical treatments because
of the patent cost, as well as the fact that others are profiting from
their generosity." In both instances, a group of individuals is
willing to share their knowledge and resources-until they realize
that those resources are being used to create patents that may then
have a negative implication on them. In the context of biopiracy,
the negative result is often the patent itself because it is seen as a
per se violation of cultural traditions. In the case of patient contri-
butions, the negative result may be a violation of fiduciary
406. Council Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 6
July on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13.
407. Some have suggested that with technological advances in DNA sequencing, the
process of isolating a gene is no longer inventive, even if the resulting product technically
does not exist in nature. See, e.g., NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 376, at 3.30;
John H. Barton, Rational Limits on Genomic Patents, 18 NATURE BIOTECH 805, 805 (2000)
(noting that although discovery of DNA sequences used to be a laborious task, automatic
sequencing devices available today should make the process lack adequate inventive step for
patentability); Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L.
REv. 707 (2004) (reevaluating United States patent law regarding the patentability of DNA
and ultimately concluding that gene patents should not be patentable).
408. See generally Cynthia M. Ho, supra note 98 (providing discussion of a gap between
patient preceptions and patent law, as well as possible avenues to address the gap).
SPRING 2006]
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 531 2005-2006
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
responsibility, as well as an unexpected lack of access to the medi-
cal test or treatment that the patient helped to produce since the
patent owner has the right to exclude all others from the patented
invention.
Another important issue to biopiracy is a potential modification
to the United States' definition of prior art, which could help pre-
vent the issuance of what are currently considered valid patents. As
previously noted, to determine whether an invention is adequately
new, and thus deserving of patent protection, the United States
considers any printed document published anywhere in the world,
but does not afford equal status to oral information. There is not a
groundswell of support at present to modify this rule, although
some academics have advocated eliminating the distinction as
anachronistic and even unconstitutional.4 9 In addition, while one
recent Congressional proposal that attempts to address a number
of patent reforms modifies this rule, it is not clear whether this
proposal will become law. 0 Similarly, at the international level, the
current SPLT, being negotiated under the auspices of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), notably would impose
a uniform definition of novelty that would replace the United
States' rule with one that would consider knowledge known any-
where in the world-whether oral or written-to be relevant prior
art.
411
C. A New Proposal for addressing Socio-Cultural Conflicts
This section proposes a new method of promoting patent policy
by first gathering information that will not immediately threaten
the interests of patent owners. As previously noted, patent propo-
nents are highly sensitive and opposed to any changes to the scope
of patent rights.1 This method leaves untouched present patent
rights, such that patent proponents are less likely to find it objec-
tionable. Nonetheless, this section provides a method for public
commentary and direct dialogue with patent owners that should
help foster better patent policy.
409. See supra note 60 (referencing arguments for changing the definition of prior art
in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)). In addition, the NRC also recommended eliminating this distinction,
albeit for reasons of international harmonization. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
147, at 127 (noting that "in the interest of arriving at a uniform definition of prior art, the
United States should remove its limitation on non-published prior art").
410. See The Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
411. See supra Part III.B (describing SPLT definition of prior art).
412. See, e.g., supra Part IIIA
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The envisioned system would provide for internet-based com-
mentary that is hyperlinked to patents. The comments would not
appear on the face of the patent itself because they are not a part
of the patented invention. However, the comments would be hy-
perlinked to the first page of each patent. Since most patent offices
are publishing patents, and even patent applications on the inter-
net, a web link on the face of the patent to a separate site with
commentary should be technologically feasible . 4  The patent
owner would also be permitted to directly respond to comments,
which would be similarly hyperlinked to the actual patent. In par-
ticular, because objections to patents sometimes stem from
misunderstanding the underlying science, as well as a misunder-
standing of patent rights, providing patent owners with the ability
to clarify issues would be in the best interests of all.
This proposal avoids problems with incorporating morality con-
siderations directly in patent laws, which although a frequent
proposal to address ethical conundrums in patent law, has its own
host of problems. Current systems that allow considerations of mo-
rality within patent laws have been criticized on a number of
grounds. A major objection is that patent examiners typically are
unqualified to make assessments of whether a patent is adequately
immoral to be denied patentability since such examiners are hired
for their technical, rather than ethical expertise. There is also the
potential for inconsistency in application of the morality rule be-
cause of the inherent ambiguity in determining whether an
invention is sufficiently problematic to deny patentability-
whether by someone trained in science or ethics. Moreover, al-
though some existing patent systems enable third parties to raise
objections based upon morality, the result is typically that the issu-
ance of a patent is delayed, but the third parties are unsatisfied
with the process. The systems nonetheless are subject to intense
criticism from these parties.1 4 This proposal, on the other hand,
413. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 12(b)(1)(A) (2000) (noting that U.S. patent applications will
generally be published "promptly" after a period of eighteen months from the earliest filing
date unless an applicant requests an earlier date, or an exception to publication applies);
Japanese Patent Law, Law No. 121 of Apr. 13, 1959, art. 64(1), as last amended by Law No. 220
of Dec. 22, 1999 (publication "one year and six months from the filing date"); EPC, supra
note 38, at art. 93 (noting that European patent application shall be published "as soon as
possible after the expiry of a period of eighteen months" from the date of filing or of prior-
ity); PCT, supra note 292, at art. 21(2) (noting that in general, the application will be
published "promptly after the expiration of 18 months from the priority date of the applica-
tion"). See also Japan Patent Office, Trilateral Patent Website, http://www.jpo.go.jp/
index.htm (providing for the ability to search U.S.,Japanese, and EPC patents).
414. For example, under the European system that enabled consideration of morality
issues, the examination of a patent application on the Harvard "Onco-mouse," a mouse that
was genetically predisposed to develop cancer, was subject to over a dozen formal
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provides dialogue while avoiding the problems that have tradition-
ally arisen under patent systems that consider morality.
In addition, while this proposal enables discussion of moral im-
plications, it would not raise strong political challenges against
modifying patent rights in the United States. In fact, it is possible
that patent proponents may embrace this system because it pro-
vides an opportunity for patent owners to present an affirmative
case for their inventions. Moreover, adoption of this system, rather
than a whole-sale change to patent laws, could enable patent pro-
ponents to assert that they were sympathetic to concerns raised
about both biopiracy and immoral patents, without directly threat-
ening their immediate economic interests.
Beyond side-stepping problems associated with past approaches,
the present proposal provides new benefits. For example, this pro-
posal would provide for transparency of public opinion concerning
the implications of the patent, and would enable an indirect im-
pact on the potential commercialization since the comments would
be publicly available.415 Such a system would add an important layer
of public transparency about the patent process that could play an
important role in development of patent law and policy. For exam-
ple, such an accessible system could facilitate investigative
reporting and discussion by bloggers. In addition, the system could
impact ultimate commercialization of inventions by providing ad-
ditional information that might not otherwise be available. For
example, prior to entering into licensing and/or commercializa-
tion agreements, a company could consult the comments for a
gauge of public perception and opposition. Moreover, the in-
creased transparency and dialogue could assist policy makers and
legislators who would be able to consult the comments when con-
cerns arise regarding whether the patent system should be
modified. This could be particularly helpful in evaluating the
United States patent system-devoid of explicit consideration of
morality-because there is concern that legislators lack complete
oppositions by individuals and organizations, and several levels of review before the patent
was granted. See Oncomouse/HARVARD O.J. E.P.O. 1989, 451; T19/90 Onco-
mouse/HARVARD OJ. E.P.O. 1990, 476; Oncomouse/HARVARD O.J. E.P.O 1992, 588. See
also Press Release, European Patent Office, Public Oral Proceedings in the Appeal Case
T315/03 Relating to the "Oncomouse/Harvard" patent EP 0169672 (July 2, 2004),
http://www.european-patent-office.org/news/pressrel/2004_07_02_e.htm.
415. A contrary argument is that the opposition systems of some countries, such as
Europe, already allow for objections, but that the process has typically nonetheless resulted
in a patent. See DAVID A. KEvLEs, A HISTORY OF PATENTING LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES
WITH COMPARATIVE ATTENTION TO EUROPE AND CANADA 58-60 (2002) (noting that despite
substantial dissent, there were duplicative arguments made and the same eventual result as
under the United States patent system).
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information concerning what is patented, such that law makers are
unaware of morality issues concerning patents.
4
1
6
Public opinion can shape commercialization of patented prod-
ucts, as well as patent policy. For example, Monsanto disavowed
intent to commercialize genetically modified plants designed to
produce no reproducible seeds because of public protest over what
was dubbed "terminator technology."4 1 7 In addition, although not a
patent issue, public opinion has impacted the commercialization
of genetically modified food. Similarly, although Myriad Technol-
ogy, the company awarded patents on breast cancer marker genes,
aggressively sought to promote expensive licenses world-wide, it
faced major opposition from the Canadian provinces as well as
European nations. 4 " This proposal provides for broader access and
input than present patent systems that enable direct challenges
based upon lack of morality. In contrast to current legal systems
that require specific legal challenges to individual patents, the pre-
sent proposal would reduce costs because no legal action is
required. Cost is an important issue that has been cited by
416. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 130, at 502.
417. See, e.g., David R. Nicholson, Agricultural Biotechnology And GeneticaUy-Modied Foods:
Will The Developing World Bite?, 8 VA. J.L. & ThcH. 12-13 (2003). The United States, in par-
ticular, which had an interest in the patent, undertook efforts to block negative appraisals of
the technology. Although UPOV initially reported that this technology presented "consider-
able disadvantages for society," it ultimately omitted this characterization after repeated
pressure from the United States. ETC Group, US Government Forces UPOV to Abandon Termina-
tor Critique, April 17, 2003, http://www.etcgroup.org/article.asp?newsid=3 9 3 .
418. See, e.g., Press Release, Institut Curie, Against Myriad Genetics' Monopoly on Tests
for Predisposition to Breast and Ovarian Cancer Associated with the BRCA1 Gene (Sept 26,
2002); Jurdan Paradise, European Opposition to Exclusive Control over Predictive Breast Cancer
Testing and the Inherent Implications for US Patent Law and Public Policy: A Case Study of the Myr-
iad Genetics' BRCA Patent Controversy, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 133, 134-39, 147-50
(2004) (providing overview of objections to BRCA patents, including policy issues). See also
ONTARIO MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE, GENETICS, TESTING AND GENE PAT-
ENTING: CHARTING NEW TERRITORY IN HEALTHCARE 40-43 (2002); AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, REPORT 9 OF THE COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS: PATENTING OF GENES AND
THEIR MUTATIONS (2000), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/13570.html (pro-
viding overview of policy issues relating to gene patents and recommending that gene
patents be granted only when credible utility is established and that measures be taken to
ensure access to health care). Although the Myriad patents have been very high-profile,
gene patents in general have been considered a major patent policy problem. See, e.g., M.K.
CHO, PREPARING FOR THE MILLENIUM: LABORATORY MEDICINE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 47-58
(2d ed. 1998) (noting that twenty-five percent of genetic testing laboratories surveyed had
not been able to offer a test due to patent issues and that fifty percent did not develop new
tests because of patent issues); John Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test, 415 NATURE
577 (2002) (noting that thirty percent of laboratories stopped developing tests based upon
the hemochromatosis gene due to threats of patent litigation); American College of Medical
Genetics, Position Statement on Gene Patents and Accessibility of Gene Testing (Aug. 2,
1999), http://www.acmg.net/resources/policies/pol-015.asp.
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developing countries in the context of biopiracy.4 9 The removal of
a cost barrier could result in a broader range of constituencies who
could participate in discussions.4 0 There would still be a cost in
finding problematic patents, but the cost would be less than a full
legal challenge. In addition, it is possible that greater transparency
of the problem may lead to new organizations with funding and
momentum to spearhead legislative challenges. For example, in
the copyright context, the Electronic Frontier Foundation was ini-
tiated with the purpose of challenging laws that unduly restrict
public access.421
A system that works with the existing patent framework offers
systematic advantages that are presently lacking. For example, al-
though concerned citizens may write editorials, or even web site
articles about patents they view as improper, such avenues are
likely to be read and considered only by similarly interested parties,
rather than broadly considered by those responsible for patent pol-
icy such as those in Congress and the court systems. In addition,
the lack of a formal system may ultimately doom their continued
existence and utility. One example is the former website "bounty-
quest.com," which enabled interested parties to post a "reward" on
the website to anyone who could help find "prior art" to defeat the
noted patent that the web site considered to be improper. Al-
though initially hailed as a great innovation and tool to attack
improper patents, it is now defunct.
4 2
The present proposal would likely encourage a broader consid-
eration of policy issues than current formal or informal systems.
With respect to informal systems, such as bountyquest.com, there is
no encouragement of participation from the patent owner and in-
deed, the premise of the website is to attack the patent owner by
finding prior art to invalidate the patent. However, such a system
provides little assistance to objections against patents that are not
419. See, e.g., IP/C/W/403, supra note 197, at 2 (noting that challenging individual pat-
ents "may not be economically feasible for many aggrieved countries," especially in light of
prior art rules that make legal challenges "formidable and cumbersome").
420. For example, under the European patent system that considers lack of morality as
a basis for denying a patent, all of the published cases involving third party challenges in-
clude Greenpeace. This may make the challenges more easily dismissed as solely
representing the views of a narrow segment of society.
421. See Electronic Frontiers Foundation, Mission Statement, http://www.eff.org/
mission.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
422. See, e.g., Michael J Felton, A Call for Bounty Hunters, MODERN DRUG DISCOVERY,
Mar. 2001, at 57-58 (noting that BountyQuest was "born out of necessity" to address short-
comings of the U.S. patent system); Posting from Tim O'Reilly to Richard K. Belew,
http://www.oreilly.com/pub/a/oreilly/ask~tim/2003/bountyquest.1003.html (Oct. 2003)
(noting that although BountyQuest "seemed like a great idea," it was not able to translate it
into a successful business model).
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grounded in existing patent laws, but are nonetheless important
from a policy perspective; namely, objections to moral implications
of patenting traditional knowledge, as well as new technology. In
addition, present informal systems do not promote broader under-
standing of the scope of patent rights. Although editorials for and
against patents may provide some limited exchange of views, they
typically involve a delay in time. Moreover, because there is no offi-
cial venue, there is no incentive to encourage broad participation
by patent owners. Past experience shows that formal systems for
objection through patent offices may stymie serious discussion of
issues that are not present considerations under patent law. For
example, in the case of the "Vine" patent, there was a reexamina-
tion of the patent in the United States. Although the Center for
International Environmental Law (CIEL) raised objections to the
patent on the basis of moral utility, the patent office did not ad-
dress this issue. 3 Technically, CIEL's comments inappropriately
fail to distinguish between utility and plant patents, for which there
are different patentability requirements, while simultaneously in-
voking trademark registration standards, for which the
requirements are vastly different than those for either type of pat-
ents.4 2 4 Nonetheless, if there were a broader forum for airing the
problem, CIEL, or another party more familiar with patent laws
could have argued that the moral utility doctrine should be consid-
ered for plant patents. In addition, beyond enhancing arguments,
the Vine patent illustration is particularly notable because al-
though the case raised issues concerning immorality of patents
based upon biopiracy, the limited public access to the proceedings
effectively kept this argument hidden from public view, thus post-
poning public discussion of this issue.
For example, if this proposal had existed at the dawn of allega-
tions of biopiracy, it could have helped to rewrite the current
history. Organizations that have been vigilant about publicizing
biopiracy patents, such as ETC/RAFI, could have provided com-
ments linked to the specific patents. Although this would not likely
have diffused their public campaigns, it would have offered a more
organized attempt to diffuse some issues of misunderstanding. In
423. See David R. Downes & Glenn Wiser, Center for International Environmental Law,
Detailed Statement in Support of Request for Reexamination of U.S. Plant Patent No. Plant 5,751 24
(Mar. 30, 1999) (suggesting that patent right "offends religious and moral sensibilities to an
extent that is inconsistent with the concept of utility that underpins United States patent
law").
424. See id. at 24-28. See also 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (2000) (providing requirements for
utility patents); 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2000) (providing types of trademarks that cannot be fed-
erally registered).
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particular, rather than wait for academic commentators to discuss a
claim's merits or lack thereof, patent owners could directly address
misconceptions in a rebuttal format. For example, in response to
the misperception that the neem tree itself was patented such that
it could not continue to be used, an explanation linked to the ac-
tual patent might be more effective than articles that state the
same assertion but are only read by academics. In addition, al-
though owners of U.S. patents would likely dismiss assertions of
commodifying a sacred symbol in their responses, there could have
been a direct and immediate dialogue about whether U.S. patents
should consider morality issues within its patent laws. Moreover, an
open forum could have been readily joined in by NGOs, academ-
ics, and anyone with an interest in patent policy. For example,
some of the biopiracy allegations have appeared at a time when the
U.S. was considering application of a bar to federal registrations of
trademarks that are unduly disparaging of other groups-Indian
groups in particular.415 Although the scenario is different in the
sense that trademark laws have an existing basis for denying pat-
ents based on disparagement, there are patent laws in other
countries that deny patents for morality-based concerns, which are
at a minimum, analogous to disparagement. There could have
been an interesting synergy of discussion by like-minded groups
about the perception of misappropriation of cultural identities.
Intellectual property academics could have also participated in the
dialogue in a more effective manner than attempts to diffuse
rhetoric, on both sides, years after the rhetoric has crystallized into
a mindset.
Although this proposal is conceptualized within the context of
gathering information to address patents based on unauthorized
access to resources, the method can be readily transposed to other
areas where patent law and policy are in need of consideration. For
example, the negative impacts of specific patents on health care,
scientific research, or any other social policy concern could poten-
425. The PTO requested comments on whether trademarks should be prohibited for
any federally recognized Indian tribe since many insignia have religious symbols, such that
their use in commerce is considered sacrilegious. See Official Insignia of Native American
Tribes; Statutorily Required Study, 64 Fed. Reg. 29,841 (June 3, 1999); Official Insignia of
Native American Tribes; Statutorily Required Study, 63 Fed. Reg. 71,619 (Dec. 29, 1998). See
also 152 CONG. REc. S8927 (statement of Senator Bingaman) (proposing that federally rec-
ognized Indian tribe insignia be excluded from registration); Justin Blankenship, The
Cancellation of Redskins as a Disparaging Trademark: IS Federal Trademark Law an Appropriate
Solution for Words that Offend?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 415 (2001); Gavin Clarkson, Racial Imagery
and Native Americans: A First Look at the Empirical Evidence Behind the Indian Mascot Controversy,
11 CARrOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 393 (2003); Rachel Clark Hughey, The Impact of Pro-
Football, Inc. v. Harjo on Trademark Protection of Other Marks, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 327 (2004).
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tially be vetted through this proposal. To some extent, the need for
transparency and greater information is less urgent concerning the
intersection of patent and health law because the issue has already
been subject to years of discussion at the WTO, and among the
popular press. However, the ability to provide public comments to
specific patents could still have an impact that potentially enhances
prior discussions. In addition, there are other areas of patent law
that could be addressed through this system. For example, with
software and with business method patents, there remains concern
as to whether the patent system is working effectively.
4 6
The present proposal is admittedly embryonic with respect to its
precise format. However, hopefully the above outlined issues show
sufficient promise to engage further discussion and potential adop-
tion. Because this Article is focused on addressing the biopiracy
problem from multiple angles, significant details about the present
proposals are beyond its scope. However, a few logistical concerns
are nonetheless outlined for completeness.
One practical issue is what organization(s) are responsible for
linking comments to the specific patents. This could be a logical
role for WIPO, which already helps to streamline international fil-
ings of patent applications.4 27 Moreover, WIPO is a well-funded
organization that would potentially have adequate infrastructure to
sustain such a role.428 On the other hand, to the extent that WIPO
sees its mission as protecting the rights of patent owners, this may
present a conflict of interest.42 Given the current state of technol-
ogy, a small group of individuals could probably craft a method for
public input via a website that would then be of minimal cost to
maintain. To the extent that people and organizations have a
vested interest in the outcome of the system, perhaps the process
426. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TecH. L.J. 577 (1999); Tobias Buck,
IT Groups Win EU Ruling on Patents, FIN. TIMES, June 20, 2005, at 9; Josh Lerner, Where Does
State Street Lead? A First Look at Finance Patents, 1971-2000 29 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 7918, 2000); Press Release, Gov't of Pol., Pol. Does Not Support
Current Proposal for EU Software Patent Directive (Nov. 17, 2004), available at
http://swpat.ffii.org/news/04/consl 117/index.en.html. But seeJohn R. Allison & Emerson
H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987 (2003); Jeffrey R.
Kuester & Lawrence E. Thompson, Risks Associated with Restricting Business Method and E-
Commerce Patents, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 657 (2001).
427. In particular, WIPO is the organization that coordinates filings under the Patent
Convention Treaty.
428. See, e.g., WIPO, ANNUAL REPORT 2003 26 (2003), available at http://www.wipo.int/
freepublications/en/general/441/wipopub_441_2003.pdf (noting that nearly 90 percent
of WIPO's total income in 2003 came from filing fees for, and fees associated with, its arbi-
tration services).
429. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, art. 3(i),
Jul. 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
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and product could be jointly funded by a diverse group of stake-
holders. For example, religious groups that fundamentally oppose
patents on living matter may have an interest in funding the proc-
ess, as might advocates of biotechnology patents who want to
ensure fair representation of their interests. If a wide spectrum of
stakeholders contributed, the financial burden would be mini-
mized for each party, while bias would be kept at a relative
minimum because of competing interests.
In addition, actual implementation of the system would necessi-
tate considering limits on the system to stem potential misuse, or
even abuse. 40 Typical penalties for procedural abuses could be im-
posed, including charging fees for frivolous postings.431 Other
techniques might include a word limit for each posting, or a re-
quirement that each comment include contact information and
organizational affiliation, such that there is increased accountabil-
ity. The word limit could stem some manifestos against
technologies while the organizational affiliation information could
provide a means to limit over-use by specific organizations that
contest all patents of a certain class. Perhaps there could also be a
limit to one opposition per organization, per patent, to prevent
each member of an organization from filing a separate commen-
tary.
CONCLUSION
Biopiracy has been, and remains, a major concern to developing
countries. The looming question is how to adequately address
these concerns while giving proper credence to the claims of pat-
ent proponents, that Western patent rights must be respected to
promote innovation that ultimately benefits all societies. As this
Article shows, biopiracy is a multi-faceted problem involving not
only countries with polar interests, but intra-country conflict as
well. However, biopiracy remains of sufficient interest to develop-
ing countries such that they have continued to raise this issue in
the international arena despite rejections by Western countries in
multiple forums. Notably, developing countries are raising biopi-
430. A recent example outside of the patent setting lies in the attempt by the Los Ange-
les Times to introduce an interactive editorial page. The site only existed for a matter of
days before it had to be removed because of posting of obscene pictures. See, e.g., Katharine
Q. Seelye, Hands on Readers: Why Newspapers are Betting on Audience Participation, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4, 2005, at C1, C4.
431. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
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racy claims with increasing frequency that at least approaches, if
not exceeds their interest in challenging patent rights that impinge
on public health, which would seem a more immediate problem.
In addition, although some have suggested that the claims from
developing countries for increased benefit-sharing are not worth
pursuing because many inputs fail to result in actual commercial
success, the fundamental allegations of biopiracy raise serious is-
sues of broader concern to Western patent law and policy. In
particular, once the rhetoric of biopiracy is stripped away, there is
an important challenge at the heart of these claims that should
have resonance for all societies-namely, what the appropriate bal-
ance is between promoting innovation versus other public policy
goals. Developing countries and indigenous groups may prioritize
the protection and preservation of cultural heritage as the most
important public policy goal that competes with patent rights.
However, Western countries also have competing public policy
goals that include access to medicine and adequate access to tech-
nology to enable cumulative research and innovation. Ironically,
the TRIPS-plus agreements that Western countries are increasingly
pursuing may not serve the interests of any countries because of
increased restraints on the ability of countries to prioritize how to
balance domestic policy concerns against patent rights.
Biopiracy may not be a simple problem to solve, but perhaps
that is because the solution requires discussion of more issues than
are typically considered. Rather than highlight the anomaly in use
of traditional knowledge for patented inventions, highlighting the
similarity of this problem to existing issues in Western patent law
and policy may be more readily accepted and may potentially lead
to important reconsiderations of how to better effectuate patent
policy for all. In particular, although Western countries repeat the
mantra that patents are important to promote innovation, ques-
tioning whether patent law actually does so is important to
ensuring that patent law is serving its goal. Although developing
countries may not embrace the same instrumental purpose of
patent law, it may nonetheless be in their interest for Western pat-
ent law to be evaluated to the extent they share similar problems
with contemporary Western challenges.
Tackling biopiracy together with Western patent policy concerns
is a tall order. However, this Article provides not only templates to
developing countries and their advocates that should lead to more
productive discussions, but also a method for addressing broader
issues of socio-cultural conflict with patent law. There is definite
unanimity that patent law needs to address socio-cultural issues
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and the increasing globalization of society. Actual international
patent agreements have only heightened the importance of this
issue. The proposal offered in this Article provides an important
avenue for beginning to address such problems in a manner that
will not raise the ire of patent owners concerned about changes
that would impact their interests and investments. In addition, it
enables discussion to extend beyond those who are more finan-
cially capable and hopefully will help inform all sectors of society
in evaluating the continual balance of patent rights with compet-
ing socio-cultural policy.
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 542 2005-2006
